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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The business community has found itself in the predicament of first understanding and 
then knowing how to deal with the risk and disruptions to which it is exposed. Risk 
management is a well informed field in other disciplines. Supply chain risk management 
however, still needs to be understood and adequately practised, but seemingly, of even 
more urgency is disruption risk management, which as a new hot topic, is still evolving in 
both the academic and the practical fields. To compound the problem is the fact that not 
all practitioners believe that this risk actually exists and that they need to plan for it. If 
they believe that it exists, they still are unsure as to how to prepare for it and many still 
need to be convinced that money needs to be put aside to plan for and to mitigate against 
disruptive events. Disruptive events such as acts of nature, accidents, terrorist and non­
terrorist activities can cause a breakdown in the supply chain and thus very quickly 
cripple the supply chain, possibly causing disruptions to the transportation, 
communication and information technology systems. This is indeed a critical situation 
given the fact that many companies have chosen efficiency over effectiveness by 
employing such strategies of JIT, outsourcing and single sourcing strategies (Norrman, 
Jansson, 2004; CLSCM 2003, Christopher 2005, Tang 2006). In effect what they have 
done is exposed their supply chains making them very vulnerable to disruptive events.
This report then, seeks to answer what makes a resilient supply chain. To this end the 
author has used the systematic review process in an attempt to use evidence-based 
methods of scientific research (Tranfield et al., 2003) to identify, select and critically 
appraise relevant research. The process is so designed that the information, once 
discovered and developed can then be discussed and synthesized. The broad fields of 
literature will include Supply Chain Risk, Vulnerability, Resilience, Risk Management 
and Disruption Risk Management.
Findings thus far indicate that resilient supply chains have seemed to evolve from 
business continuity planning and supply chain risk management. Additionally, they are 
hinged on creating a flexible and agile supply chain, having enhanced communication 
within the network and establishing the right company culture. Firstly, the report seeks to 
situate the research in the current body of knowledge. It then describes in detail the 
methodology employed for the research and analysis of the information. The descriptive 
and thematic findings are presented, followed by their synthesis, discussion and 
conclusion. One of the main purposes and benefits of the systematic review is that it sets 
the stage to allow an issue to evolve, which can then be used to frame a PhD question. 
To this end, the conclusion includes PhD questions that the author has found of interest 
and considers as good, sound and feasible for further research and analysis.
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DEFINITIONS
Agility means using market knowledge and a virtual corporation to exploit opportunities 
in a volatile market place. (Naylor et al 1999)
Business continuity is the development of strategies, plans and actions which provide 
protection or alternative modes of operation for those activities or business processes 
which, if they were to be interrupted, might otherwise bring about a seriously damaging 
or potentially fatal loss to the enterprise. BCP includes crisis management, disaster 
recovery, business recovery and contingency planning (Norrman & Jansson 2004)
Business Continuity Management is described as a holistic management process that 
identifies potential impacts that threaten an organisation and provides a framework for 
building resilience and the capability for an effective response that safeguards the 
interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value creating activities (Foster & 
Dye 2005).
Contingency tactics are those in which a firm takes an action only in the event a 
disruption occurs (Tomlin 2006)
The de-coupling point is the point at which the market ‘pull’ meets the upstream ‘push’ 
(Christopher & Towill 2000)
Demand Management is the ability to shift customer demand to alternative products, 
particularly in the face of a disruption to the supply chain (Tomlin 2006)
Enterprise Resilience is the ability and capacity to withstand systemic discontinuities and 
adapt to network environments (Starr et al 2003)
Globalisation is the process by which many companies have become interconnected for 
business purposes. This may have been through the consolidation of the supplier base, 
through mergers and acquisitions or through the move to increased offshore sourcing, 
manufacturing and assembly. Though the motivation of out sourcing has been to 
decrease cost there is the increased risk associated with having longer pipelines and 
increased lead times. (Christopher 2005).
Just in time (JIT) is an integrated, problem solving approach aimed at improving quality 
and facilitating timeliness in supply, production, and distribution, the purpose being the 
improvement of coordination between the manufacturer and its supply chain distribution 
network. The ultimate goal of JIT is to improve competitiveness and financial 
performance (Claycomb e ta l 1999).
Leanness means developing a value stream to eliminate all waste, including time, and to 
enable a level schedule (Naylor et al 1999)
The focus of lean manufacture is the elimination of waste or muda (Agarwal et al 2006). 
Lean concepts work well where the demand is relatively stable and hence predictable and 
where variety is low (Agarwal et al 2006). It operates as a pull system where the demand 
originates from the end customer and is fed through the entire system (Claycomb et al 
1999). When demand is high and the customer requirement for variety is high a much 
higher level of agility is required (Agarwal et al 2006)
Mitigation tactics are those in which the firm takes some action in advance of a disruption 
and thus incurs the cost of the action regardless of whether or not the disruption occurs 
(Tomlin 2006)
Operational contingency -  Demand Management Shifting the customer demand from one 
product to another in the face of a disruption is demand management (adapted from 
Tomlin 2006)
Operational contingency -  Rerouting - This is the ability to reroute production to 
alternative locations or suppliers, or change the method of transport -  example air to 
ground transport, or rerouting transport or shipment to another location, airport or port in 
the event of a disaster (adapted from Tomlin 2006)
Operational mitigation - Inventory - The action of investing in extra stock as a buffer or 
form of protection in the event of experiencing a disruption (adapted from Tomlin 2006)
Operational mitigation - Sourcing - This can include having a multiple supplier or 
multiple location strategy in the event of a disruption (adapted from Tomlin 2006)
Outsourcing can be defined as the transfer of previously in-house activities to a third 
party (Lonsdale 1999). The outsourcing of the distribution, manufacturing, accounting 
and information systems have increased the inter-connectedness of organisations, but it 
has also increased the risk of not having the control on cost (Christopher 2004, 2005).
Reliability was defined as the probability that a system or component performs its 
specified function as intended with a given time horizon and environment (Bundschuh et 
al 2003)
Resilience -  A notion borrowed from the material sciences, represents the ability of a 
material to recover its original shape following deformation. For companies, it measures 
their ability to, and the speed at which they can, return to their normal performance level 
(production, services, fill rates, etc) after a disruption (Sheffi 2005c, 2006),
Risk is used in the sense that something -  a product, process, organisation etc -  is ‘at 
risk’, i.e. ‘vulnerable; likely to be lost or damaged’ (Peck 2005).
Robustness deals with the impact of failures on the performance of a system (Bundschuh 
et al 2003)
Uncertainty exists when there is no understanding of even the distribution of potential 
outcomes (Wei-Jiat & Enderwick 2006)
The supply chain is defined as the network of organisations that are involved, through 
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce 
value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate consumer (Peck 
2005).
Supply chain risk can be defined as ‘any risks for the information, material and product 
flows from original supplier to the delivery of the final product for the end user’. This is 
the possibility and effect of a mismatch between supply and demand (Juttner et al 2003)
Volume flexibility is the supplier’s ability to temporarily adjust capacity (Tomlin 2006)
Supply Chain vulnerability is defined as an exposure to serious disturbance, arising from 
risks within the supply chain as well as risks external to the supply chain (Christopher 
and Peck 2003).
x
CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
The turbulent business environment can be considered the cause of supply chain risk, not 
only is demand volatile; but also, the increasing global network and shorter clock speeds 
have made supply chains much more vulnerable (Christopher and Peck 2003) 
Notwithstanding, supply chains are now required to respond even faster to changes in the 
competitive environment. Disruptions can take many forms, for example, natural 
disasters such as the Taiwan earthquake in September 1999, which affected the global 
semi-conductor industry (Kleindorfer, Saad 2005); accidents, such as the fire at the 
Phillips plant (Sheffi 2005a, c); terrorist activities, e.g., the attack of the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001; new product and process technologies (McDermott & 
Hanfield 2000); regulatory and legal changes (Marwick 1996) and technical and 
operational problems from equipment malfunctioning (Kleindorfer, Saad 2005).
Companies now need to be able to respond to these challenges at a moment’s notice, 
being able to provide the same level of service to customers as soon as possible, 
especially in very competitive environments where companies can quite easily lose their 
advantage if they are unable to satisfy their customers’ requirements (Sheffi 2005c). A 
company that fails to adjust to its changing environment soon loses its relevance, its 
customers, and ultimately, the support of its stakeholders (Hamel & Valikangas 2003). 
Strategies such as rationalising the supplier base or moving to single source suppliers, 
outsourcing and the adoption of ‘lean’ practices through inventory and capacity reduction 
have increased the supply chain risk (Waters-Fuller 1995, Christopher 2005, Sheffi 
2005a, Sheffi 2005c). So ironically, the focus on efficiency and cost reduction has made 
chains more vulnerable (Waters-Fuller 1995m, Christopher 2005, Sheffi 2005a, Sheffi 
2005c).
The topic of supply chain risk, vulnerability and resilience has risen out of the need for 
organisations to pay more attention, not to the regular moderate risk that may come 
around due to daily operations such as employee absenteeism, poor quality and machine 
breakdowns, but it has risen out of the need to plan for low probability/ high impact risk 
events. The fact is that though a company may not be under the threat of every possible 
type of disaster or disruption, some member of its supply network may be under some 
threat, which can then have an adverse effect on the focal company. This becomes even 
more critical for companies with far reaching global networks. Thus companies now 
need to increase their understanding of their supply chains and possible risks they may be 
exposed to.
The challenge then is to manage and mitigate risk though creating more resilient supply 
chains. For companies, resilience is a measure of their ability to, and the speed at which 
they can return to their normal performance level (production, services, fill rates, etc) 
after a disruption. However, Sheffi has said that, resilient companies are not only able to 
endure the unpredictable nature of globalisation, but are also able to gain competitive
1
advantage from it (Sheffi 2005). Not only do they need to be able to respond to changes, 
but they need to be able to gain competitive advantage from these disruptions (Sheffi
2005).
The aim of this report then is to survey the literature to draw out the components and 
techniques that have been described to create a resilient supply chain. To this end, this 
report engages in a discussion which takes the following format.
Chapter two focusses on situating the research where it discusses the basic tenets of 
supply chain management (SCM) and risk. It then discusses how supply chains are made 
vulnerable, which is then followed with a discussion on the antecedents of supply chain 
risk and business continuity such as disaster management and crisis management. Along 
with the discussion on supply chain risk management, this chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the research rationale and a presentation of the research question along with 
its supporting questions.
Chapter three, the methodological chapter, discusses the benefits of the systematic review 
process over the traditional literature review process and presents the methodology used 
in carrying out this research.
The synthesis of the primary research papers takes place in chapters four, five and six. 
Chapter four provides the descriptive analysis of the field which includes the age profile 
of the articles, the areas of contribution, the major contributing authors and journals to the 
field and other such information. This chapter justifies some of the conclusions 
(Tranfield et al 2003) made in the review. Chapter five reports the thematic analysis of 
the findings, derived from an aggregative approach, outlining what is known and 
established from core contributions (Tranfield et al 2003). Chapter six, the Synthesis and 
Discussion chapter, presents models which synthesise the findings of the previous two 
chapters.
Chapter 7 provides the learning experience of the author which seeks to describe the 
challenges faced and the learnings obtained through this process. Some limitations of 
process have also been discussed.
The body of the report ends with chapter 8, the conclusion, which summarizes the 
findings and limitations of the research and the potential research questions that have 
evolved out of this review piece and the author is interested in pursuing at the PhD stage.
Figure 1 presents and overview of the various areas that are presented in the report.
2
o  
, E.iil ®
U
S '
- M
W
u >
03.
h i
o
a ;
V
« t- l
o
«
s -
r O ~ 'fl
c c
co
w
col o
rt» D>> | OJ•Cl «JQ O
a :
itm
_ i  .El•Cl cl 
CD C i
Ej « |d); Q_
c t ;
CO **■
o
■Cj o; 3 
o !  O !  CD
O
CO a :
OL
sz
0 1 03
a)
co
CD
OH
0
xz4-f
CD
C
CO
s
CO
CLl
D )|
COl 
CL •
51
© i  
■ > !  
CD | Cdi
> .
O I
CD
CO
CO
SZ
0
CO
©
CO
co
col
CD|
oD) © 
ro 
, O
_. «<1 D)' O
^  SI ^CD I CD CD 
iC I  O  CO
I CO 1 '(0
I
1 2  
I <
0  
I >
I I
J’i '
I  * -' 4-> r
. CO
/ ,  1 
k .O ;
! T  Q r
CD
1 VL
L -r s
\
0
h
S
D D
UJ
El 
col 
CD I 
CO | 
CD I 
DC ! 
CD
c  ■ 
o  
"co coD : 
O  : 
CO ;
h  !
08
<n
‘co
0
S Z  :4 ^  ;
C  1 
5 s  
C/3
<d
0
cX I ; <dCO
©I CO
JC ; 0
3  i a:
>
c |  Ei
CD i CD;
E l  « !
^  c/T c d  co 
CO*C i  «
« £  o
on
c d ;
CD
ro l
W !
CO ~
« l  Q  
ol
D )
CD!
o
- 9 >
"x!
© I  
Li_ I
.•??! c
i !  S
c l  <“  o ra 
O !  2
c d ; co! >%
o !  .©3 ; .id — 
S i  it1 ; •—
El D), —
m
si*' 
’5 )  ' 5 ) 1
<1 S! OL
CO
O !
© j
CO|
* o |
0 8
■5>
-  o
% 0  
COi
|R
ep
or
t 
St
ru
ct
ur
e.
m
m
ap
 
- 9
/8
/2
00
6 
-
CHAPTER 2
2. SITUATING THE RESEARCH
2.1 Introduction
This section seeks to locate the research in its broader perspective. It briefly and broadly 
discusses the field of supply chain management, risk management, disaster preparedness 
and crisis management vulnerability and disruptions. Thus, the research is situated in the 
key fields as illustrated in the following Venn diagram (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Venn diagram of the fields influencing the research topic
Supply Chain 
Management
Risk and 
Vulnerability
Source: The Author 2006
* Referred to business continuity to represent the wider perspective of disaster management, 
crisis management and contingency planning
The research question is also presented at the end of this chapter. The aim is to not only 
scope the field, but to provide the background against which supply chain resilience has 
and will continue to develop and evolve.
2.2 Supply Chain and Supply Chain Management
There are varying perspectives on what is Supply Chain Management (SCM). SCM first 
appeared in the 1980s when writers used it to describe an amalgamation and re-labelling
Business
Continuity
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of established business activities, i.e., logistics (transport, warehousing and distribution) 
and manufacturing based operations management (purchasing, order and inventory 
management, production planning and control). This encompassed the concepts of 
information sharing, and system integration. Since then SCM progressively developed to 
include marketing, new product development, order management and payment, (Peck
2006). Business trends of the 1990s created the need for SCM and advances in 
information technology created the opportunity (Kopczak & Johnson 2003). Shorter 
product life-cycles and greater product variety increased supply chain cost and 
complexity. Outsourcing, globalisation and business fragmentation made it imperative 
that this increased supply chain cost be addressed through the entire supply chain rather 
than from the individual company. Advances in IT allowed for real-time information 
sharing, coordination and decision making among companies. Kopczak & Johnson 
(2003)
Christopher (1998) used the value-based approach and defined the supply chain as the 
network of organisations that are linked through upstream and downstream relationships 
in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form of products and 
services in the hands of the ultimate customer (Peck 2006). There is also the value- 
adding1 process perspective as well as the inter-organisational network perspective2. For 
Handfield & Nicholas (2002), supply chains are essentially a series of linked suppliers 
and customers; where every customer is, in turn, a supplier to the next down stream 
organisation until a finished product reaches the end-user. It is evident then that there 
exist many definitions of supply chain. It has been put forward by Haywood (2002), that 
the absence of a common understanding of the term does represent a significant barrier to 
defining supply chain vulnerabilities and the implementation of the appropriate risk 
mitigation strategies (Peck 2006).
According to the Oxford concise dictionary, a network is a group or system of 
interconnected people or things. Thus, companies that are connected in a network can 
affect each other and, hence the reason for using this definition of the supply chain as the 
risk experienced by one company, can ripple through the network and be a source of 
disruption to another company. For the purposes of this discussion we will use the 
approach taken by Christopher.
With respect to Supply Chain Management (SCM), Kopczak & Johnson (2003) have 
taken the view that Supply Chain Management (SCM) has been considered to address the 
fundamental business problem of supplying product to meet demand in a complex and 
uncertain world from the point of view of the entire supply chain. Ellram and Cooper 
(1993) consider that SCM is an integrating philosophy to manage the total flow of a 
distribution channel from supplier to ultimate customer, while Monczka and Morgan 
(1997) have put forward that integrated supply chain management is about going from the 
external customer and then managing all the processes that are needed to provide the
1 In the value-adding perspective they may multiple value streams each representing a product or product 
family (Peck 2006)
2 In the inter-organisational perspective supply chains become scalable aggregations of three or more 
cooperating organisations (Peck 2006)
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customer with value in a horizontal way. Stock and Lambert (2001) says that it has 
become ‘the integration of key business processes, from end user through original 
suppliers that provides products, services and information that add value for customers. 
Christopher (1998) assumes the relational, value-added perspective which looks at the 
management of upstream and downstream relationships with suppliers and customers to 
deliver superior customer value at less cost to the supply chain as a whole. Zsidisin et al 
(2005) sees the integration of the integrated supply chain as the linkage of upstream 
suppliers and downstream customers with the firm.
Though clarity does not exist on one scope and definition for Supply Chain Management 
it is clear though, that the ultimate goals of SCM are Tower costs, increased customer 
value and satisfaction, and ultimately establishing a competitive advantage (Peck 2006). 
Though the integrated supply chain may lead to enhanced flexibility, reduced costs, 
improved quality, reduced lead-time and improve competitiveness (Zsidisin et al 2005), 
its integration has affected risk management (Zsidisin et al 2005), which leads to the next 
topic of discussion.
2.3 Risk and Vulnerability
2.3.1 Introduction
This section engages in the discussion of various types of risk, and provides a brief 
overview of the risk management process and supply chain risk. This section then 
concludes with a discussion of supply chain vulnerability.
2.3.2 A brief description of risk
Managing supply chains in today’s competitive world is increasingly challenging 
(Christopher, Lee 2004). There are varying types of supply chain risk, which will be 
briefly mentioned. Financial risk which is often quite significant can exist in the form of 
inventory costs due to obsolescence, markdowns and stock outs. ‘Chaos’ risk is brought 
on by uncertainty and complexity within the supply chain and can result in overreaction, 
unnecessary interventions, second guessing, mistrust and distorted information 
throughout a supply chain. Political Risk depends on government actions and the 
political climate of the countries at the time (Gattoma, Walters 1996). The supply chain 
is exposed to market risk which is missing the market opportunities that may exist. If the 
market signals cannot be recognised, then the supply chain will not be able to respond to 
changing market trends and customer preferences. Finally, problems and events in the 
Supply Chain make it difficult to make optimal decisions at each stage in the supply 
chain. This decision risk then becomes the inevitable consequence of making ineffective 
decisions. However, disruptive events such as the closure of US airspace in response to 
the terrorist attack on September 11th 2001, the longshoremen’s strike in California in 
2002 and the outbreak of Sars in 2003 have introduced yet another type of risk and hence 
vulnerability to be considered by managers. According to Hutchins (2006) the US faces 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats, more commonly called 
CBRNE threats, and so, CBRNE, border and transportation security, emergency
6
preparedness and response and infrastructures protection are hot areas for quality 
professionals.
Risk and uncertainty have no generally accepted definitions (Zsidisin et al 2004). 
Hutchins (2003) defines risk as the probability that an event or action may adversely 
affect the organisation. Zsidisin et al (2004) described risk as variability in outcomes or 
results. It is the product of two separate, but interrelated elements: uncertainty and 
impact. The two aspects of uncertainty that are relevant are lack of awareness of all the 
events that might occur and cause a supply disruption and the probability of occurrence 
of those events. Impact refers to the potential cost that comes about due to the disruptive 
event. Risk then, is viewed as the product of the impact and probability (Zsidisin et al
2004). This follows the generally held concept that risk is the probability that a given 
event will occur, by the severity (the negative business impact) of the risk once it occurs 
(Peck 2006). Common elements of most risk definitions include the ability or inability to 
meet contract, process and product requirements; the possibility of harm or loss if 
requirements are not achieved; the probability of an undesirable event with consequences 
and the variation away from a specification or requirement (Zsidisin et al 2004).
According to Juttner et al (2003) supply chain risk is anything that presents a risk to 
information, material and product flows from the original supplier to the delivery of the 
product to the end user. For the purposes of this report we will use risk in the sense that 
that something -  a product, process, organisation etc -  is ‘at risk’, i.e. ‘vulnerable; likely 
to be lost or damaged’ (Peck 2005).
According to Hallikas et al 2004. The typical risk management process consists of risk 
identification3, risk assessment4, decision and implementation of risk management 
actions5 and risk monitoring6.
3Risk Identification is the identification of risk and being conscious of the phenomena that cause 
uncertainty. Have to take into account the dependencies on other organizations, interruptions, quality 
failure and delivery fluctuations are signs of the risk management in the production system (Hallikas et al 
2004). This category was further categorized into two groups, the demand problems, which refer to 
problems in fulfilling customer deliveries and cost management and pricing and secondly weaknesses in 
resources, development and flexibility (Hallikas et al 2004).
4 Risk Assessment is the assessment and prioritization needed to choose the correct mitigation strategies 
according to the risk factors identified (Hallikas et al 2004). Risk assessment tends to be comprised of the 
two components of risk, the probability and the consequence o f risk. The companies experience and other 
companies’ performance are utilized at this stage and the potential consequences considered from the 
viewpoint of the organization. These can be ranked.
5 Decision and Implementation of risk management actions -  the generally used strategies for risk 
management include: risk transfer (from one company to another), risk taking for an investment, the key 
being that the company taking the risk is able to handle the impact o f it, risk elimination, risk reduction and 
further analysis of tasks. In network environment, the objectives of different networks may cause 
contradictions for am enterprise (Hallikas et al 2004)
6 Risk Monitoring -  as with any system, monitoring keeps a focus on trending to see if there is an increase 
or decrease in the types of risk being experienced. Also there may be new risk introduced to the 
organization or network and these will need to be identified (Hallikas et al 2004)
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Most types of risk assessments tend to try and determine the probability of the risk event 
happening and rate that against the impact (in financial terms) that the event would have 
if it were to actually happen. The risk can then be presented in risk diagram to gain a 
better understanding of the positioning of all the risk to each other with their potential for 
impact to the company. This too helps in the prioritization of the risk
2.3.3 Supply Chain Risk
According to Hauser (2003), ‘risk management in the supply chain does not equate to 
disaster response. Rather, it means keeping and increasingly complex process moving 
efficiently at the lowest total cost and without compromising the quality of the product or 
customer satisfaction. A 2004 survey of purchasing executives conducted by ‘Purchasing 
Magazine’ found that only half of all respondents reported monitoring supply chain risk 
often. The others monitored the risk ‘somewhat’ (17.4%), rarely (29.6%), or never 
(3.6%). Additionally, seemingly, supply chain risk management was covered from the 
supplier to the company, but not from the company to the customers (Atkinson 2006). 
However, according to Economist Intelligence Unit, boards are taking risk more 
seriously, even though this may be largely due to the governance and regulatory factors 
rather than their recognition that the overall business strategy would benefit from fully 
integrating risk management into the board level decision making.
Supply chain risk management requires a close working relationship between risk 
managers and others in the organisation (Atkinson 2006). Risk management provides the 
traditional expertise and information while other functions such as purchasing, sales, 
logistics and transportation can bring additional expertise and information on supply 
chain dynamics to the table.
Supply chain risk can arise from many sources, and sometimes without warning. These 
disruptions can be external such as natural disasters as well as internal to the organisation 
from the failure to integrate the functions of the supply chain (Hauser 2003). With regard 
to IS areas of risk, Finch (2004) considered the company to be divided into three levels, 
the application level, the organisational level and the inter-organisational level where risk 
included natural disasters, accidents and deliberate acts, as well as risk from information 
security, management issues such as skill acquisition and retention, competition and 
competitor’s action, legal issues such as violation of rights and intellectual property, 
strategic and sustainability risk and risk from strategic alliances and new product 
development (McDermott & Handfield 2000).
Effective supply risk required the identification and monetization of risk events, 
probability of occurrence and the firm contingencies for alternative sources of supply 
(Barry 2004). Hauser presented the Risk adjusted SCM framework to provide the 
business case for evaluating risk where, as Barry, the first components of the framework 
consisted of identifying the process risk and then identifying which of these were actual 
supply chain vulnerabilities. As Hauser indicated, the operational business processes 
identifies the supply risks, but not all the risks are classified as vulnerabilities. Hauser 
then defined vulnerability as a risk, which upon the occurrence of an adverse event can
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cause a significant disruption or interruption to the supply chain. The distinction between a 
risk and vulnerabilities is determined by the financial impact if the adverse event were to 
occur (Hauser 2003).
2.3.4 Supply Chain Risk Categorisation
Supply chain risk can also be categorised based on a framework proposed by Mason-Jones & 
Towill, (Christopher and Peck 2003) and which has similarly been suggested by Geary et al 
(2002) where risk is categorised into three types of risk that can be sub-divided to produce a 
total of five categories:
• Internal to the firm
a. Process risk which can come about through the sequences of value-adding 
and managerial activities undertaken by the firm
b. Control risk which comes about through the assumptions, rules, systems and 
procedures that govern how an organisation exerts control over the processes
• External to the firm but internal to the supply network -  through which materials, 
products and information flow
a. Demand risk is the potential or actual disturbance to the flow of product, 
information and cash emanating from within the network, between the focal 
firm and the market
b. Supply risk is the potential or actual disturbance to the flow of product or 
information emanating from within the network, upstream of the focal firm
• External to the network
a. Environmental risk relates to the disruptions that are external to the network 
of the organisation through which the value-streams/product supply chains 
flow.
Figure 3 summarizes the linkages between these risk categories
__________ Figure 3: Supply Chain Risk Categorisations
Supply Process Demand
Risk 4 iL ► Risk 4 i Risk
Control
Risk
Environmental Risk
Source: Christopher & Peck 2004
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2.3.5 The drivers of supply chain risk
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) have identified risk categories and drivers that can make an 
organisation very vulnerable. These are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Supply Chain Risk and r?heir Drivers
Category of Risk Description Drivers of Risk
Disruptions These are unpredictable and rare and can be quite 
damaging.
• Natural disasters
• Labour dispute
• Supplier bankruptcy
• War on terrorism
• Dependency on a single source of supply as 
well as the capacity and responsiveness of 
alternative suppliers
Delays Delays in material flow occur when supplier cannot 
respond t the changes in demand. This may be due to 
high utilization or another cause
• High capacity utilisation at the supply 
source
• Inflexibility of supply source
• Poor quality or yield at supply source
• Excessive handling due to border crossings 
to the change in transportation modes
Systems These can be attributed to a breakdown in the 
communication systems and information 
infrastructure. This is especially crucial as many 
companies have networked their information systems
• Information infrastructure breakdown
• System integration or extensive systems 
networking
• e-commerce
Forecast Forecast risks results from a mismatch between the 
company’s projection and the actual demand. 
Forecast inaccuracies can also result in information 
distortion within the supply chain. This then leads to 
the bullwhip effect as information distortion increase 
the further away from the end customer
• Inaccurate forecasts due to long lead times, 
seasonality, product variety, short life 
cycles, small customer base
• ‘Bullwhip effect’ or information distortion 
due to sales promotions, incentives, lack of 
supply chain visibility and exaggeration of 
demand in times of product shortage
Intellectual
Property
As companies become more global and as they 
outsource to the same manufacturers used by 
competitors intellectual property risk has become an 
issue
• Vertical integration of supply chain
• Global sourcing and markets
Procurement This is the unanticipated increased in acquisition 
costs resulting from fluctuating exchange rate and 
supplier price hikes
• Exchange rate risk
• Percentage of key components or raw 
material procured from a single source
• Industry wide capacity utilization
• Log term versus short term contracts
Receivables The possibility of being unable to collect on 
receivables, can torpedo the performance of any 
company
• Number of customers
• Financial strength of customers
Inventory Inventory Risk is the risk associated with having 
excess inventory which can negatively affect any 
company’s financial performance
• Rate of product obsolescence
• Inventory holding cost
• Product value
• Demand and supply uncertainty
Capacity Capacity can only be increased or decreased over a 
period of time. Thus, building excess capacity 
usually becomes a strategic choice. Thus, excess, 
underutilized capacity can adversely affect financial 
performance
• Cost of capacity
• Capacity flexibility
Source: Chopra & Sodhi 2004
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Managing risk can be difficult because often, mitigating one risk can exacerbate others (Chopra 
and Sodhi 2004), for example, lean supply and single sourcing strategies were intended to 
increase the efficiency of the firm, but in so doing can increase its vulnerability. How a company 
fares against disruptive events depends on the type of disruption and the organisation’s level of 
preparedness (Chopra and Sodhi 2004). Most companies develop plans to deal with recurrent low 
impact risk, but many companies ignore the impact of low probability, high impact risk (Chopra 
and Sodhi 2004). Table 2 gives examples of how these risks can be manifest in the supplier- 
related, internal, and customer related aspects of the supply chain.
Table 2: Supply Chain Risk Examples
Supplier-related Internal Customer-related
Disruptions • Supplier of a key part 
shuts down plant for 
month or at a key part 
of the production cycle
• Supplier capacity drops 
by 20% overnight
• Key plant shuts down 
unexpectedly for one month
• Capacity at a key plant drops 
by 20% overnight
• Demand goes up by 20% 
.... For all products
... for a key product 
....across the board
• Demand goes down by 
20%
Delays • Purchase orders of key 
parts or raw material 
delayed by month
• Distribution of production 
orders delayed by a month
• Customer orders delayed 
by a month
Systems • Supplier’s order-entiy 
system goes down for a 
week
• Key customer’s procurement 
systems inside your company 
goes down for a week
• Company’s inventory/ accounts 
system goes down for a week
• Order entry system' not 
working for a week
• Key customer’s 
procurement system inside 
your company down for a 
week
• Credit card information 
stolen from hacked e- 
commerce system
Information
Processing
• Supplier rations 
supplies by 20%
• Supplier increases 
minimum order size by 
20% then 100%
• To take advantage of volume 
discounts, company begins to 
order in quantities twice as 
large as usual, but half as 
frequently, which impacts 
supplier’s ability to forecast
• Key customer begins to 
order in batches that are 
twice as large as usual but 
less frequent
Intellectual
Property
• Key supplier redesigns 
parts and creates a new 
product
Procurement • Supplier delays in 
processing returns by 
twice as long
• Supplier forced to 
increase price of key 
components by 20%
• Transportation costs go 
up 20% overnight
• Unforeseen cash squeeze 
required month-long delays in 
paying key suppliers
Receivables • Key customer withholds 
payments one month 
longer than usual
• 20% of receivable 
payments delayed by one 
month
Source: Chopra and Sodhi 2004
The following sections provide some background information to the antecedents of 
Business Continuity and Disruption Risk Management which include Contingency 
Planning, Disaster Preparedness and Crisis Management.
2.3.6 Vulnerability
Supply Chain vulnerability is defined as an exposure to serious disturbance, arising from 
risks within the supply chain as well as risks external to the supply chain (Christopher 
and Peck 2003). Supply chain vulnerability is a relatively new and unexplored area of 
management research, though one that is in the ascendancy (Svensson 2002a, Peck, 
2005).
Most of the inventory and production management is done under the assumption that 
normal conditions will apply, not paying attention to events that may hinder the flow of 
materials and components. Additionally, particularly in global supply chains that are in 
highly competitive environments, the last two decades have experienced a growing 
emphasis on just-in-time, single supplier strategies and other lean manufacturing 
principles in their supply chains, which, while making the supply chains much more 
efficient and effective have, inadvertently, made them more vulnerable (Svensson 2000, 
Christopher 2005, Christopher and Peck 2003).
The causes of this vulnerability can be attributed to the widespread adoption of lean 
inventory practices (Mello 2001; Norrman, Jansson, 2004; Christopher 2005), the 
globalisation of supply chains (Norrman, Jansson, 2004; Christopher 2005, Drickhamer
2005), focussed factories (Norrman, Jansson, 2004; Christopher 2005), centralised 
manufacturing (Lee 2004), centralised distribution (Lee, 2004, Christopher 2005), 
reduction of supplier base (Norrman, Jansson, 2004; CLSCM 2003, Christopher 2005, 
Tang 2006), shorter product life cycles (Norrman, Jansson, 2004), more intertwined and 
integrated processes between companies (Norrman, Jansson, 2004). These initiatives 
have created longer and more complex global supply chains (Tang 2006).
Vulnerability is also increased as companies are unaware of which goods and materials 
are in their supply chain and where they are (Mello, 2001). Lean manufacture, especially 
for Japanese companies, allowed them to produce high quality products with just-in-time 
flow from suppliers to assemblers. This was also a cost-effective and efficient means of 
managing their inventory as they minimised the inventory of parts stored on their plant by 
synchronising their supply chain so that parts could be delivered just in time to be 
installed. However, in 1995 the Kobe earthquake highlighted the vulnerability of this 
model (Sheffi 2005a). Lead times are longer and inventory levels higher in international 
supply chain compared with domestic examples (Levy 1997).
Large scale disruptions showed the dependencies on the infrastructure such as phone 
lines, power lines, water lines, gas lines, rail lines, highways, and ports that connect 
companies to critical services, suppliers and customers. In the case of the Kobe 
earthquake the Osaka plant was not damaged during the quake, but there was the loss of 
gas and water supply to the plant and thus they were unable to continue production.
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Unfortunately, the Osaka plant was the sole supplier of brake shoes used by Toyota. 
Consequently, this halted the production in a number of Toyota’s factories as they soon 
ran out of parts and the Osaka plant was their sole supplier (Sheffi 2005a).
In the UK, the need to focus on supply chain vulnerability was amplified with the fuel 
protest in 2000 and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001 (Peck 2005). The 
topic of vulnerability and resilience is now finding itself as a major concern in supply 
chain management. Additionally, according to Peck (2006), supply chain vulnerability is 
benefiting from a more general upsurge in interest in risk management in several other 
overlapping areas of commercial concern and public policy. Other areas of growth 
include Corporate Governance, Business Continuity Management, Emergency Planning 
and National Security.
2.3.7 Summary
This section took a look at the wider risk perspective before narrowing the focus to 
supply chain risk, risk categorisations and drivers of supply chain risk. It then concluded 
with a discussion on the causes and effects of supply chain vulnerability. The following 
section will discuss some of the evolutionary concepts and actions of the antecedents of 
business continuity and resilience as they sort to ‘battle’ or mitigate against these risks as 
described.
2.4 Antecedents to Resilience
2.4.1 Introduction
While in the previous section of this chapter the focus was on Supply Chain 
Management, Risk Management, Supply Chain Risk Management and Vulnerability, the 
aim of this section is to give a brief description of the antecedents of business continuity 
and resilience. This is important as some of the strategies used to create a resilient 
supply chain come out of the discipline of business continuity (which will be further 
described later in the report) and thus it is considered fitting to get a sense of what led 
into the development of this area called business continuity.
2.4.2 Contingency Planning
Berman (1996) defined contingency planning as that which ‘specifies a series of events 
that are designed to take full advantage of a business opportunity or to reduce the impact 
of an event that generally will be disastrous to the firm (Svensson 2002), or according to 
Goldberg et al (1999), it involves the proactive preparation of alternative work processes 
in the event of possible system or process failures.
For many decades in the post-war era contingency planning considered that threats would 
be from ‘external’ aggressors and not from critical failures in infrastructure. On a
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national level in the public sector, contingency planning was dominated by the Cold War 
mentality and the view that preparations for conventional and nuclear war could ‘double 
up’ as preparations for chemical spills, urban riots and the like (McConnell & Drennan
2006). In the mid-1980s, high profile disasters caused many leaders to think as it 
provided a warning that critical failures can resonate in the industry and across nations. 
Many crises in one country can rapidly spill over to others in a ‘World Risk Society’ via 
interconnections through air travel, electronic communication and transportation of goods 
(McConnell & Drennan 2006).
The coming of the Year 2000 caused a further shift in thinking as it was thought that 
there would be a higher likelihood of information system failures across the globe 
affecting all IT and electronic systems, as well as the possibility of electricity outages, 
telecommunication failures, transportation failures, failures of building environmental 
and security systems, electrical equipment failure including manufacturing and safety 
equipment and general disruptions in the supply of goods and services (Goldberg et al 
1999). Thus, the traditional model of information systems contingency planning based 
on off-site data storage and computer hot sites were inapplicable. Contingency planning 
included making plans for potential systems failures as well as disruptions to utilities, in 
communication and with business partners (Goldberg et al 1999). Preparation included 
the assessment, planning, execution and recovery stages as well as scenario planning for 
the best and the worst circumstances.
The September 11th attack on the World Trade Center caused another shift in thinking 
that the ‘unthinkable’ can happen and needs to be anticipated and prepared for 
(McConnell & Drennan 2006). Incidents that have since added to this include the 
destruction of New Orleans on 2005 by Hurricane Katrina, the longshoreman’s port strike 
(Sheffi 2005, Peck 2005), the fire at the Phillips factory and the London terror attacks on 
July 7th 2005.
Thus, according to Ferris (2002), plans need to encompass the diversification of 
operations, preparing for an extended disruption (probably lasting not less than four 
weeks), training and awareness for emergency preparedness, communication, and a focus 
on end results. However, critical to the contingency plan, is preparing for the people 
issues (King 1993) which, for Morgan Stanley, included expanding capabilities for 
working at home, advanced planning with employee counsellors, striving to get people 
back to work earlier, enhanced communication, strategies for temporary housing, 
transportation, communication and other services such as grief counselling (Ferris 2002). 
These helped them recover from the effects of the attack on the World Trade Center 
much faster than other companies.
Contingency planning has thus become a much more relevant issue. According to 
McConnell & Drennan (2006), a crisis can be characterised by three sets of conditions: 
those that are severe and largely unexpected threats, of high uncertainty and the need for 
urgency in the decision making. Thus came the need to develop contingency planning to 
encompass not only preparations for ‘simple’ or traditional risks, but for the unexpected,
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unthinkable risks, which have now caused firms to pay more attention to supply chain 
security and disaster management.
2.4.3 Disaster Preparedness
As firms continue to pay more attention to supply chain security and the development of 
comprehensive disaster management processes, little help can be found in the logistics 
and supply chain management literature (Hale, Moberg 2005). According to Hale, 
Moberg (2005) a review of four top journals (Journal of Business Logistics, International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, International Journal of 
Logistics Management and Supply Chain Management Review), in logistics and supply 
chain management since 2001 resulted in few academic articles on disaster planning with 
supply chains. Instead, logistics and supply chain managers must rely on information 
from the disaster management and emergency preparedness literature (Pelland 1997).
Much of the research on the disaster management field is targeted at public servants, 
government agencies and insurance firms which had the responsibility or responding in a 
crisis. The focus had traditionally been on hurricanes, earthquakes, flooding and fires. 
According to Hale, Moberg (2005), the models and guidelines in these fields can be 
applied to disaster management planning by firms within supply chains that have 
awakened to recent world events and are now confronted with new government 
regulations. One study by Richardson (1994) suggested that carriers needed to develop 
redundancy in their information, telecommunication and energy systems as part of their 
contingency plans for unplanned disasters.
After the September 11th terrorism attacks, the Council of Logistics Management 
sponsored research on securing the supply chains during a crisis and the 
recommendations made to logistics managers about implementing disaster management 
programmes included the FEMA Emergency Management Guide for Business and 
Industry which involved the three stages of planning, response and recovery. However, 
the model used by Hale and Moberg (Table 3) includes the mitigation and detection 
stages which were added by Helferich and Cook to provide a better fit for today’s very 
complex environment. Mitigation is necessary to lessen the impact of disasters on supply 
chain continuity and the length of disruptions, while detection is there in the hope that 
disasters may be identified in a timelier manner (Hale, Moberg 2005).
According to De Tura et al (2004), the disaster recovery process is a continuous loop of 
planning, execution and feedback to refine and optimise the plan through each cycle. 
Without these elements the disaster recovery plan becomes either ineffective or quickly 
outdated. Thus, disaster Planning consists of activities, programs and systems developed 
prior to a catastrophic event that are used to support and enhance mitigation, response and 
continuity in the face of potential business disruptions (De Tura et al 2004).
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Table 3: Disaster Management Process Overview
Planning Mitigation Detection Response Recovery
1. Establish a 1. Define 1. Develop 1. Implement 1. Review and
planning team mitigation
opportunities
detection plan response plan implement 
recovery plans
2. Analyse 2. Develop 2. Acknowledge 2. Evaluate 2. Ensure
capabilities and 
hazards
mitigation plan warnings direction & control continuity o f 
management
3. Develop the 3. Initiate 3. Evaluate and 3. Evaluate 3. Maintain
plan development act on observations communication employee support
4. Implement the 4. Continuous 4. Decide on need 4. Evaluate life 4. Resume
plan improvement
program
for further action
5. Continuous 
improvement
safety
5. Evaluate 
property protection
6. Evaluate public 
service
7. Evaluate 
community 
outreach
operations
Adapted from Hale & Moberg (2005)
Contingency planning and disaster preparedness form part of a crisis management 
strategy which will be discussed in the following section.
2.4.4 Crisis Management
Crisis management should be high on institutional and policy agenda as there is the need 
to give serious consideration to strong well-resourced and forward thinking contingency 
planning to gain control over a crisis when it happens (McConnell & Drennan 2006). As 
such, the key task for crisis managers and policy makers is to establish institutional 
procedures and create cultural climates which develop capacities to cope with whatever 
extraordinary threats come their way (McConnell & Drennan 2006).
There may be varying definitions of a crisis; crises will tend to be characterised by three 
sets of conditions: severe and largely unexpected threats, high uncertainty and the need 
for urgency in decision making (McConnell & Drennan 2006). There are no universal 
guides as to how organisations should prepare for a crisis. Rather, there are very broad 
definitions or guidelines which then need to be translated into ‘good practice’ 
(McConnell & Drennan 2006). Please refer to Appendix 1 for a sample of these 
guidelines developed by Perry and Lindell (2003) for pre-crisis planning. Boin and 
Lagadec (2000) (McConnell & Drennan 2006) have indicated however, that preparation 
is more than simply planning. It is about anticipation and developing strategies to ensure 
organisation resilience in the event that a crisis presents itself.
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The key imperatives identified include:
• Being on the agenda of decision-making elites, raising awareness through 
workshops, simulations etc
• Organisations should facilitate resilience through systems for detecting weak and 
non-conventional signals, being able to process relevant information to and from 
central authorities, having the capacity for alertness and mobilisation of crisis 
units, being capable of relating technical matters to strategic issues in order to 
handle new types of crises, and promoting the capability of actors to deal with 
decentralised crisis situations
• Organisations being engaged in continuous efforts for preparation. These included 
continuously learning from experience, running tests and simulations to prepare 
for destabilising surprises, providing appropriate training, promoting learning 
within and across networks, personally involving organisational leaders in 
preparation, careful and progressive scheduling of preparatory efforts to avoid 
‘big bang’ exhaustion, and ensuring that crisis management processes are 
embedded in core organisational processes
However, firms exhibit a varying approach to crisis management. The least prepared 
organisations tend to be dismissive of threats and have little or no contingency planning. 
Mid-range organisations give fair consideration to threats and the need to have plans to 
mitigate against them. However, their preparedness tends to be an ‘add on’ to what 
already exists. High preparedness organisations give high priority to threats and the need 
for contingency planning. Their crisis planning tends to be embedded in all aspects of 
organisation structures, practices, policies and culture (McConnell & Drennan 2006).
Many organisations have found it far from easy to get the financial support to implement 
crisis management strategies. Because crises are low probability events, contingency 
planning amounts to a demand for resource to cope with an event or events that may 
never happen (McConnell & Drennan 2006, Sheffi 2005). In the face of these events 
companies may suffer from a range of maladaptive behaviours stemming from 
bureaucratic policies, poor intelligence gathering and professing, cultural ‘blind spots’ or 
even an ‘it couldn’t happen here’ mentality (McConnell & Drennan 2006), causing many 
organisations to suffer in the event of a disruption. However, in the post 9/11, even 
insurance companies are expecting both private and public sector companies to have 
contingency and business continuity plans.
A crisis can come in many forms as previously identified. Specific threats often require 
specific, measures to contain or quell them (McConnell & Drennan 2006), accordingly, 
different areas have taken a differing perspective in managing crises. Sweden takes the 
‘total defence’ perspective, the UK takes the ‘integrated emergency’ perspective and the 
US and Australia take the ‘all hazards planning’ approach. The underlying philosophy in 
these however is that regardless of the type of disaster, shared planning and coordination 
should be the basis of the emergency preparedness (McConnell & Drennan 2006). There 
still exists the need to determine how organisations should be prepared for disruptive 
events.
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2.4.5 Summary
The section presented the antecedents of business continuity and resilience which 
included disaster preparedness and contingency planning. It highlighted how the 
environment and thus the type of risks have changed and thus the risk management 
strategies that were used in the past are no longer applicable in the current business 
environment. The following section provides some information and definitions of 
Business Continuity Planning.
2.5 Business Continuity Planning
2.5.1 Introduction
While the previous section consisted of the antecedents of business continuity, this 
section will delve more into the field that is business continuity. This is considered 
important as resilience, as an evolving field, has borrowed some of the elements from this 
field.
2.5.2 Business Continuity
Today’s challenging world is continually exposing many companies to challenges and 
risks that can seriously undermine the business at any time if they are not identified and 
addressed (Dawes 2004). These threats of course include fires, crime, terrorist activities, 
natural disaster, cyber crime and virus attacks and are possible, irrespective of company 
size, location or business sector, and these threats can come locally, nationally or 
internationally (Dawes 2004). So companies need to better understand how these risks 
have increased their vulnerabilities and to then allow them to take decisive action in 
addressing these issues (Dawes 2004).
Norrman & Jansson (2004) define business continuity as the development of strategies, 
plans and actions which provide protection or alternative modes of operation for those 
activities or business processes which, if they were to be interrupted, might otherwise 
bring about a seriously damaging or potentially fatal loss to the enterprise. Thus, BCP 
includes crisis management, disaster recovery, business recovery and contingency 
planning (Norrman & Jansson 2004).
Business continuity planning (BCP) means developing plans to be resilient (Rice & 
Caniato 2003). A lack of BCP can cause companies to experience serious financial loss 
(Zsidisin et al 2004, Elliott et al 1999). BCP, developed primarily by practitioners, was 
been adopted to deal with disruptions that are difficult to predict, but once they do occur 
have immediate and a catastrophic effect (Goldberg et al, 1999, Zsidisin et al 2004). 
Companies and communities with recovery plans are better poised to be up and running 
after a disruption with limited damage to their long-term success (Engle 2005).
BCP, a high-profile, mission-critical task, has supplanted disaster recovery planning 
which fell under the umbrella of building security or human resources (Rodetis 1999).
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Elliott et al (1999) viewed BCP from a finance market perspective as ‘Planning which 
identifies the organisation’s exposure to internal and external threats and synthesising 
hard and soft assets to provide effective prevention and recovery for the organisation 
whilst maintaining competitive advantage and value system integrity. Goldberg, et al 
(1999) also said that BCP includes determining the potential risk business partners 
presented if they were not prepared to deal with disruptive events. BCP, by Shaw and 
Harrald (2004) was recognised as being a part of business continuity management which 
consists of business practices that allow firms to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, 
resume, recover, restore and transition form the disruptive event (Zsidisin et al 2004). As 
described by Rodetis, BCP is, at the heart, a form of risk management whose objectives 
were expressed as:
‘To ensure that an organisation can mitigate and manage identified risks, maintain service 
continuity and integrity, retain business and customer confidence and protect their 
employees and fully recover in the event of a problem, failure or crisis.’ (Dawes 2004)
Disaster Recovery Planning, the precursor to BCP focussed on tangible assets such as 
backing up data, securing copies and spare equipment off site and other techniques 
relying on redundancy (Rodetis 1999). BCP is not just focussed on IT. It encompasses 
projects, change programmes, logistics, outsourcing, quality supply chain management, 
health and safety, reputation and brand protection and people (Dawes 2004) and focusses 
on processes, networks, flows, procedures and affiliations essential for an organisation’s 
survival and ongoing prosperity (Rodetis 1999). Close relationships with suppliers and 
customers have also become more important and as such BCP has now expanded to 
include relationships in the supply chain (Rodetis 1999). Besides the damage disasters 
and disruptions can cause other problems can include: relocation, repairs, regenerating 
lost data and replacing lost business income which all take time and money (Rodetis 
1999). Intangible assets such as loss of market share, image and credibility, reduced 
customer satisfaction, lost research data or strained relationships with suppliers and 
customers can all be effects of being subject to disruptions (Rodetis 1999).
A business continuity programme outlines the steps to be taken to identify the risk of 
potential losses and develop recovery plans to ensure continuity of service (Hutchins 
2006), it tends to include back up plans for key business processes and supporting 
infrastructure, employee safety and well being, management succession, communication, 
information technology, manufacturing and supply chain (Engle 2005). The steps in 
business continuity plan follows the framework of risk management and can be 
categorised into (Zsidisin et al 2004) risk identification, risk assessment, risk rankings 
and risk management
The Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain Management undertook exploratory research 
in the area of Supply Chain Vulnerability on behalf of the UK government’s Department 
for Transport, Department of Trade and Industry (DTi) and The Home Office. Along with 
the conclusions drawn on the lack of research in the area of vulnerability and resilience 
the report also highlighted that many were unaware of the need to consider supply chain 
resilience as part of their approach to risk and business continuity (Christopher and Peck 
2003), thus creating that link between supply chain risk, resilience and business 
continuity.
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2.5.3 Resilient Organisations
There are a few definitions of resilience. According to Arminas (2004) resilience is the 
ability of a client and its suppliers to withstand major economic, political and natural 
disruptions.
A resilient organisation aligns strategy, operations, management systems, governance 
structures and decision support capabilities to uncover and adjust to continually changing 
risks, and to create advantages over less adaptive competitors ("Starr et al 2003). 
Establishing greater resilience has become necessary in this current economic and 
security environment which is a challenge to executives. The resilient organisation 
addresses risk across the external enterprise by increasing supply chain visibility (Mello 
2001) and establishing transparency and controls for Boards and company to address 
issues such as improper fraudulent behaviours, IT infrastructure failures, disruptions and 
interdependent supply chain or customer channels, intellectual property theft, adverse 
economic conditions and other discontinuities (Starr et al 2003).
Though senior executives have renewed their attention to conventional risk mitigation 
programmes, these are no longer applicable in the current networked global economy 
(Mitroff & Alpaslan 2003, Starr et al 2003). Risk management models have not kept 
pace with the shift from centralised to network organisations (Starr et al 2003). Though 
the organisational and economic impact of networks is well known, their vulnerabilities 
are largely unexplored by businesses (Svensson 2002, Peck 2005).
Resilience results from a planned series of safeguards against discontinuities 
encompassing everything from logistics, inventory control, and distribution channels to 
relations with government agencies, customer and suppliers. It better aligns risk 
management activity and spending with the most fundamental components of corporate 
strategy and performance: corporate growth and profit drivers, earnings consistency and 
shareholder value (Starr et al 2003).
2.5.4 Summary
This section provided some information as to business continuity planning and 
management and gave a flavour to some of the key concepts and themes that are coming 
out of the study of supply chain resilience. This section also introduced the ‘resilient 
organisation’, mentioning what were some of the key characteristics required of 
organisations that work in the network environment. The following section provides the 
rationale for this body of research along with the research question.
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2.6 Rationale for the Study
In 2001 the Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain Management undertook exploratory 
research in the area of Supply Chain Vulnerability on behalf of the UK government’s 
Department for Transport, Department of Trade and Industry (DTi) and The Home 
Office. This study was prompted by the widespread economic disruption experienced by 
the fuel protests in September 2000 and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 
February 2001. The aim of this study was to determine the state of knowledge within the 
industry on Supply Chain Vulnerability and where possible to identify the ‘best practice’ 
tools and approaches. The study found that in the UK public sector, the Emergency 
Planning and Management is a well established discipline (Christopher and Peck 2003). 
However, although issues of terrorist attack on infrastructure were dealt with at length, 
specific reference to disruptions to the supply chain were absent (Christopher and Peck 
2003).
The report also highlighted some key points: that the primary sector companies have been 
aware of the need for crisis management and disaster recovery planning for some time, 
though this still remains primarily a single firm operation, that supply chain vulnerability 
and resilience lacked the necessary research base to comprehend the breath and 
importance of the subject, that many were unaware of the need to consider supply chain 
resilience as part of their approach to risk and business continuity (Christopher and Peck 
2003).
Additionally, there is generally the lack of understanding of the wider supply/demand 
network amongst managers as many managers who manage supply chains are not really 
aware of the risk that their supply chains are opened to. While they may be aware of the 
threat due to wars, epidemic etc, they are less clear about the risk that exists within the 
supply/demand network (Christopher and Peck 2003). Peck has also highlighted that 
there exists a significant ‘disconnect’ in organisations between the determination of 
business strategy and the recognition of the impact of those strategic decisions upon 
supply chain vulnerability.
The above discussion makes clear that there still needs to be an increased understanding 
of supply chain risk, vulnerability and resilience. As such this body of research seeks to 
synthesis some of the previous work that has taken place in these areas as it attempts to 
answer the following questions:
Disruptive Risk Management: What makes supply chains resilient to low 
probability/high impact disruptions to the inbound and outbound aspects of the 
supply chain?
Essentially, the tenets that create a resilient supply chain are being investigated. To this 
end, the report identifies and examines:
1. Previous works within this discipline and others that have experience dealing with 
risk, vulnerability and mitigation of their effects.
2. What is supply chain resilience and what makes them resilient.
21
3. The various effects of disruptions on the inbound and outbound aspects of the 
supply chain.
The supporting questions included:
1. How are vulnerability and resilience related in the supply chain context?
a. What are the definitions of a resilient supply chain and the global resilient 
supply chains?
b. How do you create resilient supply chains?
c. Is there a framework for resilient supply chains?
d. Are resilient strategies the key approach to managing disruptions?
e. How do you define vulnerability?
f. Have the supply chain strategies such as single sourcing and lean 
manufacture truly made the supply chain more vulnerable to the types of 
risk under discussion? Are there other factors that cause systems to be 
vulnerable (besides lean strategies)?
g. How were risk and vulnerability managed before the emergence of lean 
strategies and such other strategies?
2. What are resilience considerations for the inbound and outbound aspects of the 
supply chain?
3. How are Business Continuity and Supply Chain resilience related?
However, this body of research has two main aims. Firstly, it is to frame and answer a 
specific research question which has been described above. Secondly, it is intended to 
provide the research questions that will take the centre stage of the PhD.
2.7 Conclusion
A lot of work was covered in this chapter. The intention was to identify the problem and 
situate it in the wider research field. To that end it was highlighted that many companies 
need to understand the risks and disruptions that can potentially affect their supply 
chains. It was identified that the traditional or conventional risk management techniques 
were insufficient due to the network and extended nature of the supply chain and that a 
seeming key to be able to mitigate against these disruptions is through establishing a 
resilient supply chain. Additionally, this chapter gave insight into the ‘foundation 
elements’ or antecedents of business continuity and resilience such as crisis management 
and disaster preparedness. Finally, the review objectives which include the research 
questions and providing a basis to establish PhD questions from the review were 
presented.
The following section gives a full description of the methodology used to carry out the 
systematic review.
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CHAPTER 3
3. M E T H O D O L O G Y
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided the problem definition and located it in the relevant 
literature fields of supply chain management, supply chain risk and vulnerability and 
business continuity. This then lends to the discussion on how the research was carried 
out given the findings already obtained. Thus, this chapter describes the techniques and 
means by which the primary research data was gathered, sorted, assimilated, synthesised 
and then presented in its final format. The aim of the research and the techniques used 
can be considered to be comprehensive if not exhaustive (Finch 2004).
3.2 Benefits of the Systematic Review over the Traditional Review Process
The evidence-based approach has been adopted to address the disconnect between 
academic research and practice. The key stages to an evidence-based approach include 
turning a ‘real world’ problem into a research question; locating all existing research 
related to that problem; ascertaining the strength of the evidence; synthesising the 
information into a coherent whole; integrating the findings with practitioners knowledge 
and applying the knowledge base in practice (cranfieldonline.com).
Management research is considered to be a relatively young field and as such there tends 
to be little consensus on the formulation of the research questions and methods to 
synthesis (Tranfield et al 2003). Additionally, researchers’ bias always plays a part in 
choosing what information or data is used and referenced. Researchers also tend to rely 
on quality ratings of particular journals rather than applying quality assessment criteria to 
individual articles and the data extraction process was often not comprehensively 
recorded or guided by explicitly chosen inclusion or exclusion criteria. The synthesis 
process tended to lack explicit descriptive and thematic analysis (Tranfield et al 2003). 
So the challenge was to develop a process that was rigorous, complete and transparent 
enough for the search and synthesis of information.
With this growing concern about the rigour and reliability of the process applied in the 
traditional literature review (Tranfield et al 2003); the systematic review process was 
borrowed from the field of medicine in an attempt to address this. A comprehensive, 
unbiased search is one of the fundamental differences between a traditional narrative 
review and a systematic review. The systematic review, now regarded as a scientific 
activity (Mulrow 1994, Tranfield et al 2003) built on the evidence based approach, sort to 
improve the quality of the review process by synthesising research in a systematic, 
transparent and reproducible manner. It is a detailed technology that aims to minimize 
bias through exhaustive literature searches of published and unpublished studies and by 
providing an audit trail of the reviewer’s decisions, procedures and conclusions 
(Tranfield et al 2003). It has been argued to provide the most efficient and high quality 
method for identifying and evaluating extensive literatures (Mulrow 1994)
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Following is a description of the protocol used to carry out the research. The protocol 
specifies the plan which the review will follow to identify, appraise and collate evidence 
(Boaz 2002). The protocol’s main strength is to encourage the review to be explicit about 
how the review will be carried out and is useful in promoting transparency, transferability 
and replicability (Boaz 2002).
3.2.1 The Systematic Review Process
The systematic Review Process adopted to fulfill the needs as described above is 
identified in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Cranfield Systematic Review Process
Stage 1: Planning the Review 
Step 1-Forming a review
Step 2- Mapping your field
Step 3 -  Producing a review
Stage 2: Identifying and evaluating studies
Step 4- Conducting a systematic
Step 5 -  Evaluating Studies
Stage 3: Extracting and Synthesizing Data
Step 6 -  Conducting Data Extraction
Step 7 -  Conducting Data Synthesis
Stage 4 - Reporting
Step 8 -  Reporting the findings
Stage 5 -  Utilizing the findings
Step 9 -  Informing research
Step 10 -  Informing practice
Source: cranfieldonline.com
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3.3 The Review Panel
During the MRes Review it was suggested that the review panel was too academic and 
Cranfield-focussed. That comment was taken on board and while it was the intention of 
the author to incorporate others beyond the realm of Cranfield University and the 
academic community, due to the lack of time it was not possible at this stage to 
communicate with others beyond the boundaries of the academic institution. The fact is 
though, that the area of supply chain risk and vulnerability is very much a new area and 
much of the work done and articles put forward thus far have originated from Cranfield! 
However, I do hope that these academic advisors will form the nucleus of what will 
become a larger, and more integrated, expert panel (Richardson 2005), (Table 4).
Dr. David Denyer provided great help in conceptualising and clarifying the form and 
direction of the dissertation. He shed light on how I should structure the systematic 
review. Ms. Heather Woodfield gave very clear guidance on the method of developing 
the key words, the search strings and performing the database searches. Both Ms. 
Woodfield and Dr. Denyer were absolutely instrumental in refining the scope of the 
eventual systematic review, clarifying what could reasonably be systematically 
researched given the very short timeframe with which I had to work. Without this 
guidance I would most certainly have been lost.
Table 4: Review Panel Members
Supervisor Professor Richard Wilding
Senior Lecturer, Cranfield School of Management
Library Support and other support Ms. Heather Woodfield 
Cranfield University Library
Dr. David Denyer
Senior Research Fellow, Cranfield School of 
Management
Dr. David Partington
Senior Research Fellow, Cranfield School of 
Management
Academic Panel Members Professor Alan Harris
Senior Lecturer, Cranfield School of Management
Professor Martin Christopher 
Professor of Marketing and Logistics
Dr. Paul Chapman (was not on original expert panel) 
Lecturer, Cranfield School of Management
Dr. Denyse Julien
Senior Lecturer, School of Applied Science (SAS)
Source: The Author 2006
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All the academic panel members recommended papers that should enrich the research 
information. They also contributed to:
• The way I thought of vulnerabilities, which should not be limited to disruptive 
events such as fires, terrorist attacks etc, but should include other dynamics such 
as new product development, innovation, and any other event that could cause a 
disruption to the supply chain
• Looking for the ‘dissenting’ voice in the literature.
• The understanding of resilience through the business continuity, or the supply 
chain perspective
3.4 Search Strategy
The purpose of the search strategy is to seek all relevant knowledge that informs the 
systematic review. While limitations exist, it is important that the researcher be able to 
attest, with a degree of confidence, that all reasonable avenues of information have been 
explored.
The research process was mainly facilitated by database searches. Considering the 
newness of this topic, virtually no core contributions came from the text books. Cross- 
referencing highlighted important references that fell outside of the database search 
process. The number of search approaches and sources used are described below.
3.4.1 Academic Databases
The academic databases provided most of the core research articles (Table 5). The 
rationale for the keywords was based on the effective mapping of the field and analysis 
during the scoping study and the key concepts in books and papers. Developing 
insightful and complete keywords and hence search strings was very much a challenge. 
This was due to the author’s inexperience in developing search strings, and due to the 
newness of the field. The keywords chosen needed to examine the antecedents of the 
field to build an evolutionary picture of what now exists of supply chain vulnerability and 
resilience, hence the need for key words and search strings that not only focussed on 
resilience and vulnerability, but also included disaster management and business 
continuity.
Originally, the idea was to do an individual topic search (on advice from the panel) for 
supply chain, disaster management, contingency planning, resilience, vulnerability, lean 
and single sourcing, but these terms and phrases were generating thousands of responses 
which were just not manageable. The keywords for the topics were then linked to form 
search strings that allowed for depth of information, while providing a more manageable 
number of hits to investigate. Thus the final search strings were then developed through 
the scoping process, the key concepts in journal articles, and the refinements of the 
concepts and ideas with the panel. Table 6 provides the list of the keywords used and the 
rationale for inclusion in the search.
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Table 5: Selected Electronic Databases
ABI ProQuest For the vast amount of journals. If it is not covered 
here then it virtually will not be covered elsewhere. 
ABI ProQuest contains the most comprehensive 
writings and empirical research in operations and 
supply chain management
EBSCO Business Source 
Premier
Virtually all business related areas are covered in this 
area with some journals being related to operations 
management and supply chain management
Google Scholar This website is proving to provide interesting 
information on the topic being researched. However, 
the number of articles found tends to be very high, but 
the first few pages are found to provide useful 
information
Science Direct Recommended to possibly source articles that may not 
come up in ABI ProQuest and EBSCO
Source: The Author 2006
Table 6: Group of Keywords
Keywords Rationale for inclusion in search
Supply Chain, Demand Chain, Logistics, 
Distribution, Production
The main area of research is within supply chain 
management; however the other terms were used before 
the concept of supply chain management rose in 
importance. In some instances these words are still 
being used.
Uncertainty, Risk, Vulnerability, Resilience, 
Flexibility
These key words were chosen since the research is 
centred around risk, vulnerability, uncertainty and 
resilience
Contingency Planning, Mitigation, Disaster 
Preparedness, Crisis Management, 
Management of Crises
These key words were identified as being associated 
with Business Continuity in the search databases. It is 
anticipated that in conjunction with the first set of 
keywords we should be able to identify how uncertainty 
mitigated in other fields
Inbound, outbound These were chosen as a focal point of the area of 
research to the supply chain
Lean manufacture, JIT, Just in time, 
inventory management, inventory control, 
planning, single supplier, suppliers
Supply chain vulnerability is increased due to the use of 
some of these supply chain strategies
Source: The Author 2006
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The keywords, when combined, formed four broad categories of resilience, vulnerability, 
disaster management and contingency planning. These then gave rise to a total of eight 
search strings as detailed below in Table 7.
Table 7: Search strings used in the electronic databases
Topic Search String Rationale for use of search string
Resilience ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) and 
((Resili* OR robust OR reliable OR (ultra reliable) 
OR flexib*))
This is a more general search string used to identify 
papers focussing on resilience, flexibility and 
reliability on supply chain and related areas.
((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
((Lean AND (thinking OR manufactur* OR 
produc*)) OR (just-in-time OR JIT) OR (Toyota 
production system OR TPS)) AND (Resili* OR 
robust OR reliable OR (ultra reliable) OR flexib*)
This was used to identify papers that express the 
effects of lean and related supply chain strategies on 
supply chain vulnerability
((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
((single AND (sourc* OR supply )) AND (Resili* 
OR robust OR reliable OR (ultra reliable) OR 
flexib*)
This was used to identify papers that express the 
effects of single sourcing and related supply chain 
strategies on supply chain vulnerability
Vulnerability ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production)) AND (Chain or network) AND 
(Vulnerab* OR risk OR exposure OR uncertain*)
This is intended to identify papers that relate 
vulnerability, risk and uncertainty with supply chain 
and related areas
((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
((Lean AND (thinking OR manufactur* OR 
produc*) OR (just-in-time OR JIT) OR (Toyota 
production system OR TPS)) AND ((Vulnerab* OR 
risk OR exposure OR uncertain*))
To identify how vulnerability, risk and uncertainty 
have been linked or related to the lean and related 
strategies on supply chain and related areas
((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
((single AND (sourc* OR supply)) AND (Vulnerab* 
OR risk OR exposure OR uncertain*)
To identify how vulnerability, risk and uncertainty 
have been linked or related to the single sourcing and 
related strategies on supply chain and related areas
Disaster
Management
((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
((Disaster OR crisis OR event OR catastrophe OR 
emergency) AND (preparedness OR management 
OR planning OR study))
This is intended to highlight or identify literature that 
has brought together disaster management in the 
supply chain and related areas. The intention also, 
was to highlight the impact of disaster management 
in the management of the supply chain
Contingency
Planning ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution 
OR Production) AND (Chain or network)) AND 
(Contingency planning) OR (risk AND (mitigation 
OR avoidance OR removal))
This is intended to highlight or identify literature that 
has brought together contingency planning in the 
supply chain and related areas. The intention also, 
was to highlight the impact o f contingency planning 
in the management of the supply chain
Source: The Author 2006
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The more traditional electronic databases such as ABI ProQuest and EBSCO, and in most 
instances, Google Scholar, provided a manageable number of journals to peruse and, as 
such, the search was not restricted to title only searches. In the case of Google scholar, 
where the number of articles identified was overwhelming, it was decided to do the 
search on the first ten (10) pages since this database does not allow one to do the search 
on the title only, or the title and abstract only. For Science Direct however, a restriction 
was placed on the title only and title, abstract and keywords, since most of the search 
strings were yielding over 5000 articles each. Table 8 outlines the results from the search 
process.
Table 8: Electronic Database Search Results -  No. of articles generated
Search
Strings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ProQuest 1026 41 34 922 8 52 300 39
EBSCO 1401 47 53 1485 34 50 425 499
Science
Direct
571 729 3731 1502 5 27 424 15
Google
Scholar
14 2 7 22 0 21 101,000 7060
Source: The Author 2006
3.4.2 Books
As was evident from the scoping study, the area of supply chain risk, vulnerability and 
resilience for which the author was interested is yet to be covered in the supply chain 
literature texts. As such, the author did not rely on books to bring adequate definition to 
the topic. However, supply chain books were used for the theoretical underpinnings of 
supply chain strategy. Though topics such as Risk Management and Crisis Management 
are covered in books, the author hardly used those resources in this instance, relying 
mainly on papers that were identified through the academic databases.
3.4.3 Selected Journals
Journals formed the core of the research and were mainly sourced via the academic 
database search. Other journals and articles were recommended through the panel and 
through the cross referencing process. The top journals proved to be ‘International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management’, ‘Supply Chain Management 
Review’, the ‘International Journal of Logistics Management’ and the ‘International 
Journal of Logistics’. The selection of the journals was based on the research activity, 
theoretical or conceptual information and the recommendation of the panel. However, 
the contributions of the last three journals were small in number which substantiates Hale 
and Moberg’s (2005) findings, that the review of the four top journals in logistics and 
supply chain management since 2001, resulted in few academic articles on disaster
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planning with supply chains. The following section summarises the number of articles 
contributed per journal.
3.4.4 Working Papers
In an attempt to cover all the bases a search of the Cranfield database for the working 
papers was performed. Eight papers with the general topic of Supply Chain Management 
were identified, of which none were relevant to the topic being researched. The list of 
papers held at the Birkbeck Library was also examined and this produced about four 
papers of which none were used as core review papers. Working papers were also sort 
through the Judge Business School Library, which is part of Cambridge University. This 
database tended to include works from UK institutions as well as other overseas academic 
institutions and other sources which include banks, government agencies. No papers 
were generated from these sources.
3.4.5 Theses
Nine theses were identified in the searches. While they were not used as part of the core 
literature in the study, they did contribute to either the form or structure of the report or 
provide further source of articles that formed part of the core research papers.
3.4.6 Other Sources
Reports from institutions such as the Cranfield Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain 
Management and from the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics did provide a 
very rich source of information, especially since, for the moment, these two institutions 
are leading in the study and research in supply chain vulnerability and resilience, as well 
as in supply chain security. Though only one article each was obtained from each 
institution most of the authors that provided articles that formed the core research are 
from these institutions. No conference papers or unpublished papers were used to 
contribute to the main body of research.
3.5 Selection
The selection process proved to be very challenging and was thus a very iterative process. 
One of the major factors with research is to define its limits. As identified earlier, the 
area of supply chain vulnerability and resilience, in the context of low probability/high 
impact events is an unexplored, underdeveloped area. Therefore, the author was very 
open to finding whatever information was available in this subject area. Once an 
assessment of the information was made, the author was then more discriminating in the 
information and papers to be used for the systematic review to ensure that only high 
quality papers made it through to the final stage. These papers tended to focus on 
vulnerability and ways of conceptualising vulnerability, methods of and frameworks for 
increasing flexibility and agility, supply chain resilience, business continuity and supply
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chain security and terrorism. These papers however, were not limited to the study of 
disruptive events to the supply side as authors still looked at developing generic 
frameworks.
3.5.1 Broad Selection Criteria
In actual fact, the author performed a double selection process. The first being on the 
titles and abstracts on the database, which, as illustrated in table 8, generated over 6000 
articles. Appendix 2 gives the breakdown for this table. Numerous articles were rejected 
at this stage. The remaining articles were approximately three hundred and seventeen 
three (317) in number not including duplicates.
3.5.2 The selection stage
The titles and abstracts were further considered to determine which other articles could be 
eliminated. This was reduced to 167 articles which were then considered according to 
their full body content. This was done according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
(Tables 9 and 10).
Selection criteria for full text papers included:
1. Conceptual / theoretical papers must contain (Coelho 2005)
• The aim of the model and relationship with existing theory and previous work
• The assumptions of the model being developed
• The variables use, parameters and equations must be clearly stated and defined
• Its contribution to existing knowledge
• Explicit proofs of the most important results and theorems
• Possibly limitations of the research
The hope was that the papers would include the following, but this was not always 
evident:
• The implication of the finding to further research and/or industry
• The opportunity for further research
Risk Management and Disaster Management papers must include:
• Theoretical framework for the specific area
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Table 9: Inclusion Criteria
Criteria Rationale
Academic papers in scholarly journals, books, 
professional reports, conference proceedings 
and government reports
These form the most reliable source of field- 
specific data which are necessary to build the 
foundations of my research.
No geographical restrictions Because of the scarcity of work in this area no 
geographical restrictions used, however, not 
withstanding though, that the studies thus far are 
located in the UK, Europe and the US.
Companies that are part of the global supply 
network
These companies tend to be much more affected 
by low probability/high impact events as:
• Other network members may be affected 
which in turn will affect their business.
• The transportation and communication 
lines may be severely affected
• The government may impose measures 
that may affect their business.
Hi-technology companies This is preferred due to the complexity in their 
global supply chain, but the research will not be 
limited to such company types.
Sectors At the moment I am not sector specific as there 
isn’t much information about. However, research 
so far has been mainly in the automotive industry 
(Sweden), aerospace (UK), chemical industry 
(US), defence (US)
Source: The Author 2006
2. Empirical Papers needed to provide (Coelho 2005):
• A clear definition of the sample used (sectors included, nationality of the sample
firms, descriptive characteristics such as size, distribution, etc)
• A clear definition of the variables and methodologies employed
• The relationship with exiting theory and previous work
• Contribution to existing knowledge
• Clearly state the empirical results and their significance. The paper must also
provide a clear interpretation of the results in the context of the existing literature 
and relevant theory
• The methodological shortcomings that may reduce the possibility to generalize 
from the results presented
The hope was that the papers would include the following, but this was not always 
evident:
• The implication of the finding to further research and/or industry
• The opportunity for further research
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Table 10: Exclusion Criteria
Criteria Rationale
Studies that use pre-1980 data are going to 
be excluded from the review
Supply Chain Management really came into 
being after this time, especially with the use 
of JIT and other strategies which are now 
showing that they make less resilient supply 
chains.
Studies that use pre-1995 data for risk 
management in the supply chain
The main body of research on Supply Chain 
Risk Management came after this time.
Non-English Papers As there was insufficient resources to allow 
for a translation of such articles.
Supply Chain Management Papers that • Focussed mainly on e-business
• Focussed on traditional supply chain 
problems
• Described frameworks and their 
application that did not have any 
bearing on my area of interest
• Emphasised buyer-supplier 
relationships
• Focussed on the economic cost of a 
disruption
• Looked at managing demand risk
• That focussed on fuzzy logic
• Supply chain, risk management 
sustainable development
• Focussed on remanufacturing
• Focussed on Cyber attacks
Source: The Author 2006
3. M ethodological Paper
Ideally the author would have preferred to include papers that considered the issues o f 
how to construct a model or conduct appropriate statistical analysis or qualitative 
analyses. However, as empirical data in this field is sparse, all contributions, qualitative 
and quantitative, theoretical and empirical papers were considered.
The rem aining articles, which were in the vicinity o f  one hundred (100), not including 
cross-referenced articles, or articles recommended by the panel, were then passed through 
the quality criteria which will be described in the following section. All the articles that 
were recom mended by the panel and those that were obtained through cross-referencing 
did pass through the quality criteria.
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3.6 The Quality Appraisal
It was not the intention to discount works on the basis of empirical methodology as the 
empirical work in the field is relatively scant. Thus contributions were assessed based on 
their theoretical contributions to understanding in the field. The author attempted to 
systematically and objectively appraise the papers, but felt that there was a cause for 
concern due to perceptions of the area, mindset and biases. This subjective fact was 
always a point of concern.
The quality criteria being measured included:
• Relevance7 the work has to the field on enquiry.
o
• Theoretical and conceptual contributions
• The research methodology9 used.
• The data analysis process.
• Limitation and future research10.
• Contribution, originality, appropriateness and significance.
Each criterion as described was ranked on scale between one and five, where one 
represents the poorest response and five represents an excellent response. From this three 
levels of papers were established, those that were accepted, those that were rejected, and 
those that could be used as reference papers in other parts of the report. These papers did 
not necessarily contribute anything new, or they probably were neither theoretically or 
methodologically sound, but did make some contributions to the thinking process. Please 
refer to Appendix 5 for further details on how the scoring system was operationalized.
3.7 Data Extraction
Descriptive information was extracted from the 148 articles (including the cross 
referenced articles and articles recommended by the panel) that passed through the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. This information, which was stored on the Excel 
spreadsheet included the Author, Title, Journal Name, Source (database, panel 
recommendation, researcher recommendation, reference recommendation), Themes 
(Supply Chain Management, Resilience, Agility), Country, Service context/industry, 
Research Category (empirical theoretical), Sample Size and comments. Articles that pass 
the quality criteria were transferred to the Procite database in accordance with the work 
form as shown in Table 11. The notes and coding of the papers at this stage formed the 
basis for the synthesis of the information later in the review.
7 -—   , .____
O f the data sources selected through the inclusion/exclusion criteria some will be more relevant than 
others. In essence this is what will be rated.
8 Theoretical and conceptual contributions made in the area of supply chain risk and vulnerability, supply 
chain flexibility, resilience and security.
9 A consideration of the research methodology used, not with a view of discounting the work, but rather 
with the view of examining its appropriateness of use
10 It was preferred that the paper included limitations of the study and possible areas of future research as 
this shows an understanding and appreciation that there is still a lot of work or research to be covered in the 
area.
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Table 11: Data Extraction Form
Author of Article:
Title of Article:
Journal Title:
Date of Publication:
Volume:
Month or season:
Part:
Page Numbers:
Empirical or Theoretical?
Where was the study located?
What was the context/industry?
What was the sample size?
Method of data collection:
Method of data analysis (quantitative/qualitative):
Study Characteristics:
Quality assessment 1/Relevance to review: (Score 1 -  5):
Quality assessment 2/Contribution to theoretical and/ or conceptual understanding: (Score 1 -  5): 
Quality assessment 3/Research Methodology (Score 1 -5 ) :
Quality assessment 4/Data analysis process (Score 1 -5 ) :
Quality assessment 5/Limitations of study (Score 1 -  5):
Quality assessment 6/Significance of research (Score 1 -5 ) :
Include Yes/No:
Reason for exclusion: ------ ----------------
Key Findings:
Short Abstract:
Keywords:
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3.8 Data Synthesis
In retrospect, this would have been an ideal opportunity to use the QSR NVivo software 
to create a thematic structure, but due to the limitation of time it was not possible to 
restart and code all the papers to build the information inductively. Hence the author 
utilised the technique of mind mapping to capture and represent the information. Buzan 
(1993) describes the mind map as an expression of Radiant Thinking and is thus a natural 
function of the human mind.
The gathering, collation and synthesis of the information was very much an incremental 
and iterative process. Maps were created to represent the main areas of concern and 
findings for risk, supply chain risk, flexibility, agility, vulnerability, disruptive risk, 
disruptive risk events and resilience. This allowed the data to take its own form, though, 
based on the author’s understanding; the maps were built from the articles found, and 
thus were a useful mechanism for understanding the totality... and. the nature.. o f the 
evidence in the field (Richardson ,2005). It also provided the framework for presentation 
of the findings in the review (Richardson 2005). This was extremely helpful in linking 
information and concepts in the final synthesis and writing-up stage.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter provided, with some detail, the methodology used to generate the primary 
research papers used for this analysis. The search strategy and search stings were 
detailed, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were discussed and the quality appraisal 
system was presented. Finally, the data extraction and synthesis stages were outlined.
The following chapter is the first of three that discusses the findings derived from the 
primary research papers. Chapter 4 presents a descriptive analysis of the papers used in 
the review and thus will cover elements such as the years of research, the geography 
concentration of the research papers, the main authors and journals that have contributed 
to the research, and other such information.
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CHAPTER 4
4. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
The methodology used to generate the findings was presented in some amount of detail in 
the last chapter. That chapter covered the search strategy employed, the selection criteria, 
the quality appraisal as well as the data extraction and synthesis stages.
This chapter is the first of three that synthesizes and presents the findings. According to 
(Tranfield et al 2003), a good trait of the systematic review is to make it easier for the 
practitioner to understand the research by synthesising the extensive primary research 
papers that were derived. Thus the descriptive analysis gives a detailed review of the 
papers used for the analysis. This data was gathered as part of the data extraction process 
and provides useful insight into the field.
4.2 Descriptions
4.2.1 Age Profile of Articles
Table 12: Age Profile of Articles
Year Count
1993 1
2000 4
2001 3
2002 4
2003 6
2004 8
2005 13
2006 4
Grand
Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
Table 12 highlights a few points. The research does not date back beyond 1993. One 
relevant paper is produced in 1993 and the next relevant paper was produced in 2000. 
This confirms what previous authors have written, that supply chain risk, vulnerability 
and resilience are relatively new fields, and thus, there is a paucity of research in those 
areas. Though there is a decline in 2001, the published papers have progressed steadily 
from 2000 to 2005. The low rating in 2006 could be due to the fact that this is the current 
year and researchers and authors have not completed publishing for the year. Please refer 
to Figure 5 for a graphical representation of the results.
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Figure 5: Age Profile of Articles
4.2.2 Distribution of papers according to journals
Table 13 shows that the International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management is the journal that provided most of the academic articles. International 
Journal of Logistics and the International Journal of Logistics Management were distant 
seconds, with each providing three core articles each. The International Journal of Agile 
Management Systems, the International Journal of Production Research, Supply Chain 
Management Review, and the MIT Sloan Management Review provided two core articles 
each.
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Table 13: Distribution of papers according to journals
Journal Count
Bell Labs Technical Journal 1
Chief Executive 1
Computers in Industry 1
Ecosystems 1
Financial Times 1
Harvard Business Review 1
Industrial Management & Data Systems 1
Industrial Marketing Management 1
Industry Week 1
Information Systems Management 1
International Journal o f Agile Management Systems 2
International Journal o f Logistics 3
International Journal of Operations & Production Management 1
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 7
International Journal of Production Research 2
Journal o f Corporate Real Estate 1
Management Science 1
MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics 1
MIT Sloan Management Review 2
Production and Operations Management 1
Report produced by the CLSM for department of transport 1
Risk Management 1
Supply Chain Management Review 2
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 1
The International Journal of Logistics Management 3
Thunderbird International Business Review 1
Unpublished paper 1
World Trade 1
www.exel.com 1
Grand Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
4.2.3 Key contributing authors
Table 14 shows that the key contributing authors are Martin Christopher, Helen Peck, 
Yossi Sheffi, James Rice Jr. and Goran Svensson. Thus, most of the research thus far has 
originated from the institutions for which they are affiliated and includes the Centre for 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Cranfield University, UK; the MIT Center for 
Transportation & Logistics, USA and Vaxjo University, Sweden.
39
Table 14: Key Contributing Authors
A uthor Count
Bundschuh et al 1
Carpenter, et al 1
Chopra, Sunil & Sodhi, ManMohan 1
Christopher, M
Christopher, M 1
Christopher, M & Peck, H 1
Cranfield CLSM 1
DeTura, N e ta l 1
Drickhamer, D — K 1
Duclos et al 1
Ferris, G 1
Finch, P 1
Foster, S & Dye, K 1
Hale, T & Moberg, C 1
Juttner, U
Juttner, U, Peck, H & Christopher, M 1
King, J 1
Kleindorfer, P. & Saad, G 1
Lee, H
Lummus, R et al
Martha, J & Subbakrishna 1
Mason-Jones, R et al
Norrman, A & Janssonm U 1
Peck, H 1
Peck,H 1
Prater et al 1
Rice Jr., J & Caniato, F 1
Rice,Jr J 1
Sheffi, Y
She'ffi, Y & Rice Jr, J
Svensson, G
Tan, W & Enderwick, P 1
Tang, C 1
Tomlin, B 1
van Hoek, R 1
Wu, T et al 1
Zsidisin, G et al 1
G rand Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
4.2.4 Geographical Influence
The results represented in Table 15 and Figure 6 make it clear that most of the research is 
out of the US with the UK being a distant second.
Table 15: Geographical Influence
C ountry Count
Australia 1
Finland 1
Sweden 4
UK 12
US 25
G rand
Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
Figure 6: Geographical Influence
C ountry
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Source: The Author 2006
4.2.5 Sectoral categorisation
No sector is mainly represented (Table 16). This may be attributed to the newness of the 
field and the need for more empirical research. The sector with the most research was the
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automotive industry. This can be attributed to Goran Svensson and his work in Sweden in 
understanding and conceptualising the vulnerability constructs.
Table 16: Sectoral Categorisation
Sector Count
Aerospace 1
Aerospace and other industries 1
All Industries 1
Automotive
Computer 1
Corporate Real Estate and Workplace Resources, Energy, Financial 
Services, Technology, Telecom 1
Electronics 1
Financial 1
General 24
Health, Tourism, others 1
Industrial, consumer and service industries 1
Not specified 1
Telecommunication 1
Varying 4
G rand Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
4.2.6 Method of analysis
The results show that most of the research is still theoretical, thus indicating that there is 
ample scope for empirical research (Table 17). For the purposes of this analysis, the case 
study research was counted separately from empirical research which tended to be more 
quantitative (Figure 7).
Table 17: Method of Analysis
Research M ethod Count
Case study & theoretical 13
Empirical 6
Theoretical 24
G rand Total 43
Source: The Author 2006
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Figure 7: Method of Analysis
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4.3 Conclusion
In the previous section we looked at the descriptive findings which indicated a few 
things:
• That the study of supply chain risk, disruptive risk, vulnerability and resilience are 
relatively new areas of research and thus there has been a steady increase in 
research and articles from 1993 to the present. This did also indicate that the 
major contributions were made post 2000 and hardly before 1993.
• The major contributing journal was the International Journal o f  Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management.
• Very little empirical work has been done and thus most of the research is still 
theoretical or conceptual in nature
• Most of the work is coming either out of the US or the UK
The following chapter will discuss the various aspects of disruptions. It looks at the 
crucial area of supply chain vulnerability and how to create resilience through the 
concepts of flexibility, redundancy, agility, strategy and culture. The chapter also 
presents findings in relation to resilience by failure mode analysis, Business Continuity, 
Disruption Risk Management, Supply Chain Risk Management and the overlap in the 
development of secure and resilient supply chains.
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CHAPTER 5
5. THEMATIC FINDINGS
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented a description of the primary research articles that were 
used for this analysis. Some key points to note is the newness of this field as illustrated 
by the age profile of the papers found, the lack of empirical research and the 
concentration of either Cranfield University, the MIT Center for Transportation and 
Logistics and Vaxjo University.
This chapter can be considered to be core to the research as it seeks to examine and 
present the findings on:
• Supply chain disruptions and stages of a disruption
• The various facts of vulnerability including the categorisations, drivers, constructs 
and dimensions of vulnerability
• Supply chain resilience and the perspective of various authors on how to create a 
resilient supply chain
• The framework for creating a flexible supply chain
• Business continuity and its relationship with supply chain resilience
• A description of disruption risk management
• A brief description of Supply Chain Risk Management
• The similarities in creating a secure and resilient supply chain.
5.2 Disruptions
5.2.1 Introduction
This section introduces the categorisation of the supply chain and thus how this is linked 
to supply, internal and demand disruptions. It also introduces the concept of the various 
stages of a disruption.
5.2.2 Supply Chain Disruptions
Disruptions can occur at any part of the supply chain. However, the supply chain is often 
divided into three main categories: the inbound or supply side, the internal processes, and 
the outbound or customer-facing side. Firstly however, events such as SARs and similar 
pathological disruptions, global terrorism, computer viruses etc were identified as 
uncertainties,11 not risks,12 as they cannot be anticipated; they change form and evolve,
11 An uncertainty is considered to exist when there is no understanding of even the distribution o f the 
potential outcome (Wei-Jiat & Enderwick 2006)
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and do not simply recur. Additionally, the impact of these uncertainties tends to be 
concentrated either by sector or by geological location. Thus, the author considers 
uncertainties to give rise to disruptive events which can be distinguished from risk that 
occurs from normal supply-demand coordination risks, since this has been extensively 
covered in the supply chain management literature in general and the literature on supply 
chain contracting in particular, which tended to be mainly concerned with the on-going 
volume and earnings risks associated with coordinating demand and supply of multiple 
supply actors (Kleindorfer, Saad 2005).
5.2.3 Stages of a Disruption
According to Sheffi, the stages of a disruption and the dynamics of the company response 
can be characterised by the following eight phases (Figure 8):
1. The preparation stage, where the company foresees the disruption and minimises 
its effect (Sheffi & Rice 2005). For storms and hurricanes there may be a 
preparation time of some days, for industrial disputes the warning time may be 
some months, but in the instance of terrorist attacks such as the London bombings 
in July 2005, there is virtually no preparation or warning time.
2. The disruptive event which is the actual event itself such as an explosion, when 
the hurricane hits or the beginning of a strike.
3. The first response aimed at controlling the situation, saving or protecting lives, 
shutting down affected systems and preventing further damage.
4. Some disruptions take a time to affect the company. In this delayed response or 
initial impact the performance of the company usually starts to deteriorate.
5. With the full impact there is the dropping off of performance.
6. The recovery preparations which often start in parallel with the first response. 
This may involve redirecting the suppliers’ source (Sheffi & Rice 2005), finding 
alternative transport modes (Sheffi & Rice 2005) or alternative suppliers (Tomlin 
2006).
7. The recovery phase is often marked by companies trying to make up for lost 
production by working overtime (Sheffi & Rice 2005), or using suppliers’ or 
customers’ resources (Tomlin 2006, Sheffi & Rice 2005).
8. The long-term impact could occur if the relationship is so critically damaged that 
the company loses its customers (Sheffi & Rice 2005). However, the long term 
impact can also be positive where there is an increase in the market share as was 
the case with Nokia that was able to capitalise on the situation, and losses to 
Ericsson that came about with the fire at the Philip’s factory.
12 Wei-Jiat & Enderwick defined risk as the variation in potential outcomes to which an association 
probability can be assigned (Wei-Jiat & Enderwick 2006)
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5.2.4 Summary
While this section discussed where disruptions can occur and how they are phased, the 
following section goes in-depth in the discussion of vulnerability considering the sources, 
categorisation and dimensions of it.
Figure 8: Disruption Profile
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5.3 Supply Chain Vulnerability
5.3.1 Introduction
The disruptions companies experience can be attributed to their size, scope and structure, 
that is, the extent to which they are connected to the world and therefore the events 
throughout it (Sheffi 2005b). The Kobe earthquake also demonstrated the connectivity of 
the global industry. Many companies that had factories in Kobe, such as Procter & 
Gamble, Caterpillar, and IBM were directly affected by the earthquake, however, many 
suppliers to multinationals companies, even those without companies in Kobe, also felt 
the impact. Apple had to slow down its production of PowerBook computers as a result 
of the interrupted production of display monitors in Kobe.
While the likelihood of any one event may be small, the collective impact that any one of 
the vulnerabilities can occur at any part of the supply chain, is high (Sheffi 2005a). Thus, 
as General Motors (GM) did, companies need to collect the information across the 
vastness of the business or supply chain to have a full picture of the vulnerabilities which 
the supply chain is subject to (Sheffi 2005a). This section seeks to describe the 
categorisation, sources and dimensions of vulnerability.
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5.3.2 Categorising Disruptions and Vulnerability
Figure 8 attempts to capture the various categories of disruptions. Sheffi (2005a) has 
categorised vulnerability into three main groups, natural disasters, accidents and 
intentional disruptions, which all require a different course of action or attention. These 
categories vary in the roles human beings and random factors play in their cause and thus 
the way of estimating their likelihood of occurrence will differ.
Natural disasters such as floods, earthquake, lightning strikes and tornadoes for disaster 
prone areas tend to be frequent and this can be statistically modelled to estimate their 
likelihood of occurrence and magnitude. Such is the case where the US Geological 
Survey is able to estimate the areas that are most susceptible to earthquakes in the United 
States. Accidents, such as fires and explosions can be analysed and assessed through the 
analysis of near miss incidents. Planning for and reducing these incidents is a way of 
reducing the accident rate and eliminating severe accidents (Sheffi 2005a).
Intentional disruptions, which can be broken down into terrorist and non-terrorist events, 
are quite difficult to plan for, as those involved seek to ensure that the attacks are 
successful and that the damage is to its maximum. Non-terrorist events include labour 
strikes, such as the Longshoreman’s and Warehouse Union strike in summer 2002, which 
staged a work slowdown in the pacific coast ports to hamper shipments from Southeast 
Asia before the holiday shopping season in the US, and the plan by Britain’s Transport 
and General Workers’ Union to strike against the country’s biggest ports at the start of 
the Christmas season (Sheffi 2005a). Terrorist activity includes the bombing of the 
World Trade Center in September 2001 and the attacks in London in July 2005. In the 
first two categories companies are better able to estimate or assess the likelihood of the 
random disruptions occurring, but this is not the case in the third category as these attacks 
adapt to defensive measures (Sheffi 2005b).
Other disruptions include pathological disruptions such as those due to SARs and Avian 
Flu in Asia, and Foot and Mouth disease in the UK (Staples 2006). Supply disruptions do 
not necessarily have to be from the first tier supplier, but can come from the second or 
third tier supplier, for example, GM experienced disruptions when a chemical spill at a 
chip plant shut down production of a second tier supplier. Supply disruptions could also 
be due to tight capacity or shortages such as the steel shortage that caused Nissan to 
suspend operations in three of its four Japanese plants. Power shortages and loss of 
phone lines can all affect the inbound or supply side of the chain.
Events can cause internal disruptions, for example, the tornado that hit the GM assembly 
plant at Oklahoma City in 2003 caused second quarter losses of $140 - $200 million 
related to lost production (Sheffi 2005a). The bombing of the World Trade Center and 
the loss of life is another example of an internal disruption. Besides the human toll there 
is the loss of relationships with employees, customers and suppliers that may be crucial to 
recovery. The use of IT also causes vulnerability to computer viruses, software 
problems, cyber attacks (Warren & Hutchinson 2000, Haimes & Longstaff 2002), 
information theft (Price 2004) and other technical outages. Disruptions in demand can be
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as a result of massive unexpected declines in demand for products and services due to 
technical changes, competitors, disruption to major customers or a sudden loss of 
customer confidence (Sheffi 2005a), or new product development (McDermott & 
Handfield 2000).
However, assessing the probability of failure in the supply chain requires information that 
is not normally available to managers and often enough; companies do not have the 
formal processes for anticipating disruptions and estimating their likelihood. Those 
companies that do have that information still rely on the manager’s subjective estimates, 
which then tend to be a relative ranking in terms of their likelihood. This manner of 
estimating the likelihood and effect of specific disruptions then means that focus should 
be placed on redundancy and flexibility measures (Sheffi 2005a).
5.3.3 Drivers of Supply Chain Vulnerability
An exploratory case study of commercial supply chains engaged in the manufacture and 
assembly of high performance military aircraft was carried out to provide insight to 
improve the resilience of the nation’s supply chain networks (Peck 2005). When asked to 
identify the sources of risk, the aerospace managers did not refer to low probability/high 
impact events such as earthquakes or terrorist attacks, but rather made reference to 
consequential risks13 arising from specific managerial decisions, requirements or industry 
trends. The sources of risk identified in the case study included shorter lead times. 
Outsourcing and increasing use of global sourcing and supply all contributed to 
uncertainty (Peck 2005). Regulatory changes as well as managing across legal, cultural 
environments made the setting for supply chain management a lot more difficult. 
However, through works with the aerospace industry, the sources and drivers of supply 
chain risk operating at several different levels were identified.
Level 1 -  the value stream/product or process 
Vulnerability can be examined at the value stream, product or process level. Ideally there 
should be the perfect flow of information and materials with partners thinking and acting 
as one -  all to attain an efficient, value based design and management of processes. The 
risk extends to the financial and commercial consequences of inefficiencies or sub- 
optimal supply chain performance
Level 2 -  assets and infrastructure dependencies 
The supply chain is seen in terms of the assets and infrastructure required to carry goods 
and information flow in level 1. The nodes represent the fixed commercial assets, sites or 
facilities as well as IT assets such as hardware, communications and service centres. The 
facilities and commercial assets are connected to national and international 
communication infrastructure e.g. cables, radio mast and satellites through nodes and 
links. They are also connected to transportation and distribution infrastructure such as 
pipelines, power grids, roads, rails, waterways through nodes and links as well as the 
mobile assets such as trucks, trains, boats and planes. Resilience at this stage should be
13 Consequential risks are risks that are anticipated side-effects to the supply chain processes, arising from 
specific managerial decision, requirements or industry trends (Peck 2005)
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assessed according to the loss of the links, nodes and other essential operation assets and 
skilled workers.
Level 3 -  organisation and inter-organisational networks 
At this level the supply chain is viewed as an inter-organisation network. Hence supply 
chain vulnerability is moved to the level of corporate risk management, business strategy 
and microeconomics. The nodes are the organisation, commercial and public sector. It is 
necessary, or rather it is the hope, that the strong organisations do not abuse their power 
and dominate the weaker ones.
Level 4 -  the environment 
The environment consists of the wider macroeconomic and natural environment within 
which the organisations do business. Political, economic, social and technological 
elements of the operating environment and the geological, meteorological and 
pathological phenomena are all factors that need to be considered. Disruptions at this 
level may be beyond the direct control of the supply chain managers and the business 
strategist.
5.3.4 Vulnerability Constructs
To answer the question ‘What makes supply chains resilient?’ then one needs to consider 
what are the risks involved and what makes supply chains vulnerable. According to 
Svensson (2004), research of the vulnerability construct in the supply chain is limited. 
Considering that vulnerability was an unexplored concept that lacked conceptualisation 
and had an unclear and ambiguous meaning, Svensson (2000), Svensson set out to 
develop a framework for analysis of vulnerability in supply chains. This model consisted 
of three principal components, source of disturbance, category of disturbance and the 
type of logistics flow. This conceptual framework however (Figure 9), was limited to the 
inbound logistic flow of vehicle manufacturers. The conceptual framework for the 
analysis of vulnerability in the supply chain and the model for the analysis of 
vulnerability consist of the following components:
Source disturbance, consisting of atomistic and holistic sources of disturbance. Atomistic 
sources of disturbance deal with the direct cause of disturbance which can include the 
first-tier subcontractor or transport. The components and materials are general in nature, 
of low value and not complex. Holistic sources have an overall perspective, dealing with 
indirect sources that may affect the supply chain between the first-tier sub-contractor and 
the manufacturer, which may include second tier as well as other subcontractors. The 
components and materials tend to be of high value, complex and rare.
Category of disturbance which is subdivided into quantitative and qualitative 
disturbances. The quantitative disturbance emanates from sources of deviation that leads 
to stock-outs, a lack of availability or volumes in the inbound logistics flow of materials 
in the supply chain and delays and breakdowns which for example, can be contributed to 
poor transportation. A qualitative disturbance comes from sources of deviation that lead
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to a lack is accuracy, reliability and precision of the components and material in the 
supply chain.
The type of logistics flow which looks at their complexity, inventory buffers, materials 
and components.
The outcome of the model presents four vulnerability scenarios that are based on the 
three components in the model.
As earlier indicated by Svensson, most of the inventory management and production 
planning in supply chain management was carried out under normal conditions, not 
taking into account that unplanned events that disrupt the supply chain can occur. Thus 
this framework allows the company to consider or examine the source of disturbance for 
the first tier suppliers and the second and other tier suppliers.
Figure 9: A Conceptual framework for the analysis of vulnerability in supply chains
Source of disturbance
Source: Svensson 2000
In 2002, Svensson introduced a different conceptual framework for the vulnerability 
construct that consists of two components: disturbance,14 and the negative consequence 
of disturbance15. The intention was to determine how the vulnerability in the firms’ 
inbound and outbound logistics flow can be conceptualised, measured and evaluated.
Svensson, in the case of analysing the Swedish automotive industry, realised that there 
seemed to be a potential association between the existence of vulnerability in the inbound 
and outbound logistics flow (Svensson 2002). The inbound and outbound vulnerability in 
logistics flows appeared to be closely related to the potential occurrence of disturbances 
in supply chains, and the impact of these disturbances in the firms’ performances is also a 
crucial feature of inbound and outbound vulnerability.
14 A disturbance is defined as a random quantitative or qualitative deviation from what is normal and 
expected (Svensson 2002)
15 A negative consequence of disturbance refers to a deteriorated goal accomplishment in terms of 
economic costs, quantitative deviations -  such as increase cycle times and down times -  and qualitative 
deviations (Svensson 2002)
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Atomistic
Quantomistic Qualitomistic
Holistic
Quantolistic Qualitolistic
It is proposed that the vulnerability in the inbound logistics that flows from the sub­
contractor, and the vulnerability in the outbound logistics that flows to customers may be 
measured and evaluated by four principal dimensions, service level -  the absence of 
disturbances, i.e. the degree of reliability in the firms inbound and outbound flows, 
deviation -  the presence of disturbances and the degree of non-reliability in the inbound 
and the outbound flows, consequence -  the negative consequence of disturbances, i.e. the 
degree of negative impact in the firms inbound and outbound logistics flows and trend -  
the direction in change in terms of the occurrence of disturbances in the firms’ inbound 
and outbound logistics flows. This was to measure and evaluate vulnerability in the 
inbound and outbound flows. Hence the dimensions of service level and deviation 
contribute to the estimation of the disturbance in the vulnerability construct, while the 
dimension of consequence contributes to the estimate of the negative consequence of 
disturbance and the trend dimension provides an estimation of disturbance issues 
(Svensson 2002).
Again in 2002, Svensson developed another conceptual framework for the vulnerability 
construct based upon time-dependence and relational-dependence (Figure 10), where 
time-dependence refers to sequential-dependence between business activities in supply 
chain, while relational-dependence refers to the interaction process between business 
activities in supply chains (Svensson 2004) (Table 18).
Figure 10: A Conceptual framework for the analysis of vulnerability in supply
chains
Time-dependence
Relationship
dependence
Low High
Low Dynamic Vulnerability Elastic
Vulnerability
High Non-elastic Static
Vulnerability Vulnerability
Source: Svensson 2002
In 2004, the research focussed on the construct of corporate vulnerability in supply chain 
that consists of three components, time-dependence, functional-dependence and 
relational-dependence in companies upstream and downstream the supply chain.
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Table 18: Managerial implications based upon the lessons learned
Lessons learned M anagerial implications
Towards suppliers
High time dependence 
High relationship 
dependence
Causes (static vulnerability scenario) e.g. unique product needs limited 
supplier sourcing, low inbound inventory buffers and high degree of 
outsourcing. Negative consequences, e.g. upstream dependence upon 
resources, activities and actors.
Contingency planning, e.g. inbound and internal preventive activities, 
cooperation, coordination and partnering
Towards customers
High time dependence 
High relationship 
dependence
Causes (static vulnerability scenario) e.g. few customers, few products, 
few markets and low outbound inventory buffers
Negative consequences, e.g. downstream dependence upon resources, 
activities and actors.
Contingency planning, e.g. internal and outbound preventive activities, 
cooperation, coordination and partnering
Source: Svensson 2000
5.3.5 Dimensions of Vulnerability
According to Sheffi (2005a) a firm’s vulnerability to a disruptive event can be viewed as 
a combination of the likelihood of a disruption and its potential severity. Vulnerability is 
assessed by determining: what can go wrong, what is the likelihood of that happening and 
what are the consequences if the event does happen. This is illustrated in Figure 11 
below.
Figure 11: Dimensions of Vulnerability
High
‘M oderate’
vulnerability
High
vulnerability
Disruption
Probability Low ‘M oderate’
vulnerability vulnerability
Low
Light Severe
Consequences
Source: Sheffi& Rice 2005a
Vulnerability is the highest when both the likelihood and the impact are high, while 
vulnerability is the lowest when both the likelihood of its occurrence and its 
consequences are low. However, the two quadrants o f ‘moderate’ vulnerabilities will still 
have very little in common. A high probability/low consequence event tends to be part of 
the daily management issues such as employee absenteeism, product quality and random 
deviations in demand, whereas, the low probability/high consequence event may be due 
to natural disasters, terrorism or any event that is outside the scope of daily management 
tasks, and thus will require a different assessment and mitigation techniques.
52
The focus of this report though, has been on low probability/high impact risk as it is the 
area that most managers still struggle with in determining how to mitigate against these 
risks.
5.3.6 Summary
This section sort to describe the various facets and ways of considering and investigating 
supply chain vulnerability. This is a crucial part in developing the resilience strategy. 
The following section discusses the various perspectives and ways put forward by various 
authors for developing a resilient supply chain.
5.4 Supply Chain Resilience
5.4.1 Introduction
This section describes the various recommendations to achieving supply chain resilience. 
It also considers the use of business continuity methods for this cause, as well as 
achieving resilience through failure mode analysis.
5.4.2 Achieving Resilience
As companies cannot afford to interrupt business applications given the intensity of the 
competition and the pressure they are under (Sheffi 2005a, Sheffi 2005c), more 
companies are now looking for strategies to increase their resilience. A resilient 
company is not only able to endure the unpredictable nature of globalisation, but is also 
able to gain competitive advantage from it (Sheffi 2005a, Sheffi 2005c). According to 
(Sheffi 2005c, 2006), resilience, a notion borrowed from the material sciences, represents 
the ability of a material to recover its original shape following deformation. For 
companies, it measures their ability to, and the speed at which they can return to their 
normal performance level (production, services, fill rates, etc) after a disruption. This 
section considers various methods of dealing with supply chain disruptions and creating a 
resilient supply chain. To this end the author considers the recommendations made by 
various authors (Figure 12).
Bundschuh et al (2003) looked to gain resilience through developing flexible systems 
based on reliability16 and robustness 7. Robustness focussed on building redundancy in 
the form of increased number of suppliers, so in the event of failure the unaffected 
suppliers can still provide their share of the total demand of the critical supply 
(Bundschuh et al 2003).
16 Reliability was defined as the probability that a system or component performs its specified function as 
intended with a given time horizon and environment (Bundschuh et al 2003)
17 Robustness deals with the impact o f failures on the performance of a system (Bundschuh et al 2003)
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Figure 12: Mind Map of Resilience
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This reduces the amount to which the supply chain can be completely disrupted. The 
second method of increasing robustness is through having a contingency supply in case of 
failure. This can be either through having Strategic Emergency Buffers (SEBs) which 
are to be used only in the event of a disruption. This was recommended by Sheffi (2001). 
SEBs consists of critical items that may be required in the event of a loss of supply. This 
inventory is not to be used for regular production, but can be very costly as there needs to 
be sufficient coverage for the loss of supply. Thus the second option, which is more cost- 
effective as it guards against the large accumulation of emergency inventory, is the 
purchase of options on additional supply in case of a loss. In the event of failure the 
unaffected supplier provides more than their contractual supply. As this supply though, is 
not in the chain, it can cause a lead-time in the contingency supply. Reliability focusses 
on the probability that the supplier is able to provide the supply when required. The 
failure to do this can result from any of the disruptions discussed throughout this report. 
Reliability of the system is then increased through customer relationships and having 
multiple suppliers.
Through their study of the events and actions during the outbreak of SARs, Wei-Jiat and 
Enderwick identified some strategies that should be put in place to create a more 
responsive supply chain by increasing its flexibility. Wei-Jiat & Enderwick (2006) 
suggested ways in which companies could prepare for these disruptions. Firstly, 
companies need quicker access to and action that will provide timely warnings based on 
environmental scanning of the local political, regional and global environments. 
Information also needs to be channelled to affiliates in other parts of the world, thus the 
importance of establishing an integrated global network and facilitating intra-company 
learning (Wei-Jiat & Enderwick 2006). Secondly, they suggested that when companies 
are choosing locations and sites the stability, reliability and predictability of the location, 
in addition to the cost benefit, need to be taken into consideration. Thirdly, it may be 
advisable to decentralise their production sites from one location (such as China) to 
smaller, multiple sites and facilities around the world, creating the global network of 
manufacturing facilities. Fourthly, diversifying the supply base and sourcing from 
multiple locations, thus reducing firm dependence on a single location was 
recommended. Possible locations besides Asia include Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. Finally, they recommended loosening the supply chain to allow for slack to 
accommodate delays and potential problems through the use of buffer inventory and 
safety stock. This may be considered costly, but the cost of an unresponsive supply chain 
in the face of disruption can be more severe than carrying excess stock.
Martha and Subbakrishna 2002, described the ‘just-in-case’ strategy. In addition to the 
recommendations of alternative sourcing arrangement as previously mentioned, they also 
recommended having alternative sources of transportation, particularly for critical 
components whether by land, sea or air. This may mean using air cargo if ports are 
closed, or rail, land or sea transport in the event of an air band. Thirdly, they 
recommended the use of demand management where the company is able to shift 
customer demand away from an affected product to an unaffected product. Fourthly, the 
use of modular products allows for quick response as well as makes it easier to shift 
demand. The postponement approach has been highly recommended and will be
55
discussed in some more detail later. Lastly, they have also recommended increasing 
inventories to the ‘right’ level and having supplier and transport relationships that will 
facilitate the movement of the inventory in the event of disaster.
Researchers at the Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain developed a framework for 
increasing supply chain resilience that looked at supply chain re-engineering, supply 
chain collaboration, culture and agility.
As supply chains have been designed to optimise cost and/or customer service and rarely 
with resilience in mind, they need to be re-engineered to reduce supply chain risk (Figure 
13). Firstly, the supply chain network that connects a company to its first and second tier 
suppliers and customers needs to be understood. This should include understanding their 
capabilities, vulnerabilities (Wu et al 2005) and risk awareness (Christopher and Peck 
2003). Understanding also extends to the understanding of the ‘pinch points’18 and 
critical paths of the network, e.g. knowing where there are limited capacity or no 
alternative options for distribution facilities or no access to ports (Christopher and Peck 
2003), for example. Secondly, single suppliers, though cost-effective and good from a 
quality perspective; often reduces supply chain resilience. Alternative supply sources 
should be available in the event that the main supply is unable to provide the products or 
services as required. With multiple sites it may be possible to have a single source for an 
item or service into each site, thus gaining the advantage of single sourcing (Christopher 
and Peck 2003). It may also be useful to consider the use of multiple sites in the event 
that the main site is inoperable. Thirdly, when designing the supply chain one of the 
principles should be to keep as many options open as possible. They may not be the 
lowest cost in the short term, but they may provide the opportunity to reduce the impact 
of vulnerabilities in the long term (Christopher and Peck 2003). There needs to also be 
the consideration of the trade off between ‘efficiency versus redundancy’ (Christopher 
and Peck 2003, Chopra & Sodhi 2004, Lee 2004). Companies may need to consider 
carrying extra capacity or inventory, which in itself is an extra cost and contradicts the 
lean strategies that have been well sort after in the 1990s.
According to Christopher and Peck (2004), since improved quality and cost reduction are 
perceived as a network wide strategy, then supply chain risk management and supply 
chain resilience too should be a network wide strategy built on sound collaborative 
relationships to mitigate risk. Rapid access to information (Christopher 2005) increases 
supply chain intelligence,19 which allows for greater visibility of the upstream and 
downstream risk profiles and changes in those profiles (Christopher and Peck 2003).
Creating an agile system is about creating networks that are able to respond quickly to 
changed conditions. The time to respond to changes is dramatically reduced. Agility is
18 Pinch points occur where there is a limit o f capacity and where alternative options might not be available 
(Christopher and Peck 2003)
19 Supply Chain Intelligence is used to describe the process o f using knowledge generated and shared by 
partners in the supply chain (Christopher & Peck 2004)
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founded on two key principles -  velocity20 and visibility21. Velocity requires shorter, 
streamlined (CLSCM 2003), end-to-end pipelines, which themselves are dependent on 
sourcing decisions as well as internal process improvement. The focus then is on 
reducing the inbound lead times and reducing the non-value added activities (Christopher 
& Peck 2004).
Finally, creating a supply chain risk management culture, which needs to be promoted in 
the company so that all are concerned about it and the issues, ideas and procedures are 
internalised so that employees may work to reduce risk wherever possible.
20 Velocity requires shorter end-to-end pipelines which themselves are dependent on sourcing decisions as 
well as internal process improvement
21 Visibility impacts agility by reducing uncertainty and enabling the goal of a demand-driven supply chain 
to be achieved and by reducing supply chain risk through shred information, both upstream and 
downstream o f the firm’s operation.
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Figure 13: Creating a Resilient Supply Chain
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Sheffi focussed on two main principles for creating resilient systems, redundancy and 
flexibility. Redundancy can be achieved by carrying extra inventory and finished goods 
to provide extra cover when a disaster occurs, through the use of multiple suppliers, even 
when the secondary suppliers have higher costs and low capacity utilization rates. These 
strategies are effectively an insurance premium which can be very costly, inefficient (due 
to poor product quality), and thus hard to justify (Sheffi 2005c). Though this was 
recommended by Sheffi, Christopher and others Sheffi has indicated that this is not a 
preferred option. Building flexibility into the supply chain is a better way of achieving 
resilience as it helps a company in two ways. It facilitates the quick response to 
disruptions in the supply chain and also encourages improved management of day-to-day 
changes in the market place. According to Sheffi and Rice (2005) ‘Flexibility amounts to 
building organic capabilities that can sense threats and respond to them quickly’, thus 
giving the organisation a competitive advantage in addition to a resilient system.
Flexibility includes firstly, the ability to move products between plants, using 
interchangeable and generic parts in many products and the cross-training of employees. 
If the company has the same layout across its plants and uses the same generic parts for 
its products, and if employees have uniformity in training, it is possible to move 
production and employees to another plant in the event of a disruption. This was the case 
with Intel with the 2003 SARS outbreak in Asia (Sheffi 2005c, Sheffi, Rice 2005). 
Secondly, concurrent processes of product development, production and distribution not 
only allow the organisation to execute different supply chain processes in parallel by 
shortening cycle time, but also means that the recovery time could be shorter if a 
disruption occurs (Sheffi 2005c, Sheffi & Rice 2005). Thirdly, after a disruption the 
requirements for products may change. Therefore, designing products and processes for 
maximum postponement of as many operations and decisions as possible increases 
resilience through flexibility. Having fewer products in their finished state allows for 
more flexibility in finishing the product according to the new demand. In 1999, Dell was 
better able than Apple to respond to changes in demand after the Taiwan earthquake 
disrupted the worldwide supply of memory chips (Sheffi & Rice 2005). Regardless of 
the procurement strategy chosen, it must be in line with the type of relationship chosen 
with the suppliers. Therefore, if a company decides to follow an arms length strategy 
then it is better that they have a high number of suppliers that they are able to turn to the 
others in times of a disruption. A collaborative relationship however, means that the 
focal company will have to gain more knowledge of the supplier and their processes, 
strategies; attitude to risk etc., and they will have to spend more time fostering that 
relationship, so that in the event of a problem the focal company can rely on the supplier 
to serve his needs first.
Finally, the Corporate Culture, has been identified as the most important or most crucial 
factor that allows companies to be flexible and resilient and bounce back from disruptions 
when they occur (Sheffi 2005b, Sheffi 2005c). Continuous communication of the way 
things are to be done and the regular transmission of information throughout the 
organisation are key. It is important that the people on the front line are able to respond 
and take action when a potential problem is imminent. This allows for the containment 
of the problem. Employees must have the training, have internalised the company
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mission and must have the authority and the support from their organisation to take 
corrective action. Additionally, passion for work was also found to be of great 
importance.
For supply side tactics, Tomlin has recommended to deal with disruptions production 
should be increased at some of the company’s other suppliers in the region (Tomlin 
2006). Firms can also use either mitigation22 or contingency23 tactics. Thus, operational 
tactics for mitigating against disruptions include operational mitigation in the form of 
inventory and sourcing and operational contingency in the way of rerouting and demand 
management24. Inventory mitigation is not an attractive strategy in an environment of 
rare but long disruptions as a significant amount of inventory will need to be carried for 
extended periods without a disruption (Tomlin 2006). If however, there is advanced 
warning of a disruption, such as a labour dispute, then there may be ample time to 
employ the mitigation inventory in advance of the disruption (Tomlin 2006). Volume 
flexibility25 provides an alternative to inventory in managing temporary imbalances in 
supply and demand which can arise because of supply side disruptions or temporary 
shifts in demand (Tomlin 2006). Volume flexibility is important as it can allow for 
contingent rerouting, thus making it part of the firm’s strategy.
While Lee may not have explicitly called it creating a resilient supply chain he sought to 
develop a responsive and competitive supply chain through agility, adaptability and 
alignment (Lee 2004). Lee states that only those companies that build all three into their 
supply chain will be ahead of the competition. The concepts are captured in Table 19 
below. An examination of the methods of achieving competitiveness and responsiveness 
will highlight that these tend to mirror some, if not most, of the recommendations to 
achieve a resilient supply chain as mentioned above.
Tang (2006) put forward a ‘robust supply chain strategy’ which has tended to mirror 
some of the suggestions for developing a resilient supply chain as mentioned above. The 
supply chain issues were classified into two major groups, supply management issues 
including supplier selection, supplier relationships, supply planning, transportation and 
logistics etc., and demand management issues including new product introduction, 
product line management, demand planning, product pricing, promotion planning etc. 
The nine robust strategies included postponement; storing inventory stock in strategic 
locations to be shared by multiple supply chain partners; having a flexible supply base, 
e.g. having different plants for production, in the event of a disruption the other plant can 
ramp up their production; using a mixed strategy of producing some products and 
outsourcing others; providing economic incentives to cultivate additional suppliers; 
flexible transport arrangement; revenue management via dynamic pricing and promotion;
22 Mitigation tactics are those in which the firm takes some action in advance of a disruption and thus incurs 
the cost o f the action regardless of whether the disruption occurs (Tomlin 2006)
23 Contingency tactics are those in which a firm takes an action only in the event a disruption occurs 
(Tomlin 2006)
24 Demand Management is the ability to shift customer demand to alternative products, particularly in the 
face of a disruption to the supply chain (Tomlin 2006)
25 Volume flexibility is the supplier’s ability to temporarily adjust capacity (Tomlin 2006)
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assortment planning, which manipulates customers’ product choice and demand by 
reconfiguring the set of products on display and the silent product roll over.
Table 19: Building the Triple-A Supply Chain
Objectives Methods
Agility Respond to short-term changes 
in demand or supply quickly, 
handle external disruptions 
smoothly
• Promote flow of information with suppliers 
and customers
• Develop collaborative relationships with 
suppliers
• Design postponement
• Build inventory buffers by maintaining a 
stockpile o f inexpensive but key components
• Have a dependable logistics system or partner
• Draw up contingency plans and develop crisis 
management teams
Adaptability Adjust supply chain’s design to 
meet structural shifts in markets; 
modify supply network to 
strategies, products, and 
technologies
• Monitor economies all over the world to spot 
new supply bases and markets
• Use intermediaries to develop fresh suppliers 
and logistics infrastructure
• Evaluate needs of ultimate consumers-not just 
immediate customers
• Create flexible product design
• Determine where companies’ products stand in 
terms of technology cycles and product life 
cycles
Alignment Create incentives for better 
performance
• Exchange information and knowledge freely 
with vendors and customers
• Lay down roles, tasks and responsibilities 
clearly for suppliers and customers
• Equitable share risks, costs and gains of 
improvement initiatives
Source: Lee 2004
Interestingly, Carpenter et al 2001, studying socio-ecological systems, have taken a 
different perspective on the topic of resilience. They described resilience as the 
magnitude of disruption that can be tolerated before a socio-ecological system moves to a 
different space controlled by a different set of processes. They looked at measuring 
resilience, and though this is beyond the scope of this report, they did introduce two 
interesting concepts. Firstly, the concept that the socio-ecological system can be resilient 
at one time scale due to the technology it adopted and can be completely ‘un-resilient’ in 
another time with the use of that same technology. Thus in measuring and planning 
resilience the timescale is an important factor to be considered. Secondly, resilience can 
be achieved in one time period at the expense of resilience in a succeeding period.
5.4.2.1 Corporate Culture
Sheffi carried out a case study analysis of three companies that were identified as being 
resilient in the face of disruptions and he found that culture contributes to resilience by 
endowing employees with a set of principles regarding the proper response when the
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unexpected does occur (Sheffi 2005b). The companies studied were Dell, United Parcel 
Services and the Military Aircraft carrier operations. The case study highlighted two 
main themes, flexibility and high service. Flexibility was obtained through being result- 
focussed, having high levels of and constant communication, the use of information 
networks and strong leadership. High service included communication, training 
empowerment and the following of strict procedures.
In being result-focussed the emphasis was on fast problem solving, execution of solutions 
and accountability for actions. High levels of communication included having frequent 
meetings and company updates where the attendees were prepared with notes prior to the 
meeting, and the minutes were disseminated after the meeting. Most of the work was 
done through teams, but for one organisation this was a very fluid or dynamic 
phenomenon where teams were created as soon as required and disbanded once the task 
had been completed. This was also supported by the informal network structure within 
the organisation which allowed for the easy flow of information. Where leadership was 
concerned members were encouraged to be innovative and enterprising in solving 
problems. Besides being empowered, they were encouraged to make immediate 
decisions which are necessary traits in the face of a disruption. The training was often 
rigorous and complete with a set of procedures to follow. Thus employees required very 
little supervision, which worked well in transferring the companies’ espoused values. 
Though these companies were in essence very different, he found that there were a few 
common traits that made them resilient organisations.
Communication
Fast and flexible organisations continuously transmit information throughout (Sheffi 
2005). This may be through regular daily, weekly or monthly meetings to keep all 
employees updated, and through information network systems such as the cell phone, e- 
mails and other media to keep persons in constant communication. The values of the 
organisation were communicated and reflected in the job descriptions and formal learning 
sessions. Additionally, employees changed jobs within the organisation to increase job 
flexibility and enhance their understanding.
Passion
Employees possessed passion for their jobs and the organisation and believed that what 
they did was important. They had a personal, deeply-felt concern and responsibility to 
serve the objective of the firm (Sheffi 2005b). Additionally, employees were never 
satisfied, always recognising that they could do better and that the company will do 
better. This went beyond trying to align or train the employees in the artefacts and 
espoused values of the firm.
Disruption Conditioning
Employees are trained and conditioned to respond to disruptions. They are encouraged to 
be innovative and flexible when disruptive events occur. This conditioning drives these 
firms’ culture and identifying how to respond to disruptive events (Sheffi 2005b).
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Distributed Power
The mission and the objectives of the organisation are internalised. Each employee is 
trained and empowered to work in the best interest of the firm, so that when there are 
early signs of a disruption the first respondent possesses the orientation and authority to 
take action. This eliminates the time that is often wasted in getting approval from those 
higher up the line of authority.
5.4.3 Additional Responses to Create Resilience
This section describes the possible areas and the effects the disruptive events can have to 
the supply chain. It has been suggested by some that rather than focus on the risk of a 
terrorist attack or other disruption, it may be wise to aggregate the various sources of 
disruptions and instead analyse the risk of disruption (Rice 2003) for example, the 
slowdown of goods entering the US after September 11 was not very different from the 
impact of the 1998 Quebec ice storm on Canadian imports or the west coast port lockouts 
in October 2002 (Rice 2003). Hence, while there are varying forms of risk, there are a 
limited set of potential outcomes or impacts to these various risks (Table 20)
Ta fle 20: Disruption by failure mode
Failure Mode: A 
disruption in ....
Description
..... Supply Delay or unavailability of material from suppliers
.....Transportation Delay or unavailability of the transportation infrastructure or various 
modes. Firms showed more concern for the inbound flows than the 
outbound flows.
....Facilities Delay or unavailability of plant, warehouses, office buildings, 
facilities used in converting products
.....Communications Delay or unavailability of the information and communication 
infrastructure
.... Human Resources Delay, loss or unavailability of human resources to continue 
operations
Source: Chopra & Sodhi 2004
From the research project initiated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to 
understand how organisations were responding to the new environment respondents 
reported that they responded by having a range of differing actions as identified in the 
Table 21 below. This suggests that no singular approach fits all situations (Rice & 
Caniato 2003). While there are a range of disruptions, the effects or failure modes are 
limited, so the data is presented by failure mode.
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Table 21: Supply Chain Resilience Responses by Failure Mode
Resilience to 
disruption in ...
Action Advantages Disadvantages
Supply Use multiple and/or local 
sources in different locales.
Use single source.
Contract for supplier 
flexibility
Modify inventory levels
Modify product to use 
standard parts
Spreads risk across two firms, two 
locations. Local source protects against 
international supply shortages.
Known supplier, high supplier 
commitment, leveraged volumes.
Contract obligates supplier in advance
Right parts inventory and risk pooling 
may reduce inventory costs.
Reduces part and inventory cost, 
complexity.
Higher cost to qualify supplier, lower 
volume leverage, no assurance 
additional supplier is more resilient. 
Vulnerable to disruption unless 
supplier as multiple flexible sites, 
backup plans.
Potentially higher cost per unit, may 
entail fixed costs for ‘take or pay 
committed volume.
Requires periodic analysis by item as
conditions change
Costly to modify existing materials
standards
Transportation Prepare for and use multiple 
modes and carriers
Use spot market for capacity
Use logistics providers to 
source transportation
Pre-disruption relationship ensures 
support in crisis
Efficient transaction with no upfront or 
lasting commitment.
Providers may have greater leverage 
access
May need commit volume ti the 
alternate modes to get access in a 
disruption.
Unknown carrier means added risk, 
potential for exceptional high 
pricing.
Requires commitment (volume, cost) 
and relationship with logistics 
provider
Production
Facilities
Use multiple sites, each 
making multiple products
Modify inventory level and 
policies
Modify product to use 
standard processes
Identify and contract backup 
production facilities
Enables shifting production around 
locations
Right finished-goods-inventory levels 
and risk pooling may reduce inventory 
costs
Leverages common processing 
capabilities for lower cost, easier 
backup available.
Committed backup assured, potential to 
co-locate at supplier or customers
Requires standardization in 
production operations, additional 
capital for additional facilities. 
Requires periodic analysis, potential 
redesign of supply networks
Costly to modify product and 
production processes
Not dependable without contingency 
contract for the facilities in 
disruption
Communication Use range of 
communication media 
Back up data
Contract for backup IT 
system
Set up and operate parallel 
or mirrored IT system
Communication in nearly any event.
Protects against data loss
Provides for near-term system 
availability.
Affords immediate systems availability
Must maintain broad range o f old and 
new technology.
Still requires physical system in 
event o f system loss.
Potential delay in immediate 
response to massive system 
disruption.
Required cost to build, operate ad 
maintain separate system in protected 
environment
Human
Resources
Develop cross-trained 
workers
Modify production process 
for unskilled labour 
Back up knowledge
Enables shifting of employees and 
production as needed.
Allows rapid increase or decrease in 
capacity
Best practices captured and document
Must cross-train employees, and 
modify work system to utilize multi­
skilled employees.
Requires simplification of production 
process (not always feasible) 
Requires significant investment to 
capture and maintain knowledge in 
useful form
Source: Rice & Caniato 2003
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5.4.4 Summary
The previous section discussed some of the theories put forward by various academics as 
they seek to describe ways in which to create a resilient supply chain. These theories 
were mainly focussed around flexibility, culture and communication. The following 
section will consider how to operationalise this flexibility that is sort after.
5.5 Supply Chain Flexibility
5.5.1 Introduction
In the previous section flexibility was considered to be imperative in creating a resilient 
supply chain. This section serves to consider frameworks that can be used to achieve this 
flexibility. Three main strategic imperatives that emerged in the last few decades are low 
cost, high quality, and improved responsiveness (both delivery and flexibility of product 
delivery) (Duclos, Vokurka, Lummus 2003). Environmental uncertainty requires a firm 
to be more flexible to be able to respond to the changes to make the firm both efficient 
and effective. In general, flexibility reflects an organisation’s ability to effectively adapt 
or respond to change (Vickery et al 1999). The relationship between uncertainty and 
flexibility is a critical issue since flexibility is often viewed as an adaptive response to 
environmental uncertainty (Vickery, Calantone, Droge 1999). In the growing turbulence 
in the business environment and competition shifting to the supply chain level, supply 
chain flexibility is emerging as one of the key competitive priorities for the future (Rao & 
Wadhwa 2002). As the supply chain extends beyond the enterprise then supply chain 
flexibility must also extend beyond one firm’s internal flexibility (Lummus et al 2003).
There are a few ways that supply chain flexibility is perceived. Much of the practitioner 
literature emphasises the importance of supply chain flexibility for successful operation 
in the global environment however, little research has been done to define what 
constitutes supply chain flexibility (Duclos et al 2003). Understanding supply chain 
flexibility is important to understanding supply chain vulnerability which can then help 
managers to produce more resilient supply chain networks.
5.5.2 Supply Chain Flexibility Frameworks
Supply Chain flexibility tended to take the perspective of implementing flexible 
manufacturing systems such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems (ERP systems) 
(Van Weele, 2005), or MRP and MRPII and DRP systems and techniques against the 
correct educational and organisational background to make a sound flexible system 
(Gattoma, Walters 1996). These flexible manufacturing systems were toward improving 
the markets’ responsiveness by striving for improved quality, minimizing stocks and 
higher turnover rates in production. These are Manufacturing Resource Planning, 
KANBAN and just-in-time Scheduling (Van Weele 2002).
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Vickery et al (1999) suggests that supply chain flexibility should be examined from an 
integrative, customer oriented perspective, thus encompassing those flexibilities that 
directly impact a firm’s customers and are the shared responsibility of two or more 
functions along the supply chain, whether internal or external to the firm. They 
categorised their flexibility in terms of product flexibility, volume flexibility, access 
flexibility and market (the responsiveness to target market) flexibility. Theirs was the 
more traditional view of flexibility based on flexibility dimensions (Lummus et al 2003). 
Christopher & Towill (2000), Mason et al (2000), and Naylor (1999) are examples of 
those who thought to create flexibility through the use of lean, agile and leagile systems 
and decoupling points (Rao & Wadhwa 2002). Fisher looked at creating flexibility with 
respect to product demand, having a flexible strategy that is market responsive. Prater 
2001 defined flexibility as the capabilities of promptness and the degree to which a firm 
can adjust its speed, destination and volumes. For Adrian (2001) the emphasis was on 
quick and inexpensive restructuring for enhanced flexibility, e.g. being able to change to 
alternative suppliers quickly if the current ones are unable to honour supplies. Rao and 
Wadhwa (2002) proposed a conceptual framework based on resource, transformation, 
process and product interdependencies.
However, Duclos et al, (2003) defined a model of supply chain flexibility to Consider 
vulnerability and risk. Six components of supply chain flexibility were identified from 
the literature on manufacturing flexibility, strategic flexibility and supply chain 
flexibility. Lummus et al (2003, 2005) looks at characteristics of flexible chains, e.g. the 
ability to add or remove suppliers, ability to postpone product differentiation etc. Certain 
characteristics or capabilities will lead to improvements in performance and thus it was 
felt that this provided the better framework in which to consider flexibility.
The flexibility framework is important as it is the medium or structure through which 
companies can achieve the required flexibility for resilience as described by Christopher, 
Peck and Sheffi. Lummus et a l’s (2003, 2005) (Figure 14) framework for flexibility 
provides the best framework to achieve these same said characteristics that have been 
identified as being important for supply chain resilience. They seem to be more 
encompassing and not limited to day-to-day demand/supply variations.
Operations system flexibility is the ability to configure assets and operations to react to 
the emerging customer trends at each stage of the supply chain. Inflexibility includes the 
inability to transfer production from one plant to another and the inability to successfully 
respond when capacity is restrained.
Market Flexibility is the ability to mass customise and build close relationships with 
customers, including the designing and modifying of new and existing products. Hence 
the responsiveness to changing market conditions and customer needs after some form of 
disruption or disaster to the supply chain is important.
Logistics flexibility is the ability to cost effectively receive and deliver products as 
sources of supply chain customer change (customer location changes, globalisation,
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postponement). This includes all the processes of transporting goods from suppliers to 
manufacturers, distribution centres and the final consumption points. However, it may be 
possible to extend this definition to transportation infrastructure, which may be affected 
in a disruption, such as roads, rail, air and sea transport and ports.
Supply Flexibility is the ability to reconfigure the supply chain, altering the supply of 
product in line with customer demand. Therefore as one member sees the need to add 
partners to complete a task, new partners with the required capabilities must be found.
Organisation flexibility is the ability to align labour force skills to the needs of the supply 
chain to meet customer requirements. This is the flexibility that is achieved through the 
workforce and the organisational structure, business practices and culture within which 
the workforce operates. Reconfiguration and adjustment of operations will only be as 
successful as the flexibility of the workforce and organisational environment allows.
Information systems flexibility is the ability to align information system architectures and 
systems with the changing information needs of the organisation as it responds to 
changing customer demands. Change within the supply chain may be inhibited if the 
information system cannot respond to these changing needs. Supply chain partners must 
be willing to adapt their information systems to meet the needs of all partners and 
upgrade the business processes as the market evolves.
Table 22 below summarises the flexibility framework as just described and also includes 
the references from which the authors have drawn in developing this framework.
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Table 22: Su jply Chain Flexibility Components and Key Characteristics
Supply Chain Flexibility 
Component
Supply Chain Flexibility Characteristics 
Ability to . . .
Reference
Operations Systems Reconfigure Assets 
Change processes 
Dynamically adjust capacity
Anderson (2000), Radjou (2000), Allnoch 
(1997)
Radjou (2000)
Logistics Process Adjust to global requirements 
Serve customer’s distinct needs 
Vary warehouse space 
Vary transportation carriers 
Introduce product postponement
Bradley (1997)
Fuller et al (1993)
Richardson (1998)
Huppertz (1999), Doherty (998), 
Swaminathan (2001), Van Hock (2000)
Supply Network Add and remove suppliers 
Select suppliers with fast ramp up
Vary supplier relationships 
Have suppliers vary capacity
Jordan (2000), Rich (1997),
Burt and Soukup (1985), McGinnis and 
Vallopra (1999), Fisher et al (2000) 
Bensaou (1999), Mason et al (2002), 
Cooper (1993), Choi and Hartley (1996)
Organisational Design Change organisational structure 
Change human resource practices
Change workforce capabilities
Link workforce between nodes 
Change culture
Miles (1989), Andrews (1994), Lau (1996) 
Zhang (2001), Power et al (2001), Mac 
Duffie (1995), Wright and Snell (1998), 
Upton (1995)
Vokurka and O’Leary-Kelly (2000), Miles 
(1989), Hall and Parker (1993), Kalwani 
and Narayandas (1995), Moller and Wilson 
(1995), Hult et al (2002)
Inform ation Systems Synchronise information systems with 
partners
Interface internal processes 
Share information with partners
Dabbiere (1999)
Vokurka and O’Leary-Kelly (2000), 
Magretta (1998)
Source: Lummus et al 2003
Figure 14: Model of Supply Chain Flexibility Characteristics
Logistics
Processes
Information
System
Flexible
Supply
Chain
Organisation
Design
Supply
Network
Operating
Systems
Responsiveness 
Supply Chain Cycle Time 
New Product Introduction Time 
Time to adjust volumes
Service
Deliver to request date 
Wide range of products 
New customer locations
Supply Chain Assets
Supply Chain inventory
Custom er satisfaction
Source: Lummus et a l 2003
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5.5.3 Agility and Leagility
A key characteristic of an agile organisation is flexibility (Christopher & Towill 2000). 
The concepts of agility also provide a foundation for understanding flexibility (Lummus 
et al 2003). According to Prater et al (2001), agility is the ability of an organization to 
thrive in a continuously changing, unpredictable business environment, i.e., an agile firm 
is one that has designed its organization, processes and products such that it can respond 
to changes in a useful timeframe (Hormozi, 2001). However, as organisations and 
networks become more complex their agility decreases (Christopher 2002). Agility is 
needed in less predictable environments where demand is volatile and the requirement for 
variety is high, whereas ‘lean’ works best in high volume, low variety and predictable 
environments. However, agility needs to be thought of from two perspectives, from the 
production side and meeting customer demand, and from the perspective of being able to 
deal with disruptive events through multiple sourcing, emergency stock and other 
strategies.
Leagility is the combination of the lean and agile paradigm within a total supply chain 
strategy by positioning the de-coupling point26 so as to best suit the need for responding 
to a volatile demand downstream, yet providing level scheduling upstream from the 
decoupling point. The key principles of the leagile system are postponement and 
information decoupling (van Hoek, 2000, Mason-Jones et al 2000). Billington and 
Amaral (1999), Mason-Jones et al (2000), van Hoek, 2000, Christopher & Peck 2004 all 
suggest that the combined effect of shared information in the supply chain and delayed 
configuration through postponement can significantly improve responsiveness. 
Companies have explored using leagile systems to deal with customer demand 
fluctuations, but these strategies can also contribute to developing a flexible and thus 
resilient supply chain.
5.5.4 Summary
This section sort to discuss the possible framework that can be used to promote supply 
chain flexibility and also to introduce the concept of Leagility which is not new, as a way 
of increasing resilience. The following section explores achieving resilience through 
business continuity.
5.6 Business Continuity and Resilience
5.6.1 Introduction
Business continuity can play a significant role in allowing organisations to have a 
competitive advantage if the organisation takes seriously the principles of Business 
Continuity Planning (BCP), and if it is fully embedded in the organisation beyond its
26 The de-coupling point is the point at which the market ‘pull’ meets the upstream ‘push’ (Christopher & 
Towill 2000)
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regulatory nature. The goal of BCP is to preserve and protect the essential elements of an 
enterprise and maintain an acceptable level of operations throughout a crisis and 
afterwards, as the company recovers (Rodetis 1999). Many business continuity plans are 
based in increasing redundancy in several facets of the companies’ operations (Sheffi, 
Rice 2005), thus BCP can speed recovery and resilience (Herbane et al 2004). With all 
the environmental changes, the concept of business continuity is on building resilience 
and not only on recovery strategies and plans (Foster & Dye 2005). BCP not only allows 
for resilience, but also for improved security by exposing potential weaknesses in the 
systems which can then be addressed. It allows for improved decision-making with 
regards to the level of security and resilience required to achieve target measures.
5.6.2 Creating Business Continuity Plans
Zsidisin et al (2004) examined how and why firms create business continuity plans to 
manage risk. This was done with firms that have established BCP and risk management 
processes in supply management. Open systems theory was used to provide a framework 
for studying BCP and for identifying potential factors and constructs to be included in the 
research protocol. The framework below resulted from the study (Figure 15)
Figure 15: Supply Chain Business Continuity Framework
Creating Prevention I Remediation Knowledge
Awareness Management
Internal
External
Identification
Assessment
Treatment
Monitoring
Plan-how to 
minimize: impact, 
duration, 
resources 
Execution
Track results 
Things gone right 
Things gone 
wrong
Future Action List
Source: Zsidisin et al 2004
Although the firms operated in very different environments, there was consistency in 
their approach to continuity planning in the upstream supply chain. Awareness is evident 
when the business realises that it is vulnerable to supply disruptions. This awareness has 
to be developed internally at the management level in order to later allocate resources to 
manage the risk. The awareness then has to be moved external to the organisation to the 
suppliers and customers in the supply chain to create awareness and to enlist them in an 
effort to manage risk (Zsidisin et al 2004). Preventing Supply Discontinuity involves 
reducing the likelihood and/or impact of supply chain disruptions which consists of the
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7 7  7 8  7 0  7 0risk identification , risk assessment , risk treatment and risk monitoring (Zsidisin et 
al 2004).
The actions taken to recover from a disruption when it occurs remediate risks. The firm 
considers how to shorten the disruption, minimize the impact to the business, and identify 
in advance the resources that will be needed to carry out this plan (Zsidisin et al 2004). 
The firm then has to learn from the experience once a disruption has occurred. This can 
be in the form of a post-incident audit that identifies important lessons learned; things 
that went right and things that went wrong, and the results of the remediation efforts, 
along with feedback to the earlier stages in the continuity planning process (Zsidisin et al 
2004).
5.6.3 Summary
This section briefly discussed the link between BCP and resilience and the common 
threads that companies use to form business continuity plans.
5.7 Disruption Risk Management
5.7.1 Introduction-
Disruption Risk Management (DRM) is a new and emerging field, gaining importance to 
many businesses, due to the vulnerabilities supply chains now so clearly experience, and 
brings together the risk management literature and supply chain coordination. The 
following sections will briefly discuss how disruptions can be categorized, and the 
various stages of a disruption.
5.7.2 Types of Supply Chain Disasters and the responses to them
Kleindorfer, Saad (2005) have suggested that to manage disruption risk, companies need 
to develop a conceptual framework that reflects the effective integration of the joint 
activities for risk assessment and risk mitigation and provide strategic direction, actions 
and necessary conditions that help advance cost-effective mitigation practices.
The framework for managing risk developed by (Kleindorfer, Saad 2005) is derived from 
theory and practice of industrial risk management. It considers the nature of the
27 Risk identification -  enumerating the causes/sources of potential supply chain disruptions (Zsidisin et al 
2004)
28 Risk assessment -  evaluating the likelihood of occurrence and the impact that event will have on the 
business for each cause or sources of potential disruptions (Zsidisin et al 2004)
29 Risk treatment -  prioritising the causes/sources of potential disruptions and developing strategies for 
reducing their likelihood and/or mitigating their impact on the business (Zsidisin et al 2004)
30 Risk monitoring -  monitoring developments in the supply chain that may increase or decrease risks on an 
on-going basis. These might included changes in the economic or political environment, changes in supply 
markets, or the status of individual suppliers (Zsidisin et al 2004)
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underlying hazard giving rise to the risk. The risk is then quantified through a disciplined 
risk assessment process which includes determining the pathways by which such risks 
may be triggered. However, the approach to managing the risk must suit the 
characteristics and needs of the decision environment. Additionally, appropriate policies 
and actions need to be integrated with the on-going risk assessment and coordination 
along supply chain partners.
Key dimensions are fundamental to disruption risk management in the supply chain. The 
first concerns strategies and actions aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of risk 
faced at both the firm and supply chain level. The second focusses on increasing the 
capacity of the participants to sustain/absorb more risk without any serious negative 
impacts or major operational disruptions. According to Kleindorfer and Saad (2005), the 
type of low probability/high consequence type of risk cannot be managed with traditional 
risk management strategies; rather they need to have a very high quality process 
management in which the process is continually audited.
DRM involves more stakeholders than simply the company’s owners and investors. They 
involve public sector regulators, governments, employees and external stakeholders such 
as law enforcement official and emergency response teams (in event of terrorist attacks). 
Given the high stakeholder involvement, care must be taken in the assessment and 
mitigation of these risks. First focal point of disruption risk management has been 
facilities and transportation links. Attention is now moving to supply chain wide systems 
to promote visibility across the supply chain on major sources of disruption and to 
promote the opportunity for joint problem solving (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005)
5.7.3 The SAM Framework
The foundation of disruption risk management is specifying sources of risk 
vulnerabilities, assessment and mitigation (SAM). Specifying the sources of risk (S) 
includes categorizing risks into operational events, natural hazards, earthquakes and 
hurricanes and finally, terrorism and political instability.
Risk Assessment (A) and Mitigation (M) is the methodology employed in industry from 
financial services to the process industry and is based on three main disciplines: 
probabilistic risk assessment using fault and event trees and vulnerability assessment 
using emerging team based approached for purposeful agents and decision analysis 
(Kleindorfer, Saad 2005). The process of identifying, assessing, mitigating and 
monitoring risk bears a stack resemblance to risk management processes which, as 
described above, have been used in many other fields such as finance, project 
management continuity planning.
The SAM task can be implemented by following 10 principles (Table 23), which have 
been based on the industrial risk management and the supply chain literature (Kleindorfer 
and Saad 2005).
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Table 23: Ten Princi pies to introduce SAM in organisations
P rin c ip le D iscussion
1 Put own house in order Internal supply chain integration and optimization must precede any 
inter-firm interfaces, Supplier Relationship Management and 
Customer Relationship Management. Site/facility management 
systems to identify and mitigate disruptions are central building 
blocks
2 Diversification reduces risk. This diversification is to be extended to include facility locations, 
sourcing options, products and services produced, logistics and 
operational modes
3 Try to ‘work on’ the weakest link in the 
supply chain as robustness is 
determined by the weakest link and a 
weak partner
DRM must provide incentive alignment and collaboration for risk 
avoidance and reduction among all supply chain partners. 
Vulnerabilities, early warning and crisis management need to be 
identified across the entire supply chain
4 Loss avoidance and pre-emption are 
better than mitigation of losses after the 
fact
The investment in risk assessment to determine key vulnerabilities as 
well as worst case scenarios are a critical first step to managing 
disruptive events
5 ‘Robustness’ versus effectiveness. ‘Robustness’ to the supply chain in the event o f a disruptive event 
must be considered in light o f the effectiveness of the chain. 
Extreme leanness and efficiency may result in increasing the level of 
vulnerability at the firm and the supply chain level. There exists a 
trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness.
6 Maintain reasonable slack Have contingency plans and back up systems that can increase the 
level o f readiness for managing risk
7 Corporation, collaboration and 
coordination in the supply chain are 
critical.
Collaborative sharing of information and best practices among 
supply chain partners is essential in identifying vulnerabilities and in 
preparing for and executing effective crisis management
8 Understand the risk that the system is 
exposed to
Using risk assessment and quantification methods to understand the 
potential extent o f disruptions to the supply chain. These are also 
critical in developing mitigation strategies to deal with the risk
9 Modularity of product and process 
designs
This provides the leverage for risk reduction, especially for 
interruptions involving discontinuities in raw material availability 
and component supply due to the flexibility which promotes 
resilience, particularly when resources and essential inputs are 
interchangeable with other items
10 The use of Total Quality Management 
(TQM) principles
The TQM principle of prevention and process control rather than 
inspection increases supply chain security and the reduction of 
disruptive risks faced while reducing operating costs
Adapted from Kleindorfer and Saad (2005)
5.7.4 Summary
This section discussed Disruption risk management and the SAM framework that was 
presented by Kleindorfer and Saad. The following section discusses Supply Chain Risk 
Management.
5.8 Supply Chain Risk Management
Supply Chain Risk Management SCRM seeks to address the issue of vulnerabilities in 
complex supply chain. Though a study or a discourse on supply chain risk management 
(SCRM) was not reflected in the research questions and objectives, the research process 
has identified this as one of the key themes and thus, in pursuing a resilient strategy one 
will have to consider the concept of supply chain risk management.
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Juttner et al 2003 define supply chain risk as ‘any risks for the information, material and 
product flows from original supplier to the delivery of the final product for the end user’. 
This is the possibility and effect of a mismatch between supply and demand. Four basic 
constructs of supply chain risk management were presented: supply chain risk sources31, 
risk consequences3 , risk drivers33 and risk mitigating strategies . Since all risk will not 
be mitigated in the same manner, the sources and classification of risk and disruptions 
provides the basis for risk assessment (Juttner et al 2003). The risk drivers tend to lead 
to a more integrated supply chain and increases the complexity of the supply chain. The 
risk mitigation strategies identified by Miller 1992 included avoidance, control, co­
operation and flexibility and a further illustrated in Table 24 below.
Table 24: Risk Mitigation Strategies
Avoidance • Dropping specific products/ geographical markets/ suppliers 
and/ or customer organisations
Control • Vertical integration
• Increased stockpiling and the us of buffer inventory
• Maintaining excess capacity in productions, storage, handling 
and/ or transport
• Imposing contractual obligations on suppliers
Cooperation • Joint efforts in improve supply chain visibility and 
understanding
• Joint efforts to share risk-related information
• Joint efforts to prepare supply chain continuity plans
Flexibility • Postponement
• Multiple sourcing
• Localised sourcing
Source: Juttner et al 2003
31 Risk sources are the environmental, organisation or supply chain-related variables that cannot be 
predicted with certainty and that impact o f the supply chain outcome variables (Juttner et al 2006)
32 Risk consequences are the focussed supply chain outcome variable like cost or quality (Juttner et al 
2006)
33 Risk drivers can be taken as competitive pressures such as globalisation, outsourcing , centralisation 
strategies etc (Juttner et al 2006)
34 Risk mitigating strategies are the strategic moves organisations deliberately undertake to mitigate the 
uncertainties identified from the various risk sources (Juttner et al 2006)
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5.9 Terrorism and Security
5.9.1 Introduction
One aspect that has taken precedence in the recent years, especially after events such as 
the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001 and more recently the 
London bombing on July 7th 2005, is terrorism and its effects on the supply chain.
Russell and Saldanha (2003) have identified that the aggregate estimated cost as a 
consequence of new security measures should be in the vicinity of US$151 billion 
additional costs annually in the US alone, of which US$65 billion can be attributed to 
logistical changes in the supply chain. It has also been estimated that businesses will 
carry extra safety stock and inventory that may go up by as much as 5% which would 
represent a US$75 billion increase in working capital (Russell and Saldanha 2003). 
Additional cost being added to the supply chain includes tighter security controls and an 
increase in the shipping and insuring of U.S. imports (Russell and Saldanha 2003).
However, such events have been described as outliers (Stauffer, 2003) quite unlikely to 
happen regularly even compared to the other events that can be categorised as low 
probability/high impact events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, to even strikes. 
However, these events can be quite detrimental to the supply chain once they occur, 
especially when we consider that the response of the government in the face of such 
events, such as closing air travel and ports (Sheffi 2005a) can cause the supply chain to 
immediately grind to a halt. This new operating environment calls for a supply network 
design that is both secure and resilient (Rice, Canaito 2003).
Rice & Caniato (2003) and Rice & Spayd (2005) have indicated that security and 
resilience are two different things and as such, should not be used interchangeably35. 
However, some of their strategies, i.e. for ensuring resilience and ensuring security, 
overlap. Thus, it is believed that some of these strategies are worth mentioning and 
taking into consideration. It still remains though, that creating a secure supply chain, 
particularly against the effects of terrorism, is beyond the scope of this report.
5.9.2 Activities to Achieve Security and Resilience
Resilience and security are improved through organisation capabilities. As with any 
initiative, the company’s leadership, attitude, belief and actions are key to ensuring that 
emphasis is placed on resilience and security. Resilience and security are part of the 
organisation’s culture and are accepted as beliefs, all of which are accomplished through 
the education and training of employees (suppliers and customers) about resilience, 
security and supply chain risks.
Secondly, BCP has the dual effect of improving security and resilience as it exposes the 
potential weaknesses in the systems which can then be addressed. BCP entails
35 Supply network security can be considered in terms of maintaining the integrity of the product, while 
supply chain resilience is the ability to react to unexpected disruption and restore normal supply network 
operations (Rice & Caniato 2003)
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establishing layers of security and resilience which can include ongoing assessment of 
supplier resilience and security by ongoing on-site visits and ‘capacity reports’, 
development and maintenance of alternative supply and production systems (Rice & 
Caniato 2003). As the layered approach is being used it is not necessary that each be 
perfectly implemented as the layers of resilience and security will mean that the actions 
will back up each other (Rice & Caniato 2003). The second BCP strategy is the setting 
up of the established emergency operating centres (EOCs) which is an allocated 
emergency space that a predetermined set of leaders can meet to plan and strategise once 
the disaster has occurred (Rice & Caniato 2003).
Thirdly, the new era will call for a change in supplier relationships. This may result in an 
increase in the long-term relationships and a reconsideration of the balance between 
offshore and local suppliers. While offshore suppliers may be less expensive, they are 
more susceptible to disruptions and have higher lead times. Many companies may go for 
a mixed strategy.
Table 25: Five Tenets of the Securibp-Aware Logistics Supply Chain Operation
T enet Definition C om m ents
1 Companies need to partner with local, state 
and federal government organisation that 
impact the movement of freight
Forming ‘partnerships’ with the government and other 
regulatory bodies such as customs department.
2 Companies need to know their overseas 
trading partners and take responsibility for 
securing their cross-border supply chains
• Importers have to be sure of their own employees and 
security procedures.
• Importers must have confidence in their trading partners
• Importers must have confidence that their trading partners 
have security measures in place to ensure that their supply 
chains are not vulnerable to illegal trafficking of drugs, 
persons, ammunition etc
• Companies should have in place security systems to ensure 
the exclusion of unauthorised personnel
3 Companies need a mode shifting capability to 
accommodate unexpected delays, 
interruptions and disasters
This mainly refers to having the flexibility to change 
transportation, e.g. flight to truck services in the event that the 
primary service is unavailable after a disruption
4 Companies need to develop a suite of 
communication channels and media to 
manage crises
Part o f the crisis management preparation is assigning and 
knowing who is responsible for communicating, who is told 
what, when, where, how and by whom. Specific channels of 
communication in a crisis might include visits from leaders to 
the crisis site, web sites, response centres, mailers, briefings and 
educational seminars
5 There is a need to adopt the military concepts 
of agility, reservists and pre-positioning for 
the management of business logistics and the 
supply chain in the new environment
Agility in the sense of the time taken to analyse a situation and 
adjust their strategic and tactical business plans in a few hours 
Reservist means being able to replace people, systems, 
documents quickly to allow the continuation o f the business in 
the time of crisis
Prepositioning of safety stock, known as the ‘Strategic 
Emergency Stock’ to be used as buffer in times of disruption
Adapted from Russell and Saldanha (2003)
Fourthly, knowledge, information, processes and relationships important to the business 
must be backed up. These processes include communication protocols, authority chains
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and decision-making procedures. Personnel and workers are key to the business, but in 
the event that they are not there to draw on their expertise, then all critical processes 
should be documented, ideally employees should be cross-trained so that if persons in 
critical roles are affected, there are others there to continue the process.
Additionally, Russell and Saldanha (2003) have offered five tenets to help companies 
ensure continuity and security in the supply chain in the event of a crisis (Table 25).
From the tenets discussed we realise that there is a strong overlap (with the exception of tenet 
1) of strategies for the increase in supply chain resilience offered by the likes of Sheffi, Rice, 
and Christopher & Peck, Lee. Tang and Tomlin.
5.9.3 Security and Collateral Benefits
Collateral benefits are derived from supply chain security investments that may provide 
valuable benefits in other areas in the firm and vice versa (Rice & Spayd 2005). Enabling 
private sector firms to improve efficiency and have improved security are the benefits to the. 
However, collateral benefits in themselves are not solely as a result of a firm’s contribution 
and investment to security, but are as a result of a combined approach to risk management, 
supply chain security and supply chain risk management (Rice & Spayd 2005) (Table 26).
Table 26: Supply Chain Security Investments that also offer collateral benefits
•  Asset Visibility and Tracking • Building Organisational Infrastructure
Awareness and Capabilities
• Personnel Security • Collaboration Among Supply Chain Parties
• Physical Security • Proactive Technology Investments
• Standards Development •  TQM Investments
• Supplier Selection and Investment •  Voluntary Security Compliance
• Transportation and Conveyance •
Security
Source: Rice & Spayd 2005
While this is very much a current and evolving topic and field, a description of these collateral 
benefits is beyond the scope of this report.
5.9.4 Summary
This section sort to introduce and briefly discuss the current topic of resilience and security of 
the supply chain in the face of terrorist activity. Some of the overlapping strategies were 
identified.
5.10 Conclusion
Much information and research findings were presented in this chapter. It covered the areas 
of supply chain vulnerability and the various ways and perspectives of determining the 
vulnerability of the business. How to achieve supply chain resilience through the perspective 
of various authors and researchers was covered. The key elements that were highlighted 
were flexibility and organisational culture. This section also tried to link the creation of 
resilient organisations through business continuity and failure mode analysis. The section
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encompassed a discussion on various flexibility frameworks that could be used to achieve the 
required flexibility. Following on was a discussion of Disruption Risk Management, and the 
chapter ended with ways of considering the resilience and security of the supply chain in the 
event of the ever-present threat of terrorism.
The following chapter seeks to synthesise the above findings and discussions into more 
‘manageable’ frameworks.
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C H A P T E R  6 
6. S Y N TH E S IS  A N D  D IS C U S S IO N
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter:
• Presented the contributions of various writers to the areas of supply chain 
vulnerability, flexibility and resilience.
• Considered how an agile and leagile strategy contributes to supply chain 
resilience.
• Described in depth the importance of the culture of the organisation in creating a 
resilient supply chain
• Presented the contribution and some related concepts of Business Continuity to 
achieving resilience.
• Identified the importance of Supply Chain Risk Management to resilience.
• Discussed Disruption Risk Management
• Introduced how some strategies can both increase resilience as well as security 
with the possibility of terrorist attacks. The concept of collateral benefits was 
introduced
• Introduced the concept of failure mode analysis as a contribution to increasing 
resilience.
This chapter synthesises that information presented in the previous chapters. It is 
comprised mainly of models that are intended to bring the main strands of the findings 
together. It suggests models that:
• Encompass the key components in determining supply chain vulnerability
• Consists of the major contributors to supply chain resilience
• Presents a conceptual model of supply chain resilience
• Amalgamates the approaches in considering supply chain resilience.
• Combines the major factors of disruption risk management
The chapter concludes with a tabulated summary of the various potential areas of 
research that have been highlighted by the various authors through the research process.
6.2 Determining an organisation’s vulnerability
As identified, the topic of vulnerability and resilience go hand in hand. However, since 
this area is a relatively unexplored area (Svensson 2002, Peck 2005) there are still
problems in conceptualising how to understand vulnerability, and how understanding it
can help in the preparation for and the creating of resilient supply chains.
The model below (Figure 16) amalgamates the contributions of various authors that have 
set out to understand vulnerability.
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Figure 16: Model for understanding supply chain vulnerability
The first part is to understand the sources of the disruption, i.e. the how and why of how 
the disruption can come about. This will include an analysis of the information and 
material flow, a breakdown in transportation and distribution, problems with the first and 
second tier suppliers, problems with retailers and/or customers, or some form of political 
instability. Also to be considered are the contributors such as globalisation strategies, 
‘lean’ manufacture, outsourcing and the like, any strategy that can make the supply chain 
more susceptible to vulnerable events.
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The second part considers the stages of the disruption as it is necessary to know how 
vulnerable the organisation is and where the most damage can occur. This forms part of 
the foundation for developing business continuity and resilience plans.
Categories of disruption form another key element and consideration will be given to 
whether the disruptions can come from internal or external sources to the organisation 
and the supply chain, and whether they can be categorised as accidents, intentional, 
natural disasters, pathological or operational events etc. It also makes use of the 
vulnerability constructs and also considers what is disrupted, e.g. transportation and 
communication infrastructure, power lines, port facilities etc.
The fourth key considers the dimensions in respect to their likelihood of occurrence and 
the impact in the event that they do occur. From this point it is possible to produce and 
develop resilient strategies to deal with the disruption.
6.3 Major contributors to supply chain resilience
The findings seem to indicate that there are key characteristics in creating a resilient 
supply chain which include organisational culture as the core to which are attached four 
sectors of resilience. Please refer to the diagram below (Figure 17).
6.3.1 Culture
Many authors concur that having the correct corporate culture is critical to any resilience 
or disruption management strategies (Sheffi 2005, Christopher & Peck 2004). Choosing 
culture as the central element seems cliched as for many models and innovative 
management techniques, the culture of the organisation has always been presented as 
being key. The same holds in this instance. While culture was not identified as being 
important to each of the perspectives used to amalgamate this model o f supply chain 
resilience, it still holds that to achieve the end results as described, these traits and 
behaviours must be embedded in the culture of the organisation.
Culture, though hard to pinpoint is represented in a tangible form through the artefacts 
and espoused values of the organisation (Schein 1996, 1984). These artefacts tend to be 
the manner in which meetings are conducted, the language , dress code, office layout and 
other ‘rituals’ that take place in the organisation (Schein 1996, 1984). The espoused 
values are reflected in the strategies, goals, philosophies, mission statements and credos 
that the organisation upholds and tries to abide by (Schein 1996, 1984).
To understand how culture impacts on thinking and behaviour the unconscious, 
underlying assumptions which determine how group members perceive, think, and feel 
(Schien 1984) need to be understood. Such assumptions are learned responses that 
originated as espoused values. Values lead to behaviour and behaviour is used to solve 
the problem. The value is transformed into an underlying assumption about how things 
really are. As the assumption is increasingly taken for granted, it drops out of awareness.
81
Thus, as certain motivational and cognitive processes are repeated and continue to work, 
they become unconscious (Schein 1984).
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Meetings, systems & /  
, network (e-mails, . , 
telephones etc), process 
and responsibilities in 
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Supply Chain 
Strategy:
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procurement, & 
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ORGANISATIONAL
CULTURE:
Artefacts & values, 
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informal networks, 
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or finished goods, 
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Postponement,' 
changeability, 
concurrent 
processes, demand 
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Source: The Author 2006
Figure 17: Key Components of Resilience
The key components identified as being important include:
Flexibility and problem solving through being results focussed, having the right 
leadership where the focus is also on innovation and enterprise with the aim of solving 
problems as quickly as possible. Informal networks also allow for the quick flow of 
information, problem solving and decision making. Through all of this communication 
again is key. The ability to work in teams, creating and disbanding teams as required was 
also identified as being key to problem solving and supporting a quick, flexible and 
resilient organisation.
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Other traits included being conditioned to be innovative and flexible in the event of 
disruptions. Companies actually prepared for these instances through scenario planning 
and practising. Power distribution and employee empowerment were also identified as 
being important. The first response is considered to be critical and thus all are 
empowered to take action. However, the ability to take the ‘correct’ action is based on 
the employees internalising the mission and ethos of the company, on them having a 
passion and belief for the company, and on employees being adequately and continuously 
trained and conditioned to the culture, policy and procedures of the organisation.
6.3.2 Flexibility & Agility
In whatever form it has been described, flexibility and agility have been identified by 
most, if not all, of the authors as being instrumental in creating the resilient supply chain. 
Some authors do have variations in perspectives as to what the factors are that facilitate 
flexibility. On the other hand, there are a few characteristics that have been unanimously 
described as being integral to creating supply chain flexibility.
• Authors agree that some form of postponement of decisions and operations is 
critical in creating that flexible supply chain. It also has the added advantage of 
reduced inventory during the course of normal operations as products are stored in 
their raw or basic form and then built-to-order or configured once the order comes
• Changeability was also identified as being very important. This refers to having 
interchangeable generic parts that can be used for a number of different items and 
having the same production layout between plants. With the employees cross- 
trained across companies this can facilitate moving employees to different plants 
to work if necessary.
• Running concurrent processes tends to allow for increased production and 
distribution, but this is also handy as the required production can take place in 
another plant or location from the one that has been disrupted, thus reducing the 
required recovery time.
• Demand management (Martha et al 2002, Tang 2006, etc) was also identified as 
one of the (lesser) strategies to increase flexibility. In this instance one is 
managing demand away from the products that cannot be produced in the crisis to 
one that can be produced.
• Martha et al (2002) and others have also recommended ‘just-in-case’ strategies 
that can be used to increase flexibility which include having alternative sourcing, 
alternative transportation and contractual suppliers (Tang 2006).
• Revenue Management (Tang 2006) through dynamic pricing and promotion to 
encourage customers away from one product to another.
6.3.3 Redundancy
Redundancy has been described as an insurance premium for the business (Sheffi 2005) 
and often includes having and increased inventory (Sheffi 2005), multiple suppliers 
(Bundschuh et al 2003, Sheffi 2005), strategic emergency buffers (Bundschuh et al 2003,
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Sheffi 2001), all with the aim of increasing the supply chain flexibility through increasing 
the reliability and robustness of the chain (Bundschuh et al 2003).
Many of the authors have recommended building redundancy into the system 
(Christopher and Peck 2004, Bundschuh et al 2003 etc). Though redundancy is 
considered better than having nothing, others have warned against using such strategies 
as they are very costly and bring a lot of inefficiencies into the system (Sheffi 2005).
6.3.4 Supply Chain Strategy
Strategy refers to whether the company wants to follow lean or other strategies such as 
having multiple supplier sites, a reduced supplier base, a mixed outsourcing strategy a a 
decentralised production or distribution strategy. While there are cost and quality 
benefits to these strategies they can also increase the company’s exposure to risk and thus 
organisations must be aware of the advantages, disadvantages and the risks that may 
emanate from these decisions.
In terms of the procurement or sourcing strategy, as (Christopher and Peck 2004) 
suggested, it is not to say that the ‘arms-length’ strategy is necessarily better than the 
collaborative strategy, but rather, the strategy employed must be in line with the way the 
organisation does business. In pursuing the collaborative strategy, the organisation may 
have reduced its supplier base, and thus, in the time of a disruption the organisation must 
be certain that the supplier will give them priority. This may mean producing some of the 
product for them, giving the organisation priority in supplying them, especially if the 
supplier company is also supplying the organisation’s competitor. If the organisation is 
going to use the ‘arms-length’ approach, then they will need to have a larger supplier 
base that they may call on in the event that they are unable to get supplies from some of 
their usual sources
6.3.5 Communication
While communication has been identified as being an important component in creating 
the correct culture in the organisation, it goes beyond frequent and formal and informal 
meetings. Morgan Stanley (Ferris 2002) attributes their fast recovery from the September 
11th crisis in part due to their communication systems and networks. Any of the 
information media could be disrupted and for Morgan Stanley, the telephones were no 
longer operational, however, they made full use of the intranet, emails and wireless 
connections (Ferris 2002). They attempted to control inaccurate information through a 
‘Rumour control’ network by issuing information three times per day. They also made 
use of the crisis hotline, video telecasts, videos and messages sent via voicemail to keep 
relevant persons informed. The stakeholders such as the directors, staff, clients, 
regulators, vendors and media were all communicated to.
Additionally, network-wide collaboration, in a crisis or not is crucial. There needs to be 
quick communication and rapid access to information across the network.
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6.4 Supply Chain Resilience: A conceptual model
The information as presented from the various authors has been synthesized and 
presented below. This is a distillation process that is progressive, but the author presents 
what she considers to be the key perspectives and themes of resilience in the supply chain 
(Tables 27 & 28). The perspectives represent the ‘strategies’ or the ‘doing’ aspect 
resilience while the themes represent what the output of this process may be.
Table 27: Key perspectives of resilience in supply-chain
Key perspectives of resilience in supply-chain:
1. Dynamic information interactions -
• External - Quick & timely access of environment (Wei Jait & Endowick 2006)
• Internal - Corporate culture, training and information networks (M.I.T 2006).
2. Collaborative shared strategies -
• Strategic alignment, demand management and network-wide planning (Tomlin 2006, Martha & 
Sabakhrisna 2002, CLSCM 2003, MIT 2006).
3. Absorptive Capacities-
• Inventory buffering, production mixes, supply and distribution contingency (Lee 2004, Tang 2006, Martha 
& Sabakhrishna 2002)LSCM 2003, MIT 2006)
Source: The Author 2006
External Dynamic Information Interactions represents the scanning of the environment 
for relevant information. This can be information on the threat of a natural disaster, a 
labour dispute, political or economic instability and instability within the supply chain 
network. This allows for increased transparency and visibility, quicker decision making 
and hopefully a more proactive response to disasters and disruptions.
The Internal Dynamic Information Interaction represents the bedrock of the organization. 
It is the culture, training and conditioning of the employees. This incorporates the 
passion for the business, methods and media of communication, attitude towards problem 
solving and innovation as well as the company’s philosophy to power and command.
Collaborative shared strategies incorporate the various strategies the company will 
choose to implement and how they will align the business to best utilize these strategies. 
This considers whether the company wants to use the arms length approach with 
numerous suppliers or the collaborative approach with a few suppliers. It also includes 
whether risk management is a network wide affair and to what extent is this so.
Absorptive capacities is the ability of the company to respond to disruptions through 
inventory buffering system, i.e., if one exist, supply and distribution contingencies, i.e.
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where or how the organization continues to receive its supply or distribute its service if 
the preferred method has been disrupted; and production strategy, i.e. the internal 
production versus the outsourced production. Absorptive capacities take into account the 
communication systems, transportation infrastructure, IT infrastructure, human resources 
and the like.
Table 28: Key themes of resilience in supply-chain
Key themes of resilience in supply-chain:
Robustness -  supplier network, contingency planning, production strategy (CSLCM 2003, Tang 2006)
Flexibility -  extra capacity, production, procurement & suppliers (Tang 2006, MIT 2005, Lee 2004)
Adaptability -  product/service design, cross trained employees, production between plants (MIT 2005, 
Bundschuh et al 2005, Wei Jiat & Enderwick 2006)
Efficient Communication -responsibility, information networks, supplier & customer relationships, and 
customer needs (Lee 2004)
Conducive corporate culture -  disruptive conditioning, passion, result focused, quick response, 
empowerment (MIT 2005, CLSCM 2003)
The key themes that have been identified to achieve resilience are robustness, flexibility, 
adaptability, efficient communication and a conducive corporate culture.
Robustness in the supplier network, considers whether the procurement strategy has been 
adequately aligned to the supplier network. If the arms length approach is taken, there 
should be sufficient suppliers to replace a product or service that may have been 
disrupted. If the collaborative approach is taken then it should be that the focal company 
is prioritised in the event of a disruption. In the case of production the company may 
decide to follow a mixed production strategy where some of the production is done in 
house while the rest is outsourced. This allows for some level of production can still 
continue if the outsourced supply is disrupted.
Flexibility has been identified as being one key trait of a resilient system and includes 
concurrent production and distribution processes, multiple suppliers, extra capacity and 
inventory buffer stock possibly stored in strategic locations.
Adaptability refers to the ability of the system to adjust or adapt through the use of 
modular products or generic parts, the movement of trained employees to different plants 
or the movement of cross trained employees to perform varying jobs. It also includes the 
ability of the company to move production between plants as may be required.
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Communication continually finds itself to be important throughout any disruption. 
Information needs to be quickly communicated through the communication network. 
With the correct network infrastructure and well established supplier and customer 
relations there is the rapid access to information and increased supply chain intelligence. 
It is often necessary to determine before hand who are the people or what teams are 
responsible for communication and through what forum and media.
The passion exhibited by employees, their ability to act quickly, be empowered, be well 
trained, innovative and results focused all provide the conducive environment that all are 
able to respond immediately and appropriately in the time of distress. This was evident 
in the cases discussed by Sheffi (2005), Ferris (2002) that allowed the respective 
companies to steer their way through the disruptive events.
The above concepts have been synthesized and presented in the model below (Figure 18). 
Figure 18: Factors affecting Resilience in the Supply-chain -  a conceptual model
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External interactions
(information & 
knowledge) contingency.
Resilience in the Supply-chain
Absorptive Capacities-
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Sector
Geographical scale 
Product type/materials
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Flexibility
Adaptability
Communication
Culture
Company level: 
Internal interactions
(information & 
knowledge) Collaborative shared 
strategies - Strategic alignment 
and network-wide planning
Source: The Author 2006
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The internal and external interactions are the capabilities of the organisation, i.e. the 
culture, training, knowledge and information that the organisation possesses and thus are 
central to the supply chain.
The absorptive capacities and shared strategies are those which are implemented by the 
organisation and the effectiveness of these strategies are based on the company’s internal 
and external capabilities.
The application of these strategies have to be applied in the context of the sector, product 
type; geographical location and scale as these influence how the organisation will achieve 
resilience.
The internal and external interactions or capabilities, the absorptive capacities and shared 
capacities need to be coordinated and worked together within the context of the sector, 
location etc to achieve the desirable outcome of resilience, which include robustness, 
flexibility, adaptability, efficient communication and a conducive culture.
6.5 Approaches to Resilience
Figure 19: Approaches to resilience
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The author also considers that there are varying dimensions companies employ to achieve 
supply chain resilience (Figure 19). This is through the combined efforts of the supply 
chain strategies as discussed in chapters five and sections 6.3 and 6.4 above, the use of 
the failure mode method of analysis and the various methods that provide supply chain 
resilience as well as security.
The resilient strategy has been comprehensively discussed and thus will require no 
further elaboration. However, section 5.4.3 identifies that the research has shown that 
companies also consider what can fail as opposed to how the failure can occur. To this 
end the failure mode analysis considers:
• Modifying inventory levels, using generic or modular parts and supplier 
alignment strategy to mitigate against a supply failure.
• Multiple modes of transportation, spot market capacity and the use of logistics 
providers can be used to mitigate against transport failures.
• Employee cross-training and the modification of production processes for 
flexibility with human resources
• That communication failure can be mitigated against through the use of a range of 
media, the back up of data and the installation of a mirrored IT system.
• The use of multiple sites and the modification of the product to use standards 
processes as a means to mitigate against disruptions at production facilities.
Focusing on security is yet another way of enhancing supply chain resilience. This can 
be through the technique of layering where various levels of protection exist before a 
system can fail. Other options for security include ongoing assessments of supplier 
resilience, establishing emergency operating centres, establishing or improving on 
supplier relationships along with having a thorough knowledge of trading partners. 
Developing a secure system also entails backing up all knowledge, information and 
processes such as communication protocols and decision making procedures; business 
relationships and the cross training of employees.
6.6 Disruption Risk Management
The author considers disruption risk management and resilience to be two separate 
strategies that use similar mitigation techniques (Figure 20). Essentially, resilience seeks 
to create a system that can ‘bounce back’ from a disruption, returning to its natural state 
or maybe even improved state whereas, DRM follows very much along the lines of risk 
management and thus seeks to identify, assess and mitigate against disruptive events.
The sources of risk are categorized into natural hazards, accidents and intentional 
disruptions including terrorist attacks and political instability. Determining the causes of 
risk are opened to the traditional risk analysis framework and the categorization of 
disruptions and the determining the drivers of supply chain vulnerability as mentioned in 
sections 5.3 of this report.
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The assessment uses the probabilistic risk assessment, vulnerability assessment and the 
risk categorization through the dimensions of vulnerability into low & high impact/low & 
high probability framework as mentioned in section 5.3.5 of the report.
Figure 20: Diagrammatic Representation of Disruption Risk Management
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The analysis then moves to the mitigation stage. The principles suggested by Kleindorfer 
and Saad (2005) to introduce this framework into the organisation are very similar to the 
strategies that exist, and have been discussed to increase supply chain resilience. The 
main additions to the mitigation strategy are the use of incentive alignment where new 
suppliers are encouraged with and present suppliers are provided with incentives to align 
their business to the focal organisation and the use of Total Quality Management 
principles of prevention rather than inspection as a strategy to increase resilience.
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6.7 Conceptualising the Relationship between Resilience, SCRM, DRM and BCP
The literature has shown that developing a robust, resilient supply chain is not solely 
hinged on resilient strategies but also includes business continuity strategies, supply chain 
risk management, supply chain security, failure mode analysis and disruption risk 
management. Thus this is reflective o f what Peck said in 2005, that ‘Supply chain 
vulnerability and resilience is wider in scope than integrated supply chain management 
and business continuity planning and commercial corporate risk management or an 
amalgamation of all o f these disciplines’ (Peck 2005).
Figure 22, the mind map summarizes the Resilient, SCRM, DRM and BCP strategies. 
The author now envisages supply chain risk management to be the umbrella under which 
disruption risk management, resilience and some aspects of business continuity are 
contained (Figure 21).
Figure 21: Conceptualising Resilience, SCRM, DRM and BCP
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Source: The Author 2006
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Supply Chain Risk is all encompassing as it considers any risk in the supply chain that 
can occur between the original supplier and the end user. This can include operational 
risk, risk due to competition, changing customer demand, environmental variability and 
any disruptive event. However, disruption risk management, which draws on the 
traditional risk management process and supply chain management, is specific to 
disruptive events attributed to natural disasters, accidents and terrorist attacks and so is 
merely a subset of SCRM as shown in the diagram above.
The author suggests that two distinct categories of resilience exist, Operational Resilience 
and Disruptive Resilience. It is suggested that Operational Resilience deals with 
disruptions on the micro level, due to events internal to the supply chain such as problems 
in operations. Disruptive resilience is concerned with major disruptive events on the 
macro level. This is the focal point of disruptive risk management and the resilient 
strategies proposed have been the central theme of this systematic review. This resilience 
is closely linked with business continuity planning.
However, the author suggests that for the moment developing a robust, resilient supply 
chain should focus around supply chain resilience, disruption risk management, supply 
chain risk management and business continuity (Figure 22).
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6.8 Research Opportunities
This section is a compilation of the possible areas of research found to be identified by 
various researchers and authors through the systematic review process. The list is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but certainly highlights the potential for research in the future 
(Table 29).
Table 29: Research Opportunities
Research Opportunity Source
Research on inter-organisation dependency and a more cohesive industry-wide approach to 
‘business continuity’ in the study of the supply chain
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
Research that supports the importance of resilience of a company’s supply chain as part of 
the overall approach to risk and business continuity management
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
The implications of anti-terrorism measures implemented by the US authorities and their 
impact on domestic business and international trade.
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
Modem supply chains are at greater risk than many managers recognize and it is not clear 
that the risk from within the demand/supply network is always apparent. There is generally 
the lack of understanding of the wider supply/demand network amongst managers.
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
Few grounded studies of supply chain risk/vulnerability have been published Peck 2005
The need for individual business entities to understand the extent of the network of which 
they are a part of, and opportunity to systematically explore the network identifying its 
vulnerabilities.
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
The need for formalized procedures for supply chain risk management within and between 
organizations
Christopher 
& Peck 2004
The construct of vulnerability has principally been explored quantitatively (Svensson 2000, 
2002a, b). As such, further research is required into the qualitative features o f the construct 
of vulnerability
Svensson
2004
The research on the constructs of corporate vulnerability in the upstream and downstream 
supply chains, based on qualitative data suggest that the findings should not be generalised 
beyond the automotive industry where the research was performed (Svensson 2004). Thus 
there should be further research into corporate vulnerability in other supply chains
Svensson
2004
The impact of the visibility line (i.e. the degree of transparency or obscurity) on corporate 
vulnerability in supply chains needs to be further explored
Svensson
2004
Further empirical testing and evaluations have to be performed in order to test the validity, 
the reliability and the universal applicability of the developed conceptual framework of 
vulnerability
Svensson
2000
The conceptualisation of the construct of vulnerability in firms’ inbound and outbound 
logistics flow was done in the Swedish automotive industry and thus the findings may not 
be generalisable beyond this industry and it may also not be transferable to other countries
Svensson
2002
A focus on how the upstream vulnerability in a specific supply chain affects the existence, 
or the occurrence of downstream vulnerability in the same supply chain and vice versa
Svensson
2002
The impact of JIT and other lean manufacturing principles in inbound and outbound 
logistics on vulnerability in the supply chains.
Svensson
2002
Several frameworks have been proposed to guide purchasing organisations in their 
assessment of the risk that exists with inbound supply, however, few studies exist that 
explore the key constructs necessary for assessing supply risk
Zsidisin et al 
2004
Developing and conducting a survey of supply risk assessment techniques to triangulate 
the initial case study research findings
Zsidisin et al 
2004
The need to discover the cost-effective opportunity for risk mitigation while Kleindorfer
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simultaneously providing the means to share the investment and insurance costs that must 
be in place to finance ex ante and ex post relief from the consequences of disruptions
and Saad 
(2005)
The methods and tools to assess risk of terrorism is lacking Rice 2003
There are a few ways then that supply chain flexibility is perceived. Much of the 
practitioner literature emphasises the importance of supply chain flexibility for successful 
operation in the global environment, however, little research has been done to define what 
constitutes supply chain flexibility
(Duclos et al 
2003).
The relationship between corporate strategy, risk and implications for supply chain 
management are poorly understood
Juttner et al 
2003
A better understanding of the source of various sources of supply chain risk and 
vulnerability, particularly from a supply network perspective
Juttner et al 
2003
A method or framework for determining how risk implications can be anticipated at an 
earlier stage.
Juttner et al 
2003
Observations of past supply chain disruptions such as Kobe, earthquake, 1995; Quebec ice 
storm, 1998; major strikes and disasters etc to determine and to give insight into the variety 
of prevention and response mechanisms. This can be applied to dealing with any type of 
disruption
Rice & 
Caniato 2003
Further development of tools to adequately assess risk of their specific network Rice & 
Caniato 2003
The development of an analytical model for the dual supply arrangements suggested by 
Sheffi to increase resilience
Bundschuh et 
al 2003
The analytical formulation for the integration of strategic emergency stock in the supply 
chain as suggested by Sheffi
Bundschuh et 
al 2003
An investigation of the uncertainty over oil prices and the future cost effectiveness of the 
global supply chain (due in part the military action in the Middle East)
Peck 2005
The need to conduct an in-depth multi-tiered case study on each of the sectors used to 
validate the findings of the aerospace case study. The aerospace study highlighted the 
absence of any understanding of the scope and dynamic nature of the sources and drivers 
of vulnerability
Peck 2005
Further work on the integration of supply chain risk and conventional risk management 
concepts and taxonomies.
Peck 2005
A need for more conceptual and empirical research on disaster planning for logistics 
managers and supply chain managers
Hale & 
Moberg 2005
To determine the extent to which supply chains are able to cope with uncertainty and 
emergencies
Lee 2004
The study of BCP from a solely empirical perspective to a theory oriented perspective Zsidisin et al 
2004
Source: The Author 2006
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter is a synthesis of the information presented in the previous chapters. Models 
for supply chain vulnerability, resilience and the approaches to resilience were presented. 
The author also presented a conceptual framework of resilience and a conceptual diagram 
representing Resilience, DRM, SCRM and BCP. Possibilities for further research as 
explicitly identified in the literature have been presented.
The following chapter describes some elements of the author’s journey through this 
learning process.
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CHAPTER 7
7. LEARNING EXPERIENCE
7.1 Introduction
Before the author concludes the report, it was thought useful or helpful to share the 
feelings, perceptions, concerns and triumphs through the journey of discovery36. To this 
end, this is what this chapter is set to do.
7.2 Reflections
The review and methodological process at times seemed more suited to fields such as 
medicine that, once the techniques are adequately applied, should yield similar results. 
Essentially, in the social sciences this process, and thus the results, seems very much 
subject to the researchers’ biases and limitations. So though this process is transparent, I 
hesitate to say that it is replicable though it does minimize bias and errors.
Carrying out the systematic review required two main types of knowledge, one, of the 
field that is being researched and two, of the techniques and tools required to complete 
the process. Firstly, knowledge of the field guards from doing repetitious work, which at 
times I felt I was doing, thus not necessarily contributing anything new at the moment. It 
felt like a big data gathering exercise to say things that have already been said. A more 
adequate knowledge of the field would have prevented the ‘repeat’ work. While this is 
part of the learning process, it seemed to be somewhat ‘time-wasting’, which was crucial 
when time was a limited resource. Secondly, the process of carrying out the systematic 
review, searching, finding, recording, selecting and synthesising the data still had to be 
learned.
The key is in generating the appropriate keywords and search strings. This is a crucial 
element of the research and is probably one of the areas that I found very challenging, i.e. 
to develop the search strings that will uncover the precise papers that provide the 
information on which to ‘hang’ the report. The panel members Ms. Heather Woodfield 
and Dr. Paul Chapman were very helpful at this point. Additionally, Ms Woodfield and 
Dr. Denyer were extremely instrumental in identifying more suitable boundaries for the 
scoping study and the systematic review.
In addition to generating the search strings the inclusion and exclusion criteria were also 
considered critical, but I did not experience too much difficulty here as there is not much 
literature in this area, and thus I did not experience a challenge in determining the 
boundary conditions for the research.
The papers that passed the inclusion and exclusion analysis stage were then quality 
assessed. There is room for subjectivity when applying the quality assessment criteria as 
it is opened to the biases, experience and perceptions of the researcher. Some papers that
36 This was seen in a previous report and thought to be a good idea. -  From Luis Coehlo (2005)
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were originally accepted needed to be reassessed as they were later found to be lacking in 
information or new contribution to the research. It was then thought prudent to recheck 
some of the papers that were originally rejected. Papers were not accepted but were used 
as a reference source. The process in itself was not complete and should not stand on its 
own. This is where the experience of the panel and cross-referencing came into play and 
were thus very important. I was then able to get papers and new ideas that I would not 
have had, had I relied solely on using the search strings and databases, working papers 
and citation databases.
Initially, I could not conceptualise how to synthesise and present the information, but 
discussions with my supervisor, Professor Wilding, did bring some ideas and clarity 
which were very helpful, greatly appreciated and well used.
At times it did seem that I was doing two, or three projects, one, enhancing the scoping 
study, two, focussing on the key findings and developing that area, and three, ensuring a 
transparent, replicable and auditable process to be written up as the methodology. This, I 
found distracting, as just as much or even more time was spent recording the data as was 
spent analysing and synthesising it to produce a sensible and creditable piece of work. At 
times, the process seemed too structured as in recording all the figures, actions and 
decisions, some potential ‘leads’ for papers were unexplored due to the immensity of the 
project. I did however, try to capture the evolution of thought, concepts and questions in 
the methodological diary (refer to the appendix). This was recommended in a previous 
review and thought to be a good idea (Lupson 2004).
7.3 Conclusion
In this chapter the thoughts and perceptions and feelings when carrying out this 
systematic review process were discussed.
Though the systematic review process may be a tedious one, I do believe that there is a 
lot of merit and good that comes out of it. It allows for focus and guidance, particularly if 
one enjoys processes. This was then a ‘mixed bag’ as I think it is good, but very tedious 
and requires persistent, meticulous and constant work to successfully complete the 
process. The development and reference to the consultation panel is very useful. The use 
of the databases and learning about data gathering from other sources of information are 
an invaluable skill, and thus a good head start into the academic career. Limitations, such 
as the researchers’ bias and inexperience and the inability of the technique itself to 
uncover all the sources of information, are mitigated through the assistance of the expert 
panel. I am in agreement that, though sometimes too structured, it does give a more 
sound output than the traditional review process.
The following section provides the conclusion to the report where I revisit the objective 
and the research question to determine where all the elements or questions previously 
presented have been answered and, if not, then some explanation is presented. I also try 
to develop opportunities or ideas for further research that can be taken to the stage of the 
PhD.
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CHAPTER 8
8. CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
There are three main aims to this chapter.
The first aim is to revisit the research question and supporting questions to discuss 
whether the report has indeed fulfilled its original aims and objectives, and the extent to 
which these have been fulfilled. This section highlights ambiguities and concerns that 
have evolved from the research.
The second aim of the research is to identify the limitations of this research piece. This 
acknowledges that there are things that could have been done better. It also signals to 
others that there are varying perspectives that could have been taken to complete the 
report.
One of the key aims of this research piece is establish further research questions on which 
to build the PhD. To this end, this report sought to provide the foundation for further 
PhD research by discussing relevant bodies of literature that will influence that work and 
through the descriptive and thematic analysis, establish gaps in the literature on which to 
build the PhD research. To this end, the third and final section presents various ideas, 
questions and research opportunities that can be taken to the PhD stage.
8.2 Discussion
A lot of work and research findings have been presented through the course of the report, 
but the task at the end of it all, is to determine if and how well the aims and objectives 
have been met. For this we revisit the research question:
Disruptive Risk Management: What makes supply chains resilient to low 
probability/high impact disruptions to the inbound and outbound aspects of the 
supply chain?
The supporting questions included:
4. How are vulnerability and resilience related in the supply chain context?
a. What are the definitions of a resilient supply chain and the global resilient 
supply chains?
b. How do you create resilient supply chains?
c. Is there a framework for resilient supply chains?
d. Are resilient strategies the key approach to managing disruptions?
e. How do you define vulnerability?
f. Have the supply chain strategies such as single sourcing and lean 
manufacture truly made the supply chain more vulnerable to the types of
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risk under discussion? Are there other factors that cause systems to be 
vulnerable (besides lean strategies)?
g. How were risk and vulnerability managed before the emergence of lean 
strategies and such other strategies?
5. What are resilience considerations for the inbound and outbound aspects of the 
supply chain?
6. How are Business Continuity and Supply Chain resilience related?
8.2.1 Defining resilience and creating a resilient supply chain
In 5.4 a definition of supply chain resilience was presented, however, specific reference 
was not made to the global resilient supply chain. This was due on part to the fact that 
the literature did not make specific reference to the global supply chain and it was taken 
that the supply chains that are most affected by the described disruptions or disruptive 
events are the extended or global ones.
This section then proceeded to present the various perspectives of resilience as presented 
by various authors. Many authors presented frameworks, or concepts by which to create 
a resilient supply chain, the most recommended methods included the postponement of 
decisions and operations to as late a stage as possible; increased redundancy through 
increased inventory, buffer stock and multiple suppliers; better communication through 
the free and quicker flow of information with customers and suppliers; corporate culture 
and strategy alignment with respect to the procurement, production and distribution 
strategy for example.
8.2.2 Are resilient strategies the key approach to managing disruptions?
Resilience strategies are a key approach to managing disruptions. However other 
approaches such as Business Continuity, Supply Chain Risk Management and Disruption 
Risk Management have also been identified in managing disruptions.
Supply Chain Risk Management seems to provide the broad perspective of risk in the 
supply chain, incorporating operational and disruptive events, while disruption risk 
management seems to focus mainly on disruptive events. Additionally, there is no clear 
distinction between business continuity and resilience. However, chapter five and figures 
12 and 22 show there is a significant overlap in the strategies used to mitigate against 
these risks. Therefore, as the literature has suggested, these core fields are yet to be 
clearly understood and thus integrated in a coherent way.
In addition to the strategies mentioned above, there is the failure mode analysis which 
seeks to plan and manage disruptions through looking at the things that can fail a system. 
Consequently, these are other areas or ways in which companies can plan for disruptions. 
The fact is that companies may need to combine strategies to ensure a robust network.
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8.2.3 How is vulnerability defined?
Section 5.3 seeks to focus on the concept of vulnerability. Vulnerability has been defined 
as an exposure to serious disturbance arising from risk within the supply chain as risks 
internal to the supply chain (Christopher & Peck 2003). The present stage of 
vulnerability analysis has been defined and discussed. Two methods of determining the 
sources of risk and vulnerability have been presented. The first method considered the 
sources of vulnerability as presented by Peck and associates. This considered the origins 
of risk and vulnerability on the four levels of the value/ stream product or process, the 
asset and infrastructure dependencies, the organisation and inter-organisational networks 
and the environment. The second, which was presented by Svensson, considered the 
construct of vulnerability through four different conceptual frameworks. Once the source 
of the disturbance has been understood the dimension of the disturbance, i.e. its 
disruption probability and consequence then needed to b determined.
8.2.4 Have the supply chain strategies made the supply chain more vulnerable to the 
types of risk under discussion?
Though not explicitly defined or discussed in this report, the literature has clearly 
identified that globalisation and supply chain strategies such as single sourcing, and 
‘lean’ manufacture have increased supply chain risk, thus making them a lot more 
vulnerable to disruptions.
Additionally, if one considers that vulnerabilities cause disruptions, then one is open to 
think of other ways in which supply chains are vulnerable to disruptions. This can be 
through new product innovations, operation or process problems, or increased 
competition. However, the focus and thrust of this dissertation has been towards what 
has been coined ‘disruptive events’ due to low probability/high impact events, where 
events such as operational problems and new product innovations may not be easily 
categorised.
8.2.5 How were risk and vulnerability managed before the emergence of lean 
strategies and such other strategies?
In retrospect, this is a very ‘weighty’ question as it does not distinguish between risks 
internal and external to the organisation and risks internal or external to the supply chain. 
Of course, the issue of the supply chain would not have been as relevant before as this 
area is relatively new with increasing emphasis over the last 20 years. However, there are 
two elements which exist when considering the question.
Firstly, the area of risk and operational risk, though not defined in this report has a well 
established history and thus, these were the techniques applied to managing risk previous 
to this era. This has led many authors to comment that the traditional risk management 
framework and models were no longer applicable in dealing with the evolving supply 
chain risk (refer to section 2.5.3). Additionally, as identified in section 2.4, Crisis 
Management, Contingency Planning and Disaster Preparedness techniques were used to 
manage risks that were external to the organisation.
100
Secondly, the original question of ‘How were risk and vulnerability managed before the 
emergence of lean strategies and such other strategies?’ seems to imply that lean 
manufacture in a sense solely brought about this new type of risk and vulnerability. This 
is not entirely correct. The way the world does business has significantly changed, with 
globalisation, increased networked organisations and, yes, supply chain strategies as well. 
Thus disruptive events will have more of a profound effect now than they would have had 
in the past, since more organisations are networked. But two things have also changed. 
Firstly, the threat of natural disasters has increased due to changing weather patterns 
(Herbane et al 2004) and the changing landscape of the world. Secondly, there has been 
an increase in terrorist activity, especially in places such as the US and the UK. To 
compound the issue, in the event of such threats, governments impose restrictions on air 
travel and the like, which then severely cripples the movement of goods. All of these 
issues together make managing supply chain risk and vulnerability much more difficult in 
this era and thus cannot be compared with previous eras.
8.2.6 What are resilience considerations for the inbound and outbound aspects of 
the supply chain?
A clear distinction between the various effects of disruptions to the inbound and 
outbound aspects of the supply chain was not established. The review process has 
highlighted that no clear distinction exists between supply chain inbound and outbound 
resilience strategies. Section 5.4 however, does mention that Tomlin recommended some 
mitigation and contingency tactics for the supply side while Tang provided two major 
classifications of the supply management issues of supplier selection and relationships, 
supply planning, transportation and logistics and the demand management issues which 
included demand planning, product line planning, promotion planning etc. However, 
following this, the nine suggested robust strategies suggested by Tang did not 
differentiate between the inbound and outbound aspect of the supply chain.
8.3 Research Reflections
No project would be complete without a critique of the process and an identification of 
what could have been done differently were this to be redone. This is what this section 
sets out to identify, limitations and thus potential areas of improvement in the report.
With respect to the process there are some specific areas that needed augmenting:
• Though the well known databases such as Proquest and EBSCO were used it
would have been good to include a search of other databases such as Scopus.
• With respect to working papers it would may have been beneficial to be able to
refer to other databases such as that provided by the Judge Business School
Library which source working papers from academic institutions around the 
world.
• It was unfortunate that it was not possibly to liaise with practitioners as had 
originally been intended. It is believed that their comments would have most 
certainly enhanced the outcomes of the report.
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• In the case of the descriptive analysis it would have been good to be able to 
provide a thematic representation of the papers chosen as the key papers to show 
which themes took precedence in which year.
With increased understanding there are various aspects that are now better understood 
and could be further pursued:
• I would specifically try to distinguish between demand side and supply side 
resilient strategies. Tang (2006) and to a lesser extent Tomlin (2006) did attempt 
to do this
• I think great scope exist for trying to understand supply chain risk management 
which was not fully understood and appreciated in the outset of this review and 
were this paper to be redone, this would take a more central place in the analysis
• The author is of the opinion that disruption risk management still needs more 
definition. Other themes that emanated from the research included terrorism and 
security, business continuity, disruption risk management and supply chain risk 
management. The author now considers these as overlapping areas, but yet 
distinct areas of research and thus, it was felt that justice was not done to these 
areas through the course of the review. Only one paper makes specific reference 
to the term Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) and thus it is believed that this area 
requires more synthesis and understanding.
• The author has identified some ambiguity in her own understanding of 
vulnerability. Though this is considered important in understanding resilience it 
is felt that more could have been done to integrate vulnerability in the synthesis of 
the review.
8.4 Further Research
This area is rich with possibilities that can either generate several interesting PhDs or 
opportunities for further research. It is a shame to have to take only one idea further. 
However, the ideas and questions that the author considers interesting and hence would 
like to take forward to the next stage of the PhD are presented below.
1. How to create a business case to implement a supply chain resilient strategy in an 
organisation?: the strategic and business template for supply chain resilience.
The possibility exist to do achieve this through the case study approach
2. How do companies decide on which strategies will provide them with a flexible 
supply chain? To what extent does the company apply flexible and agile strategies 
to ensure the resilience of the organisation and the supply chain? What are the 
tensions in resource allocations towards establishing and implementing a resilient 
strategy?
A framework for determining the best flexible strategies to be implemented in the 
organisation can be developed.
This question lends itself to a one or three case study analysis approach
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3. A comparative study: What were the response mechanisms that helped companies 
and supply chains through disastrous effects such as the Kobe earthquake (1995), 
the Quebec storm (1998) or SARS (2003)? How can the knowledge gained be 
used to plan for supply chain disruptions such as further natural disasters or other 
pandemics?
A combined methodological approach can be used by the way of the case study 
analysis and a quantitative analysis approach.
4. Are there levels of resilience, i.e. is there a micro or operational level resilience or 
a macro, environmental level of resilience (disruptive resilience)? If this does 
exist how can they be defined and applied to organisations? Can a company be 
micro level resilient and not macro level resilient and vice versa? If there is a 
macro level or disruptive resilience how fundamentally different is this from 
business continuity planning?
Again this lends to the single case study approach. The findings or conceptual 
framework that would be developed can then be applied and tested across other 
companies to determine its validity.
5. What are the most effective demand side disruption management and resilient 
strategies? An empirical study.
Given the information and understanding thus far of supply chain resilience a 
conceptual framework can be developed and tested quantitatively to determine the 
best demand side disruption management and resilient strategies.
6. Is resilience measurable? How is resilience measured? Is resilience static or 
changing? Can a company move in and out of being resilient?
The preference would be to perform a quantitative method of data gathering and 
analysis.
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Appendix 1: Pre-Crisis Planning Process
Pre-Crisis Planning Process developed by Perry and Lindell (2003). Taken from 
McConnell & Drennan (2006).
The Process should:
1. Be based on accurate knowledge of threats and likely human responses
2. Encourage appropriate action by crisis managers
3. Encourage flexibility in responses
4. Promote inter-organisational coordination
5. Integrate plan for each hazard into a multi-hazard approach
6. Involve the training of relevant personnel
7. Provide for testing through drills and exercise
8. Be adaptable through an ongoing process adjustment to new circumstances
9. Be a strong advocate in the face of inevitable resistance to resources commitments 
for low probability events
10. Recognise the differences between crisis planning (preparedness) and crisis 
management (implementation and performance)
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Appendix 2: Break down of search results
These tables give the details of the search over various databases. Duplicates have not 
been accounted for, and thus the numbers do represent papers that have been duplicated.
Resilience
1. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) and ((Resili* OR robust OR reliable OR (ultra reliable) OR flexib*))
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 1026 1007 19 1.85
EBSCO 1401 1366 41 2.9
Science Direct 571 550 21 3.67
Google
Scholar
14 13 1 7.14
2. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) AND ((Lean AND (thinking OR manufactur* OR produc*)) OR (just-in-time 
OR JIT) OR (Toyota production system OR TPS) AND (Resili* OR robust OR reliable) 
OR (ultra reliable) OR flexib*)
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 41 35 6 14.63
EBSCO 47 44 3 6.38
Science Direct 729 710 19 2.60
Google
Scholar
2 2 0 0
3. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) AND ((single AND (sourc* OR supply)) AND (Resili* OR robust OR reliable 
OR (ultra reliable) OR flexib*))
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 34 32 2 5.88
EBSCO 53 52 1 1.88
Science Direct 3731 3700 31 0.83
Google
Scholar
7 6 1 14.29
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Vulnerability
4. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production)) AND (Chain or 
network) AND (Vulnerab* OR risk OR exposure OR uncertain*)
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 922 895 27 2.93
EBSCO 1485 1402 83 5.59
Science Direct 1502** 1467 35 2.33
Google
Scholar
22 22 0 0
** Search done on titles only as the advanced search produced over 5( 
the title, abstract and keyword search produced over 10 000 hits
3 000 articles and
5. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) AND ((Lean AND (thinking OR manufactur* OR produc*)) OR (just-in-time 
OR JIT) OR (Toyota production system OR TPS)) AND ((Vulnerab* OR risk OR 
exposure OR uncertain*))
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 8 7 1 12.50
EBSCO 34 28 6 17.64
Science Direct 5* 3 2 40.00
Google
Scholar
0 0 0 0
* Search done on titles, abstracts and keywords as the advanced searc 
approximately 5 000 articles
i produced
6. (Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network) AND (single AND (sourc* OR supply)) AND (Vulnerab* OR risk OR exposure 
OR uncertain*) _______________________________________ _
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (% )
ProQuest 52 49 3 5.77
EBSCO 50 43 7 14.00
Science Direct 27 *** 22 5 18.52
Google
Scholar
21 20 1 4.76
*** Search done on titles, abstracts and keywords as the advanced search produced 
approximately 10 000 articles
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Disaster Management
7. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) AND ((Disaster OR crisis OR event OR catastrophe OR emergency)) AND 
(preparedness OR management OR planning OR study)
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (%)
ProQuest 300 283 17 5.67
EBSCO 425 408 17 4.00
Science Direct 424 *** 416 8 1.92
Google
Scholar
101, 000 - 8 -
*** Search done on titles, abstracts and keywords as the advanced search produced 
approximately 10 000 articles
Contingency Planning
8. ((Supply OR demand OR Logistics OR Distribution OR Production) AND (Chain or 
network)) AND (Contingency planning) OR (risk AND (mitigation OR avoidance OR 
removal))
Database Initial Search Rejected Accepted Acceptance 
Rate (% )
ProQuest 39 20 19 48.71
EBSCO 499 453 46 9.21
Science Direct 13 2 13.33
Google
Scholar
7060 - 12 “
*** Search done on titles, abstracts and keywords as the advanced search produced over 
10 000 articles
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Appendix 4: Methodological Diary 
7“ July 2006
I have just printed some sample dissertations to guide me through this process. I have 
also formulated some mind maps on what the key processes are to complete the 
systematic review and what the key components of the report are.
From reading the dissertations I realise that it is important that I record all that is done 
throughout the process, so all the finds and hits need to be recorded. The methodology 
has been emphasised as being key to producing a good quality review.
I have also decided to do the methodological diary to record the stages of the research 
and the progress of thinking and ideas.
S'* July 2006
I have just completed the mind map of the timeframe to complete the dissertation project.
I need to revisit the keywords and search strings that were developed at the MRes stage. 
I still am not satisfied with them and thus will refine them even further. However, I have 
used some of the keywords and have identified an overwhelming number of articles. I 
then need to redefine the keywords to find a manageable number of articles that are 
precise and insightful.
l(fh July 2006
I met with my supervisor Professor Richard Wilding. I did not have anything to report at 
the moment except that I have started the process.
I have decided that the Scoping aspects of the research should include:
• Foundation elements or antecedents of business continuity
• A discussion on disruptions categories, i.e. whether they are internal, accidents,
disasters OR low probability/high impact grouping/framework OR disruption
types or impact (failure mode). I intend to choose an angle to describe the ‘best’ 
way to consider a disruption
• What the main risks or vulnerabilities for the inbound, outbound and internal 
aspects of the company are
For the Systematic Review aspect I want to present/discuss
• The definition of resilient supply chain, global supply chain and vulnerability
• How to create a resilient SC
• The framework for resilience
• Supply chain strategies -  e.g. single sourcing etc, and the effect they have on 
increasing supply chain vulnerability
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I have categorised key words into what I consider to belong/contribute to the Scoping 
Study and the Systematic Review
i f  July 2006
I have just revisited the search strings, have tested them and am using them to perform 
the search on ProQuest, EBSCO and other sites
i f  July 2006
I have completed the elimination of approximately 100+ articles based on:
• Being in e-business,
• Being focussed on regular or traditional SC problems
• Describing SC frameworks and their application which is not the focus of my 
research
• Emphasising buyer-supplier relationship
However, the readings have emphasised the importance of agility in creating a flexible 
supply chain. Flexibility lends to resilience.
The second elimination phase to begin where I will be applying (lightly) the quality 
criteria
20th -  22nd July 2006
From the readings it seems that supply chain flexibility is also achieved through 
focussing on SC agility.
Given the present climate there are a few articles on security and terrorism. I am yet to 
decide if I will include this in the report since they may include looking at supply chain 
security, which, in itself, is a huge topic.
24th July 2006
Have applied the quality criteria to 100+ articles and have identified 47 as being core to 
the research.
25th July 2006
I have completed the key article searches and compiled the core list, reference list and 
rejected list. I have sent the core list to the panel members and am awaiting feedback.
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26"' July 2006
I have started reading the literature and have realised, or rather, further appreciated, that
Resilience can be referred to as effective emergency response strategies which to react 
and recover from inevitable supply chain disruptions (Hale, & Moberg 2005)
I have not considered the use of sites to store documents and equipment in case of a 
disruption, though, thinking about it, this was part of the risk management strategy used 
by my employing company in Trinidad.
There has been insufficient work in Logistics and hence in supply chains, about business 
continuity and resilience, therefore the focus of the research has to encompass disaster 
preparedness.
The disruption profile can be used to understand how to plan for resilience (Sheffi, & 
Rice Jr, 2005). Companies need to understand how they are vulnerable and why they are 
vulnerable.
Supply Chain Risk Management should contain these four elements (Cavinato 2004) - 4
external events can be divided into four categories to include non-terrorist activities such 
as strikes
Drivers Source
Mitigation Consequence
Requires
Gave more 
information on 
creating resilient 
supply chains
increased
understanding
Source: Cavinato 2004
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The disaster recovery process can include:
Feedback Execute
Adapted from de Tura et al 2004 
I have read that:
• The passive acceptance of disruptions is sometimes appropriate, as mitigation and 
contingency strategies are not free (Tomlin 2006)!
• The effect of the risk varies between SMEs and large companies due to their size 
and resource capability (Milgate 2000)
• That Finch (Milgate 2000) has categorised the possibility of risk to the
o Application level -  floods etc 
o The organisational level -  intellectual property 
o Inter-organisational level -  strategic alliances
• That resilience and security are not the same thing though there may be responses 
to address the both, (Rice & Caniato 2003) e.g.
o Business continuity planning 
o Designing systems to ‘fail smartly’ 
o Using layers to provide backups 
o Aggressively training people
• Risk operates at many different levels (Cranfield CLSM 2003)
• Risk management & risk management in supply chains are two different things 
(Cranfield CLSM 2003)
• There is a general upsurge in interest in risk management, public policy 
management, corporate governance, business continuity, emergency planning and 
national security which are influencing or affecting the drive for supply chain 
resilience (Peck 2006)
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2S"‘ July 2006
This seems to come to me as ‘new’ revelations although I have said this numerous times. 
To answer the question ‘What makes supply chains resilient?’ you not only need to 
consider flexibility and agility, but you also need to consider and understand what are the 
risks involved and what makes the supply chain vulnerable.
3tfh July 2006
I have started the task of writing the Findings part of the report.
I have also decided to include Supply Chain Security in the research, given the 
importance of it in today’s environment.
31st July 2006
I think that a key point is identifying or defining what is a ‘disruption’. I had considered 
that disruptions were due to natural disasters, acts of terrorism or accidents. However, 
disruptions can also be due to New Product Innovations, Operational Issues, Change in 
Demand and Competition. Thus, disruptive events can be anything that leads to the 
supply chain not being able to produce the product on time, to specification and quality to 
fulfill customer demand. I then need to specify the type of disruption, i.e. whether they 
are low probability, high impact events etc, that I am interested in.
Rice (2003) has suggested that it may be wise to focus strategy on the type of failure 
mode. This now makes sense given the extent of disruptions that the supply chain is 
opened to.
I have been reading Hallikas et al and Sheffi and Rice and think that whether within a risk 
framework (Hallikas et al 2004) or vulnerability framework (Sheffi & Rice 2005), the 
idea then is to take the risks identified, and place each in the framework. This can then 
be used to form the vulnerability in map (Sheffi & Rice 2005) or a risk map (Hallikas et 
al 2004) to understand the company’s risk profile.
I have been reading Sheffi and Rice and now think that in understanding the risk profile 
you can then use the vulnerability map that categorises the relative likelihood of potential 
threats to an organisation and a company’s relative resilience to these disruptions. This 
helps in the prioritising and planning. (Sheffi & Rice 2005)
NVivo would have come in very handy here to synthesise the information being found. 
However, it is late to start coding papers now. Therefore, I have decided to use mind 
maps to synthesize the information and build a picture/framework of thoughts, 
definitions, findings etc., and to develop my own understanding and conclusions as I 
work.
I have started working with the concept of what makes a resilient supply chain. I have 
identified some differences in perspective between that held by Sheffi and Christopher &
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Peck., e.g. with respect to redundancy. Culture has been identified as being critical to all 
perspectives on building resilience. Most of the work thus far though has been from 
these two represented institutions and thus I am anxious to find what others are saying.
I have started forming a master mind-map to capture the varying perspectives on creating 
a resilient supply chain.
1st August 2006
I have started compiling the flexibility mind-map and comparing and analysing the 
findings.
With regards to the flexibility perspective I am yet to find someone who says something 
different to Christopher and Sheffi. However, there are various frameworks that can be 
used to obtain flexibility. The best suited thus far is the one recommended by Duclos et 
al (2001, 2003) as they encompass most of the components as described by Sheffi and 
Christopher and Peck.
2nd August 2006
I have decided not to go in depth into terrorism and security in the supply chain as this 
will be very much involved and beyond the scope of this paper. However, according to 
MIT there exists an overlap in the techniques used to produce a resilient and a secure 
supply chain. This information I will discuss.
I have made countless mind-maps to this date! I have also started making the Master 
mind-map for vulnerability. Once this information has been assimilated and written up, I 
will do one to help me understand the many dimensions, meanings and evolutions in risk 
management and supply chain risk management.
3rd August 2006
It is very difficult to decide whether this report should include a full aspect on terrorism 
or not, however, if we are examining how to make supply chains resilient in the face of 
disruptive events, then we must include how to make them resilient in the face of terrorist 
attacks because they can and will occur at some point in the future and companies have 
had to change the way they do business due to this fact.
The fact is that businesses have to continue to live in the aftermath of terrorist attacks 
which however, have led them to work in a heightened state of security.
136
S,h -  f '  August 2006
I have just completed reading some new information that will form the basis for the 
Scoping study which I expect to include as description of the problem and areas of risk 
management, crisis management, business continuity and supply chain management.
7th August 2006
I have a problem defining or distinguishing between developing a resilient supply chain 
through implementing agile and flexible systems .... Or rather, understanding if this is 
indeed business continuity!
I was unsure as to whether agility leads to flexibility or flexibility leads to agility, but I 
have since concluded that agility leads to flexibility. Can the theory or perspective of 
lean & agile or leagile systems be used in creating a resilient supply chains as agility 
leads to flexibility?
Business Continuity Planning is at the heart of making supply chains resilient and 
flexible?! Then how is BCP linked with DRM?!
What is supply risk management?
8th August 2006
Leagile Systems may not in themselves be used to increase supply chain resilience 
because, as described earlier, the supply chain is concerned with two types of agility, 
agility on the customer side and agility due to disruptions. However, some of the 
concepts, such as postponement, can be used to help or prepare a company to bounce 
back from a disruption.
I think that further investigation of leagile systems needed to look at how it can be used to 
increase supply chain resilience in the event of disruptive events.
Additionally, what has been identified as being necessary to develop a resilient system 
such as people leadership, team work, communication, training, making problems visible 
were at least partly encapsulated in the ‘complete’ and true Toyota Production/lean 
System (Likert & Morgan 2006) So is it that people wrongly or incompletely used TPS, 
only focusing on JIT processes?
9th August 2006
I met with Professor Martin Christopher. An idea for further research was the area of 
business continuity and its link to supply chain resilience, and another was looking at the 
inhibitors and enablers to a resilient system.
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9th and 10th August 2006
I am now working on the methodology and the Descriptive Findings chapters of the 
report. The Descriptive Findings have highlighted that the main source of information is 
the International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. A distant 
second is the Supply Chain Management Review which was one of the journals 
recommended by Professor Christopher. Since the research is still very much in a fluid 
stage it is felt that the Descriptive Findings should be one of the last aspects of the report 
to be concluded where the findings will be a true representation of the papers found and 
used to inform the research.
u"‘ to i f '  August 2006
I have started the full edit of the report. Not a process that fills my heart with joy!!!
13th A ugust 2006
The focus is on the Scoping Study. I am not sure that the report is saying what I want it 
to say at the moment. I have decided to speak on supply chain and supply chain 
management and how the lack of definition of the topic has led to an inability to define 
and therefore mitigate against vulnerabilities. The areas of disaster management, crisis 
management and contingency planning have been discussed, but I am not satisfied with 
them at this moment. I believe that they should be more descriptive, i.e. tell more about 
the development of the fields and how they relate and lead to supply chain management, 
supply chain risk management, supply chain vulnerability and, by extension, resilience.
I now need to work on the area of identifying risk and vulnerabilities in the supply chain. 
15th August 2006
I met with my supervisor, Professor Richard Wilding, who recommended a few key 
points that I want to immediately take on board:
• To read the paper on writing a dissertation or PhD thesis by Chad Perry
• To try and create models to synthesise the information that has been found
• The ability to convert the mind-maps into meaningful narrative
16th August 2006
I have started creating the models to represent the work. I thought that I would synthesise 
resilience and vulnerability through this process. I may consider resilience with a core 
(being culture) with three key dimensions of flexibility, communication, ... and one other 
from strategy or redundancy, or I may have to think of another model. I also want to 
represent the different ways or dimensions of thinking of supply chain vulnerability, i.e. 
whether as a construct, contributors, dimensions etc. This is still to be developed.
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18th August 2006
I have started editing the Introduction and Executive Summary again. They are all still 
too wordy, so I have to figure a way around that.
They may all be ‘risks’, but they may not all be sources of vulnerability! Vulnerability is 
such that it will actually disrupt the business. I had seen this earlier, but I am a little more 
convinced of this now.
19th August 2006
I have started synthesizing the information. I have actually used a flow that I previously 
created to represent DRM. I think I will use this as a springboard to discuss the 
vulnerability and flexibility models. Still want to include one on agility and leagile 
systems.
I have also gone through the aims and objectives of the research to determine if I have 
achieved, or rather, to what extent I have achieved the aims of this research. This is 
discussed in the conclusion. I have also started describing further research that can come 
out of this dissertation.
21st August 2006
I have realised that the main principles or benefits of leagile systems are postponement 
and information decoupling, as well as general decoupling. This is covered in the things 
raised by Christopher, Peck and others, i.e. postponement and visibility or the free flow 
of information to increase resilience.
I now think that to develop a safe system you need to have three elements: resilience, 
business continuity and DRM.
Previously I had not considered DRM to be separate and distinct from creating resilience 
but I now believe that it is. I understand resilience to or as making a system ‘bounce 
back’ from a disruption, while DRM looks at ways of mitigating against disruptions. But 
I think that there is overlap and a company may explore elements of more than one 
concept.
Also, I think that there is a circular relationship with vulnerability, flexibility and agility 
all of which impact on resilience.
23rd -  24“'August 2006
I somewhat changed the model on understanding vulnerability to include the stages of a 
disruption, the sources of vulnerability, the categories of vulnerability and the dimensions 
of vulnerability.
I continue to edit the document (including this section).
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25th August 2006
First draft sent to Supervisor via e-mail as a preparation for the meeting on 31st August. 
31st August 2006
Met with my Supervisor where we discussed or agreed that more work needed to be done 
on the models generated. We also discussed the need to have the report poised in such a 
way that a PhD topic can be developed beyond this stage.
31st August -  1st September 2006
This time was spent pulling together the references for the report.
2nd September 2006
Spent the time developing the future areas of research which can be found in the 
conclusion of the report. I also continued editing the report.
3rd September 2006
Have continued working on the thematic finds and synthesis of the report.
6th September 2006
The concept of SCRM has taken precedence. I am trying to establish or clarify the link 
between DRM, SCRM, BC & Resilience. I now believe that SCRM is the umbrella 
under which DRM and Resilience are contained.
8th -  9th September 2006
I have drawn the three mind maps using the mind mapping programme.
Iff1 -  12th September 2006
Continue to synthesise information and work on the conclusion of the report. I have 
included the limitations of the report in this chapter.
I am also working with explicitly and succinctly stating the links and ambiguity with the 
areas of SCRM, DRM, BC and Resilience.
13"' -  14th September 2006
I have been developing new conceptual models for resilience and for the relationship 
between DRM, Resilience, SCRM and BCP. I have also reworked the questions for 
further research at the PhD stage.
15th September 2006
Mres dissertation was submitted to the Registry.
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Appendix 5: The Scoring System Explained
All the papers were not necessarily rated out of thirty (30). It was preferred that papers 
did include limitations and opportunities for further research, however, if they didn’t this 
did not necessarily work against them. Empirical papers with limitations and future 
research were rated out of thirty, with the decision rule to accept being above 22 points. 
Papers with a score less than 12 were rejected. Empirical papers that did not have 
limitations or future research were rate out of 25. The decision point to accept these 
papers was at 18. Papers below 11 were rejected. Theoretical and conceptual papers 
were not judged for research methodology. Theoretical and conceptual papers with 
limitations or future research were rated out of 25, with the decision point to accept being 
18. Papers that received a rating below 11 were rejected. Theoretical and conceptual 
papers without the limitations and future research were rated out of 20 with the 
acceptance decision point being 14. Papers with less than 7 points were rejected. The 
table below describes how the various scores on the scale were defined
Appraisal tool for the Systematic Review
Elements to consider 1 - Poor 3 - Medium 5 - High
Relevance the work has to 
the field on enquiry
Little relevance to field of 
enquiry
Moderate to field of enquiry Significant relevance to field 
of enquiry
Theoretical and 
conceptual contributions
Inadequate literature review 
and rationale for theoretical 
and conceptual contributions 
poorly established
Adequate review of the 
literature and good discussion 
of theoretical and conceptual 
contributions
Good review of literature 
and excellent discussion of 
theoretical and conceptual 
contributions
The research 
methodology used
Paper does not provide 
sufficient information on 
research methodology
Adequate information of 
research design provided
Full discussion on 
information for research 
design provided
The data analysis process Sufficient information on 
analysis process not provided
Some information on the data 
sample and method and 
rationale for analysis provided
Adequate information on the 
data sample and method and 
rationale for analysis 
provided
Limitation and future 
research.
Paper does not provide 
sufficient information in either 
o f these areas
Paper mentions limitations but 
does not explain relevance to 
understand results. Paper 
mentions further research but 
does not provide sufficient 
links to present research or 
possible impact of future 
research
Paper clearly states 
limitations and implications. 
Future research is well 
defined and links to paper 
and possible impact of future 
research identified
Contribution, originality, 
appropriateness and 
significance
Does not make a significant 
contribution to current 
knowledge.
Contribution to knowledge 
exist, but limited in 
importance, originality and 
significance
Significant contribution to 
current knowledge
Adapted from Marcos (2000)
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